South Sudan – Dr. Gerrit Kurtz

Frieden in der Krise: Konfliktbearbeitung am Horn von Afrika

SWP-Studie 2026/S 10, 08.05.2026, doi:10.18449/2026S10

Das System internationaler Konfliktbearbeitung befindet sich in einer tiefen Krise. Entsprechende Instrumente wie UN-Friedensmissionen werden abgezogen, normative und machtpolitische Voraussetzungen wie eine US-garantierte internationale Ordnung gelten nicht mehr, und bisherige Abkommen haben zu oft eine Vertiefung gewaltsamer autoritärer Systeme statt deren Transformation bewirkt.

Am Horn von Afrika zeigt sich diese Krise besonders deutlich. Stabilität brachten dort weder international erzwungene Friedensabkommen wie in Südsudan noch solche, die wie in Sudan 2020 praktisch ohne Mediation zwischen bewaffneten Akteuren ausgehandelt wurden. Regierungen wie die äthiopische haben Friedensprozesse vielmehr regelmäßig instrumentalisiert, um die eigene Herrschaft zu sichern.

Jüngere Vermittlungsprozesse sind primär eine Funktion regionaler Rivalitäten und diplomatischer Interessen von beteiligten externen Akteuren, wie in Sudan seit Kriegsbeginn im April 2023. Ist wie hier ausländische Unterstützung verfügbar, haben Konfliktparteien weniger Anreize, sich auf Kompromisse einzulassen.

Weil Mechanismen zur Umsetzung von Abkommen nur schwach ausgestattet sind und politisch wenig unterstützt werden, gibt es nach Waffenstillständen keinen inklusiven politischen Prozess, um die Konfliktursachen anzugehen. Erneute Waffengänge sind früher oder später die Folge.

Für europäische Beiträge zur Konfliktbewältigung am Horn von Afrika sollten Lehren aus dieser Krise gezogen werden. Es gilt weder nostalgisch auf die weitgehend untergegangene Art der Konfliktbearbeitung zu blicken noch frustriert rein sicherheitsdominierten Ansätzen zu folgen. Vielmehr sollte Europa zivile Friedensinitiativen unterstützen, politische Gewaltökonomien auszutrocknen helfen und die eigene Zusammenarbeit mit konfliktverschärfenden Regierungen wie den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) überdenken.

Volle Publikation

Eskalation in Südsudan. Hier herrscht ein Krieg mit System

Der Machtkampf im Südsudan spitzt sich zu, treibt das Land knapp anderthalb Jahrzehnte nach der Unabhängigkeit in einen vielschichtigen Bürgerkrieg – und reiht sich ein in das immer komplexere Konfliktfeld am Horn von Afrika.

Erschienen in Zenith Online, 03.02.2026

Südsudan erlebt ein scheinbares Paradox. Einerseits kündigen hochrangige Vertreter von Armee und Opposition Offensiven an und die Kontrolle über Gebiete wechselt. Andererseits bekräftigen sowohl Regierungs- als auch Oppositionsvertreter, dass sie am Friedensabkommen von 2018 festhalten wollen. Südsudans Bürgerkrieg zeigt, wie ein international verhandeltes Abkommen von verschiedenen Konfliktparteien instrumentalisiert wird. Denn Gewalt, oft zulasten der Zivilbevölkerung, ist dem politischen System tief eingeschrieben. Der Krieg in Sudan trägt zur Eskalation bei.

Das »Revitalisierte Abkommen zur Beendigung des Kriegs in der Republik Südsudan« (R-ARCSS) wurde im September 2018 zwischen der Regierung unter der Führung von Präsident Salva Kiir Mayardit und einer Reihe von Oppositionsgruppen geschlossen. Deren wichtigste ist die Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition (SPLM-IO), geführt von Riek Machar Teny. Machar wurde 2020 Erster Vizepräsident als Teil einer Übergangsregierung der nationalen Einheit.

Die Umsetzung von R-ARCSS verlief äußerst schleppend. Nach sechs Jahren war gerade einmal jeder sechste Punkt umgesetzt. Die Übergangszeit wurde mehrfach verlängert – und damit auch die Aussicht auf die ersten Wahlen seit der Unabhängigkeit Südsudans im Juli 2011. Derzeit sind sie für Dezember 2026 angesetzt. Einen Wendepunkt markierte der März vergangenen Jahres. Sicherheitskräfte setzten Machar unter Hausarrest und Kiir schasste seinen Vize. Im September folgte eine Anklage wegen Hochverrats und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit. In dem laufenden Prozess wird Machar vorgeworfen, eine Offensive gegen die Regierungsarmee in Nasir organisiert zu haben.

Die SPLM-IO sah die Verhaftung und Entmachtung Machars als Verletzung des Friedensabkommens, das ihn persönlich als Amtsinhaber nennt. Im September 2025 rief Machars Stellvertreter Oyet Nathaniel Pierino zum Kampf für einen »Regimewandel« in Juba auf, nachdem Präsident Kiir immer mehr SPLM-IO-Mitglieder einseitig ihrer Regierungsposten enthoben hatte.

Bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen laufen mittlerweile in mindestens sechs von Südsudans zehn Bundesstaaten. Beteiligt sind unterschiedliche Konfliktparteien, die längst nicht alle der SPLM-IO angehören. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit erregte eine Offensive der SPLM-IO in Jonglei. Deren Truppen gelang es seit Ende Dezember, mehrere Orte in dem Bundesstaat in der Region Obernil zu erobern. Mehr als 230.000 Menschen flohen aus den betroffenen Gebieten. Im Gegenzug riefen die Streitkräfte des Südsudan (SSPDF) sämtliche Zivilisten, humanitären Organisationen und UN-Mitarbeitenden dazu auf, drei Landkreise in Jonglei umgehend zu verlassen, nämlich Nyirol, Uror und Akobo. Der hochrangige SSPDF-General General Johnson Olony, zugleich Kommandeur der Agwelek-Miliz der Schilluk-Volksgruppe, rief seine Truppen vor der Gegenoffensive dazu auf, niemanden zu verschonen.

Mehrere Runden von Rebellion und Eingliederung später sind beide Seiten erheblich geschwächt, auch im Vergleich zum letzten Bürgerkrieg

Nach internationalen Protesten der Afrikanischen Union, der Vereinten Nationen und weiterer Partner ruderte ein Regierungssprecher zurück, behauptete Olony habe sich versprochen und bezeichnete das Regierungsvorgehen als »Verteidigungsmaßnahme«. »Wir sind nicht im Krieg«, sagte Informationsminister Ateny Wek Ateny und versprach, die SSPDF werde »Zivilisten schützen«. Ein Sprecher der SPLM-IO verwies in ähnlicher Art und Weise darauf, dass die SPLM-IO sich lediglich gegen die Aggression der Regierung verteidige und dass diese Maßnahmen auf dem »Völkerrecht und der Schutzverantwortung gegenüber der Bevölkerung« basierten.

Die Episode wirft ein Licht auf den systemischen Charakter von organisierter Gewalt in Südