Geopolitics – Dr. Gerrit Kurtz

Statebuilding in Somalia und Somaliland im Angesicht geopolitischer Rivalitäten

Nachdem der Staatsaufbau in Somalia und in Somaliland lange divergierte, hat er sich in den letzten Jahren begonnen anzunähern. Somalia hat die Verfassung überarbeitet und ist auf dem Weg zu direkten Wahlen. Somaliland führt seit Jahrzehnten Wahlen durch und konnte 2025 mit Israel die erste Anerkennung durch einen UN-Mitgliedsstaat erreichen. Die beiden Staatsbildungsprozesse werden von erheblichen Elitenkonflikten begleitet, die durch das Engagement extraregionaler Akteure befördert werden.

In: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 18.August 2026

Bild: A view of Lido beach in Mogadishu, AMISOM

1 Einleitung

Seit dem Sturz des damaligen Präsidenten Siad Barre 1991 und dem folgenden Bürgerkrieg haben Somalia und die sich im gleichen Jahr für unabhängig erklärte Region Somaliland ihre jeweils separaten Erfahrungen gemacht, einen Staat aufzubauen. Beide haben diesbezüglich Fortschritte zu verzeichnen, stoßen mittlerweile jedoch auch auf ähnliche Herausforderungen und Widersprüche.

Somalia ist beim Staatsaufbau sehr stark von internationaler Unterstützung abhängig gewesen, sowohl beim Aufbau legitimer Regierungen, für die Sicherheit angesichts des Konflikts mit Al-Shabaab, als auch für wirtschaftliche Ressourcen und Staatsausgaben. Im Unterschied dazu musste Somaliland ohne internationale Legitimität und mit deutlich weniger externen Ressourcen auskommen, hatte aber auch weniger eigene Sicherheitsprobleme. In beiden Gebieten spielte der Dialog mit einflussreichen Akteuren (insbesondere traditionellen Führungspersonen von Clans sowie den Vertretern somalischer Bundesstaaten) eine wichtige Rolle, der teils in einem Spannungsverhältnis zur Herausbildung einer stärkeren Zentralstaatlichkeit stand. Statebuilding und Friedensbemühungen nahmen teilweise sogar ein antagonistisches Verhältnis zueinander ein (Mushtaq 2018, S. 94).

Somaliland ist es gelungen, mehrfach direkte Mehrparteienwahlen zu organisieren, die zu friedlichen Machtwechseln führten. Umgekehrt beförderten opportunistische Eliten, eine schwache Zentralstaatstradition sowie die Verfügbarkeit von Ressourcen durch rivalisierende externe Akteure interne Machtkämpfe in Somalia. Dort fanden auf nationaler Ebene seit 2012 nur indirekte Wahlen statt, überdies jedes Mal nach einer umstrittenen Verlängerung der Wahlperiode. Die Machtkämpfe sind ebenfalls ein entscheidender Grund für mangelnde Fortschritte im Kampf gegen Al-Shabaab.

In den letzten Jahren haben sich die Statebuilding-Erfahrungen von Somalia und Somaliland jedoch angenähert. Im Dezember 2025 konnten Bürger*innen von Mogadischu an den ersten direkten Kommunalwahlen seit mehr als 50 Jahren teilnehmen. Im März 2026 beschloss das somalische Parlament in Mogadischu, die letzten Änderungen der Verfassung anzunehmen. Damit ging ein 14 Jahre langer Überarbeitungsprozess zu Ende. Auch auf nationaler Ebene sind direkte Wahlen geplant. Allerdings trat die Verlängerung der Legislaturperiode und damit der Amtszeit der aktuellen Regierung von vier auf fünf Jahren mit sofortiger Wirkung in Kraft. Dies traf auf deutliche Ablehnung anderer politischer Eliten in der Opposition, einschließlich in einigen der Bundesstaaten Somalias. Was ein Meilenstein in der staatlichen Entwicklung Somalias sein sollte – die Fertigstellung einer dauerhaften Verfassung – wurde zum Zankapfel politischer Eliten.

In Somaliland gab es 2023 einen bewaffneten Konflikt in der Stadt Las Anod, welchen die Sicherheitskräfte Somalilands verloren. Zwei Jahre später wurde dort der neue Bundesstaat North East ausgerufen, welcher sich Mogadischu zugehörig erklärte. Sowohl in Somalia als auch in Somaliland gibt es autoritäre Tendenzen von Regierungseliten (Elder 2021; Freedom House 2025). Die jeweilige Stärkung des Zentralstaates ging auf Kosten der territorialen Kohärenz der beiden Gebiete. Eine wichtige Rolle spielte dabei auch die Unterstützung rivalisierender externer Akteure. Mogadischu arbeitet insbesondere mit der Türkei, Katar, Saudi-Arabien und Ägypten zusammen, während Somaliland eng mit den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) und Israel kooperiert (Chome 2026). Israel war auch der erste UN-Mitgliedsstaat, der Somaliland im Dezember 2025 als eigenständigen Staat anerkannte.

Im Folgenden werden die unterschiedlichen Statebuilding-Erfahrungen in Somalia und Somaliland betrachtet. Diese erklären auch die jeweilige Herangehensweise an internationale Zusammenarbeit. Die lang andauernde Verfassungsreform in Somalia war ein Machtkampf um die staatliche Organisation. In Somaliland hat die Anerkennungspolitik in den letzten Jahren an Dynamik gewonnen. Transaktional auftretende externe Akteure erleichtern es somalischen Eliten, ihre jeweiligen opportunistischen Ziele zu verfolgen, anstatt sich auf die Verbesserung der Lage der Bevölkerung zu fokussieren.

2 Entwicklung der Staatlichkeit in Somalia

Das überwiegend aride, tiefliegende Gelände, in dem die Somalis leben, hat keine Tradition eines starken Zentralstaats hervorgebracht. Die dominante Lebensform ist nomadischer Pastoralismus auf der Grundlage von Kamelen, die wechselnde Weidegründe brauchen. An diese Lebens- und Wirtschaftsweise angepasst entwickelte sich ein verzweigtes Clansystem als Solidargemeinschaft ohne starke politische Führungspersonen, jedoch mit eigenem Rechtssystem (Lewis 1988).

Dementsprechend war die Vorstellung von Nationalstaaten, wie sie im 19. Jahrhundert in Europa aufkam und über die Kolonialmächte ans Horn von Afrika gebracht wurde, der traditionellen sozialen Organisation von Somalis äußerst fremd. Die Erfahrung der imperialen Fremdherrschaft war dabei durchaus unterschiedlich. Während Italien im Süden und Zentrum Somalias versuchte, einen Zentralstaat aufzubauen, hielten sich die Briten im Norden deutlich stärker zurück und setzten auf die Zusammenarbeit mit traditionellen Eliten. Somalische Eliten grenzten sich auch vom äthiopischen Imperialismus ab, der von einer Tradition sesshafter Landwirtschaft und der solomonischen Monarchie im abessinischen Hochland ausging. Im Unterschied dazu unterhielten somalische Clanvertreter*innen „endless negotiations over how to share the spoils of government between them“ (Clapham 2017, S. 55). 1969 übernahm das Militär die Macht und etablierte die autoritäre Regierung unter Siad Barre, der den Gesamtstaat jedoch hauptsächlich mit Gewalt und Zwang zusammenhielt (sowie externer Unterstützung während des Kalten Krieges). Mit dem Ende der externen Unterstützung und Barres Sturz 1991 brach dieses Kartenhaus zusammen. Ohne staatliche Strukturen stützten sich Somalis auf die beiden Traditionen, die sich gehalten hatten: Clanherrschaft und Islamismus (Abdullahi „Baayadiyow“ 2018, S. 221). Bürgerkrieg, die Herausbildung von Warlords und eine Reihe militärischer Interventionen externer Mächte waren die Folge.

Bemühungen, die politischen Kräfte Somalias zu vereinen, standen den Ambitionen einiger Eliten entgegen, welche diese mit Gewalt verfolgten. Die Gründung von Übergangsregierungen auf internationalen Konferenzen verstärkte die Auseinandersetzung eher, beziehungsweise schuf neue Gelegenheiten, staatliche Positionen und damit Zugang zu Ressourcen zu verteilen (De Waal 2015). In den frühen 2000er-Jahren prägte der US-geführte „Globale Krieg gegen den Terrorismus“ Somalia. Dazu arbeiteten die USA auch mit Milizenführern und Warlords zusammen. Diese waren jedoch nicht im Stande, sich gegen die Islamisten durchzusetzen, welche vielmehr Mogadischu erobern konnten. Dies brachte 2006 wiederum Äthiopien dazu, militärisch zu intervenieren und die Islamisten der „Council of Islamic Courts“ aus der Hauptstadt zu vertreiben (Menkhaus 2007). Allerdings bildete sich aus dem Council of Islamic Courts Al-Shabaab, die sich später mit Al-Qaida verbündeten und heute weite Teile des ländlichen Territoriums im Süden und Zentrum Somalias kontrollieren.

Der somalische Staat ist weitgehend von externen Zuwendungen abhängig – 2025 machten externe Quellen Zweidrittel der staatlichen Einnahmen aus (Federal Government of Somalia 2026). Eigene Einnahmequellen sind beispielsweise Häfen und Flughäfen, an denen Zölle erhoben werden können, welche 2025 etwa 39 % der einheimischen Einnahmen ausmachten. Bundesstaaten (Federal Member States, FMS), die über eigene internationale Häfen verfügen – Jubaland und Puntland – sind deutlich weniger von Zuschüssen aus dem Bundeshaushalt abhängig als der Rest.^{Footnote 1} Das Verhältnis der FMS-Regierungen zur Bundesregierung sollte also auch vor diesem fiskalischen Hintergrund gesehen werden.

3 Erfolge und Grenzen von Staatlichkeit in Somaliland

Somalilands Erfahrung mit dem Wiederaufbau von Staatlichkeit wird oft sehr stark vom Rest Somalias abgegrenzt (Prunier 2026). Dabei sind auch dort Clan-Identität, die Kontrolle von Infrastruktur und der Umgang mit internationalen Akteuren eng miteinander verwoben.

Somaliland entstand im Mai 1991 im Kontext des bereits laufenden Bürgerkrieges zwischen dem Somali National Movement (SNM) und der somalischen Bundesregierung. Die SNM wandte sich gegen übergreifende Kontrolle aus dem Süden. Ende der 1980er-Jahre hatte es massive militärische Schläge der Bundesregierung gegen Städte im Norden gegeben, einschließlich der Bombardierung von Hargeisa. 50.000 bis 100.000 Zivilist*innen sollen bei dieser Militärkampagne getötet worden sein (Gordon 2023). Der Erfolg bewaffneter Gruppen im Süden, Mogadischu zu erobern, erneuerte die Angst vor der Dominanz des Südens. So entschieden die SNM sowie traditionelle Führer, die Union mit Somalia aufzulösen. Somalilands Argument für staatliche Eigenständigkeit besteht bis heute darin, dass das ehemalige britische Schutzgebiet 1960 für fünf Tage unabhängig war (und von den damaligen Großmächten als solches anerkannt wurde), bis es sich mit der ehemaligen italienischen Kolonie zur Republik Somalia zusammenschloss (Bradbury et al. 2003).

Zentral für die Entwicklung einer eigenständigen politischen Identität war die separate staatliche Entwicklung, die Somaliland seit 1991 genommen hat. Diese beruhte auf einem Dialog der wichtigsten Großclans und ihrer traditionellen Führungspersonen in der Region, welche über das Oberhaus (House of Elders oder Guurti) eine eigene Vertretung erhielten. Gerade in den ersten Jahren der Unabhängigkeit waren es diese traditionellen Führungspersonen, welche in internen bewaffneten Konflikten vermittelten und damit quasi-staatliche Aufgaben übernahmen (Bradbury et al. 2003, S. 459). So entstand ein hybrides System, das sehr viel stärker als (später) im Süden auf einer Kombination von traditionellen und modernen Elementen von Herrschaft beruhte. Die ersten Mehrparteienwahlen fanden im Dezember 2002 auf lokaler und im April 2003 auf nationaler Ebene statt. Seitdem hat es mehrere friedliche Machtwechsel gegeben.

Gleichwohl sind etwa im letzten Jahrzehnt zunehmend autoritäre Tendenzen zu beobachten. Somaliland wird von dem Isaaq-Großclan dominiert, demographisch und politisch. Während kleinere Clans sowohl im Osten als auch im Westen die Staatsgründung mittrugen, profitierten sie nur wenig von der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Entwicklung der letzten Jahre (Norman 2023). Das politische Leben konzentriert sich in der Hauptstadt Hargeisa, während der Hafen (und Flughafen) von Berbera eine zentrale wirtschaftliche Rolle spielt. Isaaq-Unternehmer*innen im Zentrum profitierten vom Staat (Elder 2021). Investitionen aus den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten, Großbritannien, der EU und den USA fokussierten sich auf die Entwicklung eines Infrastruktur-Korridors von Berbera bis nach Addis Abeba. Infrastruktur außerhalb von Hargeisa, Berbera und diesem Korridor ist jedoch kaum entwickelt, was zu Unzufriedenheit bei den dortigen Clans führte (Hoehne und Norman 2026, S. 16).

Am deutlichsten wirkte sich diese Entwicklung in der Stadt Las Anod im Osten aus. Ein lokaler Streit führte zu Protesten gegen die Regierung, die Anfang 2023 in einen bewaffneten Konflikt zwischen Sicherheitskräften von Somaliland und lokalen Milizen der Dhulbahante, des dort dominanten Großclans, eskalierten. Erstere beschossen Las Anod zwischenzeitlich mit Artillerie, konnten aber die Stadt nicht zurückerobern und zogen sich nach einem halben Jahr von Kämpfen aus der Region zurück. Die bewaffneten Gruppen (SSC-Khatumo) erklärten daraufhin eine eigene Verwaltung, mit dem Ziel, sich der Republik Somalia anzuschließen (Hoehne und Norman 2026). Die Bundesregierung in Mogadischu witterte eine Chance, das staatliche Projekt der abtrünnigen Region Somaliland zu schwächen und erkannte diese Verwaltung von ihrer Seite aus an. Im August 2025 wurde aus der Region der neue somalische Bundesstaat „North East“, zu dessen feierlicher Gründung im Januar 2026 der somalische Präsident Hassan Sheikh Mohamud anreiste – der erste Besuch eines somalischen Staatsoberhaupts im Norden seit 40 Jahren. In der Folge verlor Hargeisa die Kontrolle über ein knappes Drittel des beanspruchten Territoriums.

4 Die somalische Verfassungsreform

Das aktuelle politische System Somalias basiert auf der vorläufigen Verfassung von 2012, aus der die somalische Bundesregierung (Federal Government of Somalia, FGS) hervorging. Seitdem lief ein Überprüfungsprozess, um sich auf eine dauerhafte Verfassung zu einigen.

Ein zentraler Streitpunkt ist die föderale Organisation Somalias. Während Somaliland sich bereits 1991 abgesondert hatte und Puntland 1998 als autonome Region gegründet wurde, kamen die anderen heutigen FMS erst nach 2012 zustande, basierend auf den Aushandlungsprozessen zwischen den jeweiligen lokalen Machthabern, oft mit externer Unterstützung. Die Grenzen und Kompetenzen der FMS waren dabei umstritten, schufen sie doch jeweils eigene Mehrheitsverhältnisse für die lokalen Clans. Der Wiederaufbau der staatlichen Strukturen, an denen sie grundsätzlich Interesse hatten, wurde von diesen als Nullsummenspiel betrachtet, bei dem Gewinne einzelner Clans oder der Zentralregierung als Beeinträchtigung der eigenen Macht gesehen wurden (Mushtaq 2018, S. 94).

Über die lange Zeit der Staatsbildung nahmen die Clanfamilien eine zentrale Rolle ein. Die „4,5-Formel“ zur Aufteilung staatlicher Positionen und Abgeordneten im Parlament erhärtete die politische Bedeutung der Clans.^{Footnote 2} Die vorläufige Verfassung von 2012 sieht eigentlich direkte Wahlen vor. Wegen der angespannten Sicherheitslage und mangelnder politischer Einigkeit über die Organisation direkter „One Person One Vote“-Wahlen wurde die 4,5-Formel jedoch auch seit 2012 bei indirekten Wahlen angewandt. Dabei nahmen die FMS bei der Besetzung der Wahlgremien eine zunehmend einflussreiche Rolle ein (Rift Valley Institute 2023, S. 9).

Neben der mangelnden Sicherheit (angesichts der Präsenz von Al-Shaabab) sowie geringen Kapazitäten des Staates waren Streitigkeiten innerhalb der politischen Elite dafür verantwortlich, dass keine direkten Wahlen stattfanden. Sowohl 2016 als auch 2020 gab es keine rechtzeitige Einigung über den Wahlprozess, sodass die Legislaturperiode verlängert wurde. Mächtige FMS warfen der Bundesregierung vor, das politische System dominieren zu wollen. Dies war auch bei der Diskussion der Verfassungsänderungen 2023–2026 der Fall. Die Verfassungskommission schlug vor, ein präsidentielles System mit direkt gewähltem Präsidenten einzuführen. Die Zahl der zugelassenen Parteien sollte auf die jeweils zwei stärksten, die aus den Kommunalwahlen hervorgegangen wären, begrenzt werden, gleichwohl es ein Verhältniswahlrecht geben sollte. Im parlamentarischen Verfahren und Verhandlungen mit der Opposition wurden diese Vorschläge jedoch noch stark verändert, sodass der Präsident wie bisher von den Abgeordneten gewählt werden und es keine Begrenzung der politischen Parteien geben sollte (nur eine 10 %-Hürde) (Schmidt 2026). Am 4. März 2026 nahmen Mehrheiten des Unter- und des Oberhauses im Parlament diese Verfassungsänderungen an.

Dennoch wandte sich die somalische Opposition, insbesondere die Präsidenten der Bundesstaaten Puntland und Jubaland sowie ehemalige hochrangige somalische Regierungsmitglieder, gegen die Verfassungsänderungen, insbesondere die Verlängerung der laufenden Wahlperiode.

Puntland hatte sich bereits 2022 aus der weiteren Überarbeitung der Verfassung rausgezogen. Nachdem das Parlament in Mogadischu im März 2024 die ersten vier Kapitel der überarbeiteten Verfassung angenommen hatte (einschließlich Stimmen von Abgeordneten aus Puntland), zog die Regionalregierung des nördlichen Bundesstaats sogar seine Anerkennung der somalischen Bundesregierung zurück. Said Abdullahi Mohamed Deni, der Präsident Puntlands, trat 2022 bei den somalischen Präsidentschaftswahlen an und erklärte bereits 2025 seine erneute Kandidatur (Mustaqbal Media 2025).

Jubaland, ganz im Süden Somalias, zog seine Zusammenarbeit mit der FGS im November 2024 zurück. Vorausgegangen waren von der FGS nicht anerkannte Regionalwahlen, welche die Basis für eine dritte Amtszeit des Präsidenten von Jubaland, Ahmed Mohamed Islam Madobe, schufen. In der Bundesverfassung sind mehr als zwei Amtszeiten nicht vorgesehen. In der Folge kam es zu bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Einheiten der Bundesregierung und der Regionalregierung von Jubaland, aus denen letztere als Sieger hervorgingen. Somalische Truppen mussten über die Grenze nach Kenia fliehen.

Im März 2026 schloss sich South West State der Kritik der anderen beiden Bundesstaaten an den Verfassungsänderungen an und beendete ebenfalls die Zusammenarbeit mit der FGS. In diesem Fall konnte sich Mogadischu jedoch durchsetzen. Die Regierung entzog dem damaligen Präsidenten von South West State, Abdiaziz Mohamed Hassan (Laftagaren), seine Anerkennung und schickte Truppen in die regionale Hauptstadt Baidoa. Laftagaren zog sich zurück. Im Gegensatz zu den Auseinandersetzungen in Jubaland, wo äthiopische Truppen auf Seiten der Regionalregierung eingegriffen hatten, hielten sie sich in South West State zurück.

Die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen in Jubaland und South West State deuten auf ein grundsätzliches Problem hin: Es gibt kein Verfassungsgericht oder sonstige belastbare Institution, welche einen Streit zwischen FMS und FGS entscheiden könnte (SOMLAW 2026). Wenn Verhandlungen scheitern, greifen die Beteiligten regelmäßig zu Gewalt.

5 Somalische Anerkennungspolitik

War die Erlangung völkerrechtlicher Anerkennung ein langgehegtes Ziel von Regierungen in Hargeisa, nahm dieses Vorhaben mit dem Verlust von Las Anod 2023 eine neue Dynamik an (Hoehne und Norman 2026, S. 27). Am 1. Januar 2024 schloss Somaliland ein Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) mit Äthiopien ab. Laut äthiopischer Regierung sollte Äthiopien eine Marinebasis sowie verbesserten maritimen Handelszugang erhalten. Dafür sollte Somaliland Anteile an Ethiopian Airlines bekommen und die äthiopische Regierung versprach, ihre Position gegenüber der Anerkennung Somalilands zu prüfen (ENA English 2024).

Massive Proteste aus Mogadischu folgten. Die somalische Regierung organisierte diplomatischen Widerstand in der Arabischen Liga, intensivierte die Zusammenarbeit mit Ägypten und Eritrea, den wichtigsten regionalen Gegnern Äthiopiens, und drohte, die äthiopischen Truppen in Somalia des Landes zu verweisen. Im November 2024 verlor der somaliländische Präsident Muse Bihi Abdi die Präsidentschaftswahlen. Mitte Dezember 2024 erzielte die Türkei eine Einigung zwischen Abiy Ahmed, dem äthiopischen Ministerpräsidenten, und Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, dem somalischen Präsidenten. Das MoU wurde darin zwar nicht direkt erwähnt, aber die Regierungen verkündeten, auf einen verlässlichen Meereszugang für Äthiopien hinzuarbeiten (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2024). Die Aussicht auf eine baldige äthiopische Anerkennung Somalilands verschwand.

Die neue somaliländische Regierung schaffte es, im Dezember 2025 Israel als ersten UN-Mitgliedsstaat zu gewinnen, der das Gebiet als eigenständigen Staat anerkannte. Für Israel ging es primär um nationale Sicherheitsinteressen. Die Lage von Somaliland am Golf von Aden gegenüber von Jemen ist hierbei zentral. Israel ist mehrfach von den Houthis, die mit Iran in der sogenannten „Achse des Widerstands“ verbündet sind und Teile Jemens kontrollieren, angegriffen worden. Die Houthis beschossen darüber hinaus 2024/25 Handelsschiffe im Roten Meer, die Israel anfuhren und die sie mit Israel verbündeten Staaten zurechneten. Von Somaliland aus kann Israel die Aktivitäten der Houthis leichter überwachen. Für Israel dient das Engagement in Somaliland, das eng mit den VAE zusammenarbeitet, zudem als Gegengewicht zum türkischen Einfluss in der Region (Donelli 2026). Entgegen der somaliländischen Erwartungen hat die israelische Anerkennung jedoch keinen Kaskadeneffekt ausgelöst, bei dem andere Regierungen nachgezogen hätten. Neben Äthiopien und den VAE hat Somaliland insbesondere Aspirationen, die USA und Großbritannien zu diesem Schritt zu bewegen. So gibt es offene Sympathien für die Anerkennung Somalilands bei konservativen Politikern wie dem ehemaligen britischen Verteidigungsminister Gavin Williamson (Duale 2026) oder republikanischen Abgeordneten in den USA. Die jeweiligen Regierungen hielten sich aber bisher zurück. Im UN-Sicherheitsrat verteidigten die USA zwar Israels Anerkennung Somalilands, betonten aber, dass ihre eigene Haltung in der Frage sich nicht geändert habe (UN News 2025).

6 Schlussfolgerungen

Statebuilding in Somalia hängt entscheidend von internationaler Unterstützung ab. Diejenigen FMS bzw. Regionen, die ausländische Investitionen insbesondere in Infrastruktur und den Sicherheitssektor anziehen konnten, können eine unabhängigere Politik gegenüber der Regierung in Mogadischu verfolgen. Dies betrifft Jubaland und Puntland sowie Somaliland. In allen drei Gebieten investierten die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate in dortige Häfen sowie Militärbasen in Berbera, Bosaso und Kismayo. Verschiedene ausländische Trainingsbemühungen der somalischen Streitkräfte bzw. einzelner Spezialkräfte stärkten zwar durchaus die jeweiligen Einheiten im Kampf gegen Al-Shabab, allerdings blieb die Integration dieser Kräfte, die oft ihre Clan-Loyalität behielten, in eine einheitliche Armee eine große Herausforderung (Robinson und Matisek 2021). Eigene Kräfte der FMS zementierten die Fragmentierung. Hinzu kommt, dass Äthiopien und Kenia als wichtigste Nachbarstaaten ein Interesse daran haben, die Bedrohung von Al-Shaabab von ihrem eigenen Territorium fernzuhalten. Dafür halten sie eigene Truppen, sowohl als Teil der Mission der Afrikanischen Union als auch auf bilateraler Basis, in Somalia, die mit FMS wie Jubaland sehr eng zusammenarbeiten. Dieses Engagement läuft somit eher auf Pufferzonen in den jeweiligen Grenzregionen als auf die Stärkung des somalischen Gesamtstaates hinaus.

Insgesamt müssten Bemühungen zum Staatsaufbau nicht im Widerspruch zur somalischen Tradition von Dialog und Konsens stehen. Angesichts der Vielfalt der somalischen Gesellschaft könnte ein demokratisches System mit direkten Wahlen vielmehr Koalitions- und Konsensbildung befördern. Somalilands Erfahrung zeigt, dass traditionelle Elemente mit solchen modernen Institutionen zusammenwirken können. Voraussetzung dafür ist allerdings, dass die beteiligten Eliten tatsächlich die verschiedenen Konzepte miteinander verbinden wollen und nicht opportunistisch auf den jeweils größten Gewinn an Ressourcen und politischen Verbindungen aus sind. Die wachsende Konkurrenz externer Mächte, die Interesse am Horn von Afrika haben, erleichtert jedoch dieses Verhalten.

Notes

Während Hirshabelle 2020 98 % seiner Einnahmen aus Zuwendungen erhielt, waren dies bei Puntland nur 13 % und 43 % bei Jubaland (Davies et al. 2023).
Das 4,5 System wurde erstmals 1997 eingeführt und 2000 reformiert. Indem es sich auf Clans und nicht auf Territorien bezog, sollte es die kriegsbedingte Binnenvertreibung und die Sicherheitslage berücksichtigen. Nach dem System erhalten die vier größten Clanfamilien jeweils die gleiche Anzahl an Sitzen im Parlament, während alle anderen kleineren Clans (die „0,5“) die Hälfte von Sitzen eines Clans erhalten (Rift Valley Institute 2023).

Frieden in der Krise: Konfliktbearbeitung am Horn von Afrika

SWP-Studie 2026/S 10, 08.05.2026, doi:10.18449/2026S10

Das System internationaler Konfliktbearbeitung befindet sich in einer tiefen Krise. Entsprechende Instrumente wie UN-Friedensmissionen werden abgezogen, normative und machtpolitische Voraussetzungen wie eine US-garantierte internationale Ordnung gelten nicht mehr, und bisherige Abkommen haben zu oft eine Vertiefung gewaltsamer autoritärer Systeme statt deren Transformation bewirkt.

Am Horn von Afrika zeigt sich diese Krise besonders deutlich. Stabilität brachten dort weder international erzwungene Friedensabkommen wie in Südsudan noch solche, die wie in Sudan 2020 praktisch ohne Mediation zwischen bewaffneten Akteuren ausgehandelt wurden. Regierungen wie die äthiopische haben Friedensprozesse vielmehr regelmäßig instrumentalisiert, um die eigene Herrschaft zu sichern.

Jüngere Vermittlungsprozesse sind primär eine Funktion regionaler Rivalitäten und diplomatischer Interessen von beteiligten externen Akteuren, wie in Sudan seit Kriegsbeginn im April 2023. Ist wie hier ausländische Unterstützung verfügbar, haben Konfliktparteien weniger Anreize, sich auf Kompromisse einzulassen.

Weil Mechanismen zur Umsetzung von Abkommen nur schwach ausgestattet sind und politisch wenig unterstützt werden, gibt es nach Waffenstillständen keinen inklusiven politischen Prozess, um die Konfliktursachen anzugehen. Erneute Waffengänge sind früher oder später die Folge.

Für europäische Beiträge zur Konfliktbewältigung am Horn von Afrika sollten Lehren aus dieser Krise gezogen werden. Es gilt weder nostalgisch auf die weitgehend untergegangene Art der Konfliktbearbeitung zu blicken noch frustriert rein sicherheitsdominierten Ansätzen zu folgen. Vielmehr sollte Europa zivile Friedensinitiativen unterstützen, politische Gewaltökonomien auszutrocknen helfen und die eigene Zusammenarbeit mit konfliktverschärfenden Regierungen wie den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) überdenken.

Volle Publikation

The Destabilising Role of the United Arab Emirates in African Conflicts

SWP Comment 2026/C 19, 13.05.2026 (with Wolfram Lacher and Stephan Roll)

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has become one of the most aggressive external actors in African conflicts, from Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia to Sudan. The leadership in Abu Dhabi obstinately denies its support for belligerents, yet it has maintained it even during the US-Israeli war against Iran – despite the serious repercussions for the UAE. Its role impedes efforts at conflict resolution and exacerbates humanitarian crises and regional instability. It undermines Europe’s interest in reliable trade routes, the prevention of forced displacement and regional integration. Germany and its European partners should accord much greater weight to the UAE’s destabilising actions in their bilateral relations, criticise them more explicitly and consider sanctions. The context of the war with Iran, as well as tensions between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, offers an opening for a change in policy in Abu Dhabi.

The Iran war has eclipsed a development that had attracted increasing attention among the European public in late 2025: the role of the UAE in African conflicts, particularly in light of the devastating humanitarian consequences of the ongoing war in Sudan. This war reached a new peak in October 2025, when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) captured the city of El-Fasher in North Darfur and subsequently committed massacres leading to an estimated tens of thousands of deaths. The UAE is regarded as the RSF’s most important military, logistical and financial backer. Even after the start of the war with Iran, numerous suspicious cargo flights departed from the Emirates to Ethiopia, apparently to transport supplies across the border to the RSF. The UAE’s involvement in African conflicts, however, extends far beyond Sudan. As early as 2014, it supported Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in the Libyan civil war, including during their offensive against the internationally recognised government in Tripoli in 2019–20. In Ethiopia, the government of Abiy Ahmed relied on drones from the UAE to repel an offensive by Tigrayan rebels in autumn 2021. A hallmark of Emirati interventions is the reluctance to deploy its own military forces. Instead, it exerts its influence mainly through local partners, many of them quasi-state or non-state armed groups.

Support for disruptive actors

The UAE’s allies include Haftar’s LAAF in Libya, the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) in Sudan, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) as well as the police and military forces of Somaliland in northern Somalia. According to numerous reports, the UAE supplies these groups, as well as the Ethiopian government, with weapons systems that are often decisive to the course of wars, such as advanced long-range drones. The UAE has also carried out its own air strikes against the government in Tripoli and in the Somali region of Puntland, where it attacked a cell of the so-called Islamic State.

Three of the UAE’s local partners – the LAAF, the RSF and the PMPF – have tense or even hostile relations with their respective central governments. They originate from para-state militias and control their own territory. Support for the Ethiopian government, particularly during the war in the country’s north in 2020–22, departs from this pattern, as in that case the Emirates strengthened the internationally recognised government against the Tigray Defense Forces (TDF). Nevertheless, all of these actors – and the UAE itself – are pursuing a disruptive agenda with regard to their political systems and aiming to shift the local balance of power.

The UAE’s toolkit also includes recruiting foreign fighters and mercenaries, transporting them to battlefields or deploying them for logistical support. As early as 2010, the UAE deployed a South African-run private military company to establish the PMPF in Somalia, allegedly for combating piracy. It later paid Sudanese mercenaries who fought on Haftar’s side in Tripoli. And in Sudan, the Emirati security firm Global Security Services Group organised the recruitment, transport and payment of several hundred Colombian mercenaries, including via a military base in the Emirates. When the US government imposed sanctions on the actors involved in 2025 (with the exception of the aforementioned Emirati security firm in question), it stated that these men had reinforced the RSF with “tactical and technical expertise, served as infantry and artillery personnel, as drone pilots, vehicle operators and instructors, some of whom even trained children for combat”.

Emirati activities in these conflict zones do not occur in isolation, but form part of a transnational network established by the UAE. Supplies to the RSF were routed, among other places, via LAAF-controlled areas of Libya (above all Kufra in the south), via N’Djamena and Amdjarass in Chad, and in some cases via stopovers in Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Bosaso in Puntland served as a base for supporting the PMPF, but also for transporting weapons from Yemen and Colombian mercenaries for the RSF. The UAE continually adapts these routes to respond to changes in the military situation or the positions of local rulers. To gain influence in the countries that form part of this logistical network, it deploys large sums of money. For instance, during a visit in June 2023, the UAE promised Chadian President Idriss Déby a loan of US$1.5 billion. Emirati loans also helped the governments in Ethiopia and Kenya to overcome short-term financial difficulties. At the same time, the UAE profits from the export and smuggling of gold from conflict zones such as Sudan.

The Emirates denies most of these activities, particularly direct military support for parties to the conflict such as the RSF. After a 2024 report by the United Nations (UN) panel of experts referred to “credible” evidence of Emirati support for the RSF, there was no mention of this in the subsequent report, though it did appear in the leaked draft of that same report. The UAE points to the published, apparently amended version as proof of its alleged non-interference and even calls for a UN arms embargo for the whole of Sudan, whereas at present it applies only to Darfur.

The UAE has gone to considerable lengths to avoid international criticism. For instance, Emirati Minister of State Lana Nusseibeh spent four days in Brussels in November 2025 to meet with Members of the European Parliament. In the Parliament’s resolution on Sudan, adopted at the same time, the UAE’s support for the RSF is not mentioned, following opposition from the European People’s Party to amendments tabled by left-wing parliamentary groups.

Economy, geopolitics and self-enrichment

The specific interests underlying the UAE’s actions in individual conflicts often remain unclear. Decisions are made within a small circle, with Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Emir of Abu Dhabi and Emirati President, at its centre. Moreover, the threshold for intervention is low, as the UAE until recently bore hardly any political costs for these activities. These interventions do not necessarily follow a coherent overarching strategy. Nevertheless, certain underlying motives can be identified. For instance, the UAE’s security policies are frequently explained by external economic interests. Indeed, in recent years the Emirates has emerged as one of the most important economic partners of numerous African states. The state-owned logistics groups DP World and AD Ports Group, based in Dubai and Abu Dhabi, operate or are developing ports and associated infrastructure in, among other places, Somalia, Senegal, Tanzania, Mozambique, Angola and Egypt. These port projects form part of strategically significant economic corridors designed to transport raw materials such as minerals, agricultural and energy commodities to international markets.

For the UAE, these corridors are essential also because they secure long-term access to strategic resources and trade routes. Such investments reflect an Emirati strategy to diversify the economy away from oil. Military interventions can therefore be understood as a means of safeguarding these economic interests.

However, given the impact of the UAE’s regional policies, this is at best a partial explanation. The UAE’s involvement often contributes to the destabilisation of economic spaces, suggesting additional motives that are not primarily economic. Foremost among these is the Emirates’ ambition to gain greater influence in the region and, with it, greater international significance. The primary aim is to hold its own against significantly stronger regional powers, such as Iran, but above all against its larger neighbour on the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia. Tensions between the two “brother states”, such as those that escalated in Yemen at the end of 2025, are by no means new. Whereas border disputes and wrangling over competences within the Gulf Cooperation Council used to dominate, the rivalry is now manifested predominantly in competing economic development and regional strategies. Both states are pursuing ambitious plans to establish themselves as central hubs for trade, logistics and investment between Africa, Asia and Europe. Since Riyadh forced Abu Dhabi to withdraw from southern Yemen, it has become clear just how serious these tensions are – with acute regional repercussions. Saudi Arabia, like Egypt and Somalia, temporarily closed its airspace to UAE supply missions bound for the RSF. Consequently, Ethiopia gained in importance as a logistical hub for such deliveries. Even the war with Iran, which has severely affected both the UAE and Saudi Arabia, did little to ease bilateral tensions. These tensions were also the reason why the Third International Sudan Conference in Berlin on 15 April 2026 initially failed to produce a joint final declaration. At the end of April 2026, the UAE also announced its withdrawal from the OPEC+ oil cartel, a move likely to further strain its relationship with Saudi Arabia.

The ideological opposition of the ruling Al-Nahyan family in Abu Dhabi to the Muslim Brotherhood also significantly shapes its regional policies. The family seeks to preserve its authoritarian model of rule and opposes Islamist movements that pursue social mobilisation and demand political participation. Abu Dhabi therefore pursues a policy of actively containing such actors, which is reflected in both domestic repression and an interventionist foreign policy. This became particularly evident during the blockade of neighbouring Qatar between 2017 and 2021, which was largely driven by Abu Dhabi. Qatar’s leadership was accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood in the region.

In African conflicts, too, the UAE often supports local actors such as the RSF, which explicitly opposes the Muslim Brotherhood or groups aligned with it. Yet, at times, the Emirates demarcation from other Islamist actors remains blurred. Security alliances are pragmatic in nature and do not necessarily align with the officially stated goals of counter-terrorism.

Finally, personal networks of members of the ruling families in Abu Dhabi and Dubai also play a role. Mansour bin Zayed, for instance, a brother of the President and chairman of the sovereign wealth fund Mubadala, has, according to media and research reports, close ties to local power actors in African conflicts, including Haftar in Libya and Dagalo in Sudan. Trade in and smuggling of gold and other resources provide lucrative sources of revenue for both the RSF and the regular Sudanese military (Sudanese Armed Forces, SAF), as well as for their business partners in the UAE.

Escalation and spread of conflicts

The conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, Libya and Somalia each have their own causes and are not merely proxy wars. Nevertheless, external military and financial support – in this case from the UAE – encourages the conflicting parties to pursue their goals by force. This has consequences: The war in Sudan has created the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, measured by the number of people who, according to the UN, are dependent on humanitarian aid (33.7 million), have been displaced (at times more than 15 million) or are suffering from extreme hunger. The RSF, a partner of the UAE, is responsible for targeted violence against the Sudanese civilian population. This includes sexual violence, hostage-taking, looting, displacement, attacks on medical facilities and mass killings. Much of this violence is directed against members of non-Arab minorities such as the Masalit in West Darfur and the Zaghawa in North Darfur. The city of El-Fasher, which the SAF and its allies controlled until October 2025 as the last provincial capital in Darfur, was besieged by the RSF for a year and a half. During its capture of the city, the RSF proceeded in such an organised manner against the non-Arab civilian population that a UN fact-finding mission described it as having the hallmarks of genocide.

The UAE’s logistical network, established primarily to support the RSF, is helping to link conflicts in various countries more closely. Since autumn 2025, the UAE has set up a training camp for the RSF in Benishangul-Gumuz in western Ethiopia. Military equipment intended for the RSF, some of it apparently arriving via the city of Berbera in Somaliland, also appears to be rerouted via a base of the Ethiopian armed forces. At the same time, the RSF has launched an offensive in the south of Sudan’s Blue Nile state, in which it is apparently also deploying units from South Sudan.

The UAE’s logistical support to the RSF via Chad threatens the fragile balance there. Several ethnic groups in Darfur – and therefore the local parties to the conflict – have close ties to Chad, from where some of the fighters also originate. President Déby at least temporarily allowed the UAE to use the country as a logistical hub to support the RSF. This fuels tensions within the Chadian military elite, since the RSF recruits predominantly from Arab groups and fights against units drawn from the Zaghawa – Déby’s own group. Repeated clashes between the RSF and the Chadian army in the border area suggest that the conflict could escalate.

Libya illustrates the potential long-term consequences for Europe of Emirati interventionism. There, the UAE’s early intervention in support of Haftar was a key reason why his attack on Tripoli in April 2019 turned into a protracted civil war. It lasted for more than a year and resulted in a permanent Turkish and Russian military presence in the country. Whether the UAE financed the involvement of the Russian Wagner Group in this conflict, as the US Defense Intelligence Agency claimed in 2020, remains unclear. What is certain, however, is the UAE’s close cooperation with Wagner during the war: Wagner’s logistics relied in part on transport flights from the UAE, the UAE deployed Pantsir air defence systems that were operated by Wagner personnel, and the latter provided target coordinates for Emirati drones. The Emirates therefore shares some of the responsibility for the now entrenched Russian military presence in Libya, and thus for the country’s ongoing division.

The humanitarian consequences of the conflicts in which the UAE intervenes are far-reaching – although the UAE itself remains largely insulated from them. The massive refugee crisis caused by the war in Sudan weighs particularly heavily on neighbouring states. However, it has also led to a growing number of Sudanese refugees arriving in Europe via the Mediterranean. Among arrivals in Italy, both the number and the proportion of Sudanese nationals doubled between 2024 and 2025, from 3 to 6 per cent. In Greece, Sudanese refugees already constituted the second-largest group in 2025, accounting for more than a fifth of the total.

Undermining international conflict resolution

A consistent pattern emerges not only in the UAE’s interventions, but also in its approach to international conflict resolution. The Emirates participates in diplomatic processes aimed at ending conflicts, but it uses the international stage primarily to present itself as an ostensibly constructive actor.

The most prominent example of such diplomatic manoeuvring is the Quad format (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the United States), which in September 2025 presented joint commitments for a ceasefire in Sudan. These included an end to external support, which, according to US intelligence reporting, the UAE in fact further intensified in 2025. These diplomatic initiatives served more to allow the RSF once again to present itself as a willing partner for a ceasefire while carrying out a massacre.

The UAE also positions itself as a humanitarian donor for Sudan. At a conference organised jointly with the African Union, the regional economic community IGAD and Ethiopia in February 2025, it pledged US$200 million, followed by a further US$500 million at a US conference in 2026. However, it is unclear where these funds are going, as the UAE contributed only around US$33 million to the UN-coordinated plan in 2025. Germany had already witnessed during the Berlin Libya Process (2019–20) how the UAE undermined diplomatic efforts: Despite pledges (together with Russia and Turkey) to cease support for the Libyan parties to the conflict, that support was in fact intensified. Even on the day of the Berlin Libya Conference in January 2020, transport aircraft flew from the Emirates to eastern Libya. Consequently, the war did not end as a result of diplomatic efforts, but because of the military balance of power created by these interventions. Both Libya and, currently, Sudan demonstrate that, without pressure, including the UAE in conflict resolution processes does not produce results.

The UAE’s actions also undermine a key instrument of multilateral conflict resolution: arms embargoes. The UAE’s open disregard for the UN embargo on Libya from 2014 onwards, and particularly during the Tripoli war in 2019–20, likely encouraged states such as Turkey to adopt a similar approach. The same has applied to Sudan since 2023. A report from a UN panel of experts lists 458 flights involving heavy transport aircraft from military airports in the UAE or from the Emirati transhipment hub of Bosaso to eastern Libya between October 2024 and the end of 2025. These included 239 flights to Kufra, a hub for support to the RSF. These shipments likely violated both the UN arms embargo on Libya and that on Darfur. At the same time, it is clear that support for the SAF from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Turkey, Iran and other countries is also fuelling the war.

In both conflicts, Western governments have been conspicuously reluctant to criticise the UAE, which also prevents them from pressing other intervening states more forcefully to comply with the embargoes. To date, no member of the UN Security Council has explicitly addressed the UAE’s support for the RSF in meetings. This leniency towards Emirati interventionism has contributed significantly to the loss of credibility of the sanctions regimes.

Not a constructive partner

This analysis of Emirati interventions in Africa shows that the UAE has not, to date, been a reliable partner for European efforts at conflict prevention and resolution on the continent. Rather, the country acts as a spoiler whose interventions exacerbate local conflict dynamics, entrench war economies and drive state fragmentation. The consequences are not only disastrous for the societies affected, but also impact European interests – ranging from regional stability and migration to safeguarding multilateral order.

This assessment is by no means new. Even so, the UAE has so far not had to reckon with any tangible political consequences from Germany and its European partners for its actions. In the overall balance, other aspects of the bilateral relationship predominate: economic and trade interests; security cooperation, which has taken on even greater significance amid the Iran war; the UAE’s close cooperation with Israel; the strategic goal of preventing the Emirates from drifting further towards China or Russia; and, more recently, cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence.

There is an urgent need for a sober and comprehensive review of relations with the UAE, especially since other aspects have so far been neglected. These include, for instance, the Emirates’ ambivalent to obstructive role in international climate negotiations, its pragmatic to friendly dealings with Russia, as well as its efforts to exert political influence in Europe – including relations with right-wing populist to far-right parties and support for networks spreading disinformation. Emirati foreign policy in Africa is therefore not an isolated shortcoming of an otherwise constructive partner. Rather, it should be understood as the expression of a consistent approach aiming to project power: The UAE promotes disruptive actors and systematically links military support with commercial and ideological interests.

This approach could be intensified further in the future. Following the UAE’s withdrawal of its remaining troops from Yemen at the turn of 2025/26 due to differences with Saudi Arabia, African theatres have become even more strategically important: as hubs along the trade and energy routes through the Red Sea, as locations for port and logistics projects as part of an expansionary foreign trade policy, as gateways to raw materials and as zones of military influence. The fact that logistical support for the RSF in Sudan continued even amid Iranian attacks on the UAE demonstrates the importance the Emirates attaches to this policy. The Emirates’ recently initiated cooperation with Israel in establishing a military presence in Somaliland likewise reflects such ambitions.

At the same time, Abu Dhabi is likely to be far more interested now than before in not jeopardising its good relations with European states. Growing criticism of Emirati policy in Middle Eastern states, tensions with Saudi Arabia, and the economic and security vulnerabilities exposed by the Iran war present an opportunity to exert more effective pressure on the UAE. Specifically, Germany and its European partners have five courses of action available to them in order to encourage a more constructive Emirati regional policy.

First, the reputational dimension should be utilised more effectively towards Abu Dhabi. The UAE attaches great importance to its image as a modern, stable and responsible actor. Addressing its destabilising activities more openly in international forums can generate political pressure. Instead of merely speaking in general terms about external support for conflict actors in Africa, Germany should explicitly mention both the UAE and other states involved, without allowing itself to be drawn into Gulf rivalries. Reputational damage can also have economic consequences, as in the case of the alleged involvement of the former head of DP World in the Epstein network – he resigned following the intervention of a Canadian pension fund.

Second, the EU should expand its financial sanctions and apply them more consistently, particularly where Emirati actors have been documented as violating UN embargoes or supporting belligerents.

Third, Germany’s arms export policy towards the UAE should be fundamentally reviewed. For despite the Emirates’ increased need to protect itself against Iranian attacks, the risk of German arms being transferred or used in third-country conflicts remains real. For instance, the UAE equipped Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli in Libya with Pantsir air defence systems mounted on MAN/Rheinmetall chassis. The French Galix defence system was deployed on UAE armoured vehicles in Sudan.

Fourth, stricter criteria could be applied in the enforcement of anti-money-laundering and transparency rules. European regulation should focus more on the role of Emirati financial centres as hubs for conflict economies, informal capital flows and sanctions evasion. Although the UAE was removed from the Financial Action Task Force’s “grey list” in 2024 following the introduction of anti-money-laundering reforms, civil society organisations and transparency initiatives criticised this decision as premature. They pointed to persistent structural deficits in enforcement, as well as the continued attractiveness of Emirati financial centres for problematic capital flows.

Fifth, diplomatic engagement also needs to be reassessed. The “strategic partnership” that Germany has maintained with the UAE since 2004 suggests a broad alignment of interests. Failing to at least suspend this partnership in light of the UAE’s interventions in conflicts undermines Germany’s stated commitment to reliable, rules-based behaviour. Such a partnership makes sense only if the Emirates demonstrably reorients its policy in Africa towards de-escalation, thereby allowing Abu Dhabi’s considerable financial weight and political networks to be harnessed for constructive conflict resolution.

Dr Gerrit Kurtz is an Associate, Dr Wolfram Lacher a Senior Associate, and Dr Stephan Roll a Senior Fellow in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.

Escalations Risks in the Horn of Africa

Threats from Egypt, Ethiopia, and Somalia Exacerbate Local Conflicts

SWP Comment 2024/C 50, 28.10.2024, together with Stephan Roll and Tobias von Lossow

In recent months, relations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Somalia have deteriorated significantly. Previously separate disputes have become intertwined: namely the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the use of Nile waters and the disagreement between Ethiopia and Somalia regarding the recognition of Somaliland. The three countries use threats to improve their respective positions in these conflicts. While an inter-state military escalation does not seem imminent at present, regional tensions are likely to rise, which could further empower the jihadist Al-Shabaab militia in Somalia. Germany and the European Union (EU) should recognise the highly complex interdependence of these lines of conflict, remind the countries concerned of their common interest in stabilising Somalia, and continue to advocate for dialogue in the Nile dispute. At the same time, it is also important to hold other influential actors more accountable to contribute to regional stability.

The immediate trigger for the current tensions is the supply of weapons from Egypt to Somalia as a result of a security agreement signed by the two countries in August 2024. In addition, there were reports that Egypt, with agreement from Somalia, is planning to send several thousand soldiers to the Horn of Africa to fight Al-Shabaab and replace the Ethiopian troops that have been stationed there thus far as part of the African Union (AU) mission, which expires at the end of this year. In response, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed warned that his country would “humiliate anyone who dares to threaten us”. Apparently as a deterrent, the Ethiopian military deployed heavy weapons at the border with Somalia.

In Somalia, the foreign minister threatened to support armed groups in Ethiopia if Addis Ababa did not stop its steps towards diplomatic recognition of Somaliland. Somalia has received support not only from Egypt, but also from Eritrea: At a tripartite summit in October in Asmara, the presidents of the three countries agreed to intensify their security cooperation. At almost the same time, Egypt lodged a complaint with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), accusing Addis Ababa of jeopardising its water security by commissioning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Ethiopia, in turn, claimed that Egypt had repeatedly threatened it with violence. It is apparent that two central conflicts in the Horn of Africa are becoming increasingly interlinked and are therefore intensifying.

Egypt’s water worries

Egypt’s conduct in the Horn of Africa can also be explained by its long-standing dispute with Ethiopia over the use of the Nile’s water. This past summer, the conflict has once again intensified with the fifth phase of filling the GERD’s reservoir. For Egypt, which meets over 90 per cent of its water needs from the Nile, the construction of the gigantic dam since 2011 at the upper reaches of the Blue Nile poses a significant threat to its own water supply and therefore to national security. For years, Ethiopia has been vigorously pushing ahead with the completion of the dam project, which is intended to significantly contribute to meeting the country’s immense energy needs. In contrast, Egypt insists on its right to veto construction projects on the upper Nile and on a bilaterally agreed water sharing formula with Sudan. Cairo attributes both rights to treaties from the colonial era, which Ethiopia and the other upstream riparians reject as they were not part of these treaties.

Diplomatic efforts to resolve the water dispute, including the GERD negotiations in which external actors such as the United States of America (USA), the AU, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) mediate, have largely stalled. The same applies to cooperation within the framework of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which was established in 1999. In recent years, Cairo’s negotiating position has increasingly deteriorated. On the one hand, construction on the dam is significantly advanced, with the project nearing completion and electricity production already underway. The third and fourth turbines were connected to the grid in August 2024, with the rest of the 13 turbines due to follow in the coming months. On the other hand, Egypt has lost its key ally in the water conflict. Sudan, which long supported Egypt and pursued its own water interests, has effectively withdrawn from the negotiations as an independent actor due to its ongoing civil war. Khartoum also benefits from the GERD, particularly from protection against regular flooding.

In addition, with South Sudan’s ratification in July, the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) came into force in October 2024. This agreement establishes the permanent Nile River Basin Commission (NRBC), which initially includes six upstream riparian states, albeit excluding Egypt and Sudan. Concluding a framework agreement between all 11 riparian states, which sets out the principles, structures, and institutions for joint, basin-wide water management, was one of the main objectives of the NBI. However, since upstream and downstream riparian states failed to agree on such an accord for over ten years, Egypt and Sudan were ultimately left out when the CFA was signed in May 2010 by Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda – followed soon after by Kenya and Burundi. After all signatories except Kenya had ratified the agreement, South Sudan became the sixth state that needed to implement the CFA.

Egypt’s attempts to bolster its negotiating position on the Nile through security agreements with various states in the region, such as South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and Rwanda, have thus far been proven unsuccessful. Even after President Abdelfattah al-Sisi and Prime Minister Abiy agreed at a face-to-face meeting in Cairo in July 2023 to resolve the outstanding issues within four months, no progress was made. As a result, Egypt has started to intervene in the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia to also exert pressure on Addis Ababa.

Ethiopia’s port ambitions

While Ethiopia and Somalia had previously maintained close diplomatic relations for several years, bilateral relations have rapidly gone downhill since the beginning of 2024. The reason? The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by Prime Minister Abiy and President Muse Bihi Abdi of Somaliland in January. The MoU, the text of which has not been published, stipulates that Ethiopia will lease a 20-kilometre coastal strip for 50 years to establish a naval base there. In addition, Ethiopia is to be given economic access to a harbour of the de facto state. In return, Ethiopia promised Somaliland a stake in Ethiopian Airlines and held out the prospect of considering the recognition of Somaliland as an independent state.

To date, no UN member state has recognised Somaliland’s independence, which the autonomous region proclaimed in 1991. Nevertheless, various states maintain primarily economic relations with Somaliland. For example, the UAE has invested several hundreds of million USD in the expansion of the port of Berbera, which is operated by the Emirati company DP World since 2017, as well as in logistical infrastructure with Ethiopia on both sides of the border. At the time, Ethiopia and DP World signed an agreement under which Addis Ababa was to contribute 19 per cent of the port expansion. However, Ethiopia lost this claim in 2022 after the war-torn country failed to provide the promised funds.

With the MoU, Ethiopia is now taking a different approach to achieving its goal of its own access to the sea. Abyi’s government sees this as compensation for a “historical mistake” made by his predecessors when they granted Eritrea independence in 1993 and thus gave up access to the sea. As a result, Ethiopia is now the most populous country without a coastline. Around 95 per cent of all Ethiopian imports and exports currently pass through the port of Djibouti. The annual fees for this are up to around US$1.5 billion, which Ethiopia must pay in scarce foreign currency.

The leadership in Mogadishu firmly rejected the MoU. Somalia views the recognition of Somaliland by Ethiopia, which could be followed by other states, as a violation of its sovereignty. In April 2024, Somalia expelled the Ethiopian ambassador from the country and withdrew its own representative from Addis Ababa. Meanwhile, Ethiopia appointed an ambassador to Somaliland in August 2024.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud successfully sought diplomatic support, both in the region and from international players, including the G7 states. In this context, Somalia and Egypt concluded a security agreement in August 2024. It was on this basis that Egypt delivered weapons to Mogadishu two weeks later.

Risk of war between Egypt and Ethiopia

Military threats from Egypt in its water dispute with Ethiopia are not new. However, a direct Egyptian attack on the GERD construction site was long considered unrealistic due to the limited range of Egypt’s Air Force. Furthermore, Egypt, as a downstream state, would not achieve its main objective through military action, as Ethiopia could then deliberately reduce the Nile water flow at the dam to exert pressure on Egypt. Now that the reservoir is filled, such an attack also harbours unpredictable risks for the water flow of the Nile and would trigger a catastrophic flood in Sudan. Nevertheless, the deployment of Egyptian troops in Somalia could increase the risk of a direct military conflict between the two countries.

Should hostilities actually occur, Cairo would undertake considerable risk. Although the country has by far the largest armed forces in Africa and an extensive arsenal of weapons, this does not necessarily translate into actual military power. For example, the armed forces suffered heavy losses in the fight against insurgent groups in the Sinai Peninsula after 2013. It was only in the past two years that the security situation was gradually brought under control. Despite having troops stationed in Somalia, a military operation outside its own borders would be much more challenging, not least due to the distance, while Ethiopia could act from its own territory. Should armed action by Egypt result in massive losses or even failure, this could lead the Egyptian population to openly question the role of the armed forces in the country’s politics and economy. Civil society is already critical of the army’s preoccupation with managing a vast, inefficient economic empire.

There is also no conceivable international and regional backing for military action. Cairo is heavily dependent on the Gulf States and the USA. The UAE, in particular, has become Egypt’s most important state creditor in recent years. Meanwhile, the USA provides around US$1.3 billion annually in military aid, which makes up an integral part of Egypt’s defence budget. As both countries also maintain close relations with Ethiopia, an Egyptian military move could jeopardize this critical financial support.

Cairo’s actions are therefore unlikely to aim at a direct military confrontation with Addis Ababa. Rather, the threat of escalation is intended to persuade external actors to become more involved in the Nile water dispute on Egypt’s behalf. There has been no such internationalisation of the conflict to date, although Cairo has sought this for years. Above all, Cairo would like to see Ethiopia’s regional opponents strengthened militarily.

In addition to local groups in Somalia and Ethiopia, Cairo is likely to focus on Eritrea. Asmara’s relations with Ethiopia have deteriorated significantly since 2022 when Eritrea fought alongside Ethiopian troops against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea opposes the Pretoria Agreement between the Ethiopian government and the TPLF, which ended that war, as it thwarted Eritrea’s goal of destroying the TPLF once and for all. Border disputes and Ethiopia’s quest for direct access to the sea, possibly again in Eritrea, are further exacerbating tensions. As a result, Asmara has emphatically intensified its relations with Cairo. The summit between Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia in October is a visible sign of that rapprochement. Nevertheless, Eritrea is unlikely to simply become Egypt’s stooge. Instead, it would rather pursue its own interests in the medium term, namely the establishment of a buffer zone on Ethiopian territory. The Ethiopian federal government currently appears to tolerate the presence of Eritrean troops in northern Tigray.

Nevertheless, a direct clash between Egyptian and Ethiopian troops cannot be completely ruled out should Cairo actually station a significant number of soldiers in Somalia. This risk increases all the more if Ethiopia refuses to withdraw its troops from Somalia. Egypt could cite the defence of Somali interests and create a naval blockade of Somaliland, or in the worst-case scenario, attempt to expel Ethiopian troops.

A “game of chicken” between Ethiopia and Somalia

Two factors significantly mitigate the risk of an armed conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia: the military balance of power and shared interest in fighting Al-Shabaab.

While Ethiopia’s army is strongly involved in fighting several insurgencies and weakened by the 2020–22 war in the north of the country, it remains one of the largest military powers in the region. It possesses drones, helicopters, fighter planes, and heavy weaponry, among other equipment. In contrast, the Somali security sector remains a work-in-progress. It is not even able to effectively protect Mogadishu from attacks by Al-Shabaab. The Somali security forces are divided between units under different commands of the federal government, the federal member states, and clan militias that operate incoherently. Despite successes in training some units, the Somali security forces remain heavily dependent on international military and financial support, including from the AU, EU, USA, Turkey, Kenya, and Ethiopia.

Ethiopia and Somalia have long been united in the fight against Al-Shabaab. Addis Ababa wants to contain the jihadist group’s capabilities in its neighbouring country, maintain a buffer zone, and thus prevent it from attacking Ethiopia. In July 2022, hundreds of Al-Shabaab fighters crossed the border and advanced around 150 kilometres into the Ethiopian interior until they were repelled. The invaders are said to have included many Ethiopian nationals from the Somali and Oromia regions.

Due to this threat situation, Ethiopia is currently deploying around 10,000 of its own soldiers in Somalia. Only about a third so far have been part of the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). Addis Ababa has deployed the rest on its own initiative. These troops co-operate closely with those of the respective Somali federal member states and local militias. The Somali federal government had tolerated these troops for years (similar to Kenyan units in the south of Somalia) because they serve to provide security in their areas of operation.

The threatening behaviour of Ethiopia and Somalia reflects this unequal balance of power. Ethiopia is calculating that Somalia cannot afford to expel the Ethiopian troops from the country because they are making a decisive contribution to the fight against Al-Shabaab. In this logic, Somali reactions to the MoU with Somaliland would thus fizzle out. Conversely, the Somali government has now announced that if Ethiopia does not withdraw the MoU then Ethiopian troops need to leave the country by the end of December 2024 when ATMIS ends. Somalia is counting on the fact that Ethiopia cannot afford to withdraw. The question is who will give in first.

Escalation of internal conflicts as the real danger

While direct conventional armed conflict between the states involved is currently rather unlikely, both Ethiopia and Somalia are susceptible to both intentional and unintentional escalations due to their internal divisions.

The biggest risk is that the Ethiopian-Somali disagreements could further boost Al-Shabaab. The group has already been able to benefit from the partial withdrawal of ATMIS because Somali security forces thus far have been unable to fill the gap. In addition, the so-called Islamic State is spreading in Puntland.

It is still unclear what exactly the successor mission to ATMIS, whose mandate expires at the end of December 2024, will look like. In August 2024, the AU Peace and Security Council adopted an operational plan for a new mission under the name AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), which is supposed to replace ATMIS in January 2025. However, it has not yet been clarified which countries will provide troops or how the mission will be financed. Egyptian troops could take the lead, along with a presumably smaller contingent offered by Djibouti. However, it remains to be seen who will provide the rest of the planned 12,000 soldiers (ATMIS currently has around 12,600). More troops from the current contributors, namely Kenya and Uganda, are possible. In principle, AUSSOM is planned to continue for five years, gradually handing over increasing responsibility to the Somali security forces.

If the Ethiopian troops do indeed withdraw and are replaced by Egyptian troops, the latter are likely to have difficulties controlling the security situation, at least during the transition period. The Ethiopian armed forces have built up local networks over more than a decade and have equipped and trained local militias. Egypt would first have to painstakingly establish these contacts. Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab could continue to spread both in Somalia and possibly on the border with Ethiopia. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that weapons destined by Egypt for the Somali government could find their way to Al-Shabaab.

The AU is hoping for funding through a new mechanism created by the UNSC in December 2023. Under this mechanism, 75 per cent of future AU missions could be paid for from UN compulsory contributions. However, this requires approval by the UNSC. The UN and AU are scheduled to present a plan for the design and financing of AUSSOM by mid-November. The decision could come too late to guarantee a seamless transition from the current to the successor mission. For this reason, bridge financing is already being discussed, for which attention focusses on the most important source of funding to date: the EU. However, currently the EU opposes continued funding of an AU deployment.

Another dimension of the conflict is the relationship between the Somali federal government and Somali member states. There have already been several demonstrations in the Somali South-West State calling for the continued presence of Ethiopian troops. The President of the South-West State, Abdiaziz Laftagareen, also spoke out against the deployment of Egyptian troops and in favour of keeping the Ethiopian contingents deployed in his state.

Relations between Mogadishu and the federal member states are already strained. At the end of March, Puntland announced that it would withdraw from the country’s federal system after the federal government had pushed the first chapters of a constitutional reform through parliament. A few days later, Puntland representatives met with an Ethiopian state secretary. Ethiopia could continue to offer an open door to dissatisfied political stakeholders in Somalia in the future and thus influence the political situation there. There have been armed clashes between Somali federal member states and the government in Mogadishu at various times in the past. Somalia’s foreign ministry has already accused Ethiopia of supplying weapons to Puntland.

Conversely, Ethiopia is exposed to the risk that armed groups in the country could be supported from outside. For example, external support for the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia’s Somali State would be conceivable. Although the ONLF declared a ceasefire with the government in 2018, the movement complained in September 2024 about Ethiopian troop deployments, which it saw as a “militarisation” of the state and threat to peace.

Other intervention possibilities exist in Amhara, Oromia, Benishangul-Gumuz (where the GERD is located), and Tigray. In the past, the Ethiopian government has repeatedly accused Egypt of supporting various armed groups in Ethiopia. These include Gumuz militias, which tried to block the main road to the GERD a few years ago, as well as the TPLF during the war in the north.

The currently most active centres of conflict in Ethiopia are the regions of Amhara and parts of Oromia. The Fano militias in Amhara have benefited from past training by Eritrean forces– a support that may still be ongoing. In August 2024, Ethiopian and Kenyan intelligence services reported a cooperation between the Oromo Liberation Army, which is fighting the Ethiopian government, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Policy options for Germany and the EU

Germany and its European partners should take the geopolitical tensions in the Horn of Africa seriously and ensure that they are not exacerbated by one-sided positioning or ill-conceived financial incentives. Although an inter-state war is currently unlikely it cannot be completely ruled out due to misunderstandings, ill-considered missteps, and emotional responses on all sides. In any case, the tensions are making further regional cooperation more difficult at a time when there are already major challenges in the region: the war in Sudan, the Houthis’ attacks on shipping in the Red Sea, and the strengthening of Al-Shabaab and the so-called Islamic State in Somalia.

It is important that Germany and the EU think about the complex conflicts in the region together and not in isolation. Europeans should not allow themselves to be tempted by the power games of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Somalia to support unilateral agendas in the name of dubious promises of stability.

Regarding Somalia, the Europeans should make it clear that transitional financing of AUSSOM from the European Peace Facility must not play to the hands of Egypt’s threat against Ethiopia. A possible compromise could be that if Somalia insists on Egyptian military involvement, such troops could be stationed in Mogadishu to train security forces there, while Ethiopian troops continue to directly support the fight against Al-Shabaab in other states. The EU should continue to reject the unilateral recognition of Somaliland under international law.

In the conflict over the utilisation of the Nile water, Germany and the EU should work to ensure that the NRBC is not exploited by individual riparian states to further weaken Egypt’s position when the CFA will be implemented. The NRBC should only be supported if its activities are truly basin-wide, comply with international legal standards, and thus implicitly protect Egypt’s Nile water interests. The Europeans should also work to maintain the NBI for the exchange of information on Nile water issues between NBRC members and other riparian states or to establish a comparable low-threshold (dialogue) platform that all Nile riparian states can join without obligation.

Finally, Europeans should continue to endeavour to better coordinate their overall engagement in the region. External actors with influence on the concerned governments should also be held accountable to promote conflict resolution approaches. Turkey is already serving as a mediator between Ethiopia and Somalia, albeit so far without success. The UAE has a special role to play: It has strong economic interests in the Horn of Africa, particularly through investments in harbour infrastructure and agriculture, and is one of the most important state creditors. Financial aid and – in the case of Ethiopia – military support have contributed significantly to the consolidation of power of the current political leaderships in Cairo and Addis Ababa and increased their willingness to take foreign policy risks. Nevertheless, the UAE has lacked vision for regional order. Its contribution to constructive conflict resolution remains small – a fact that should be addressed more assertively with Abu Dhabi.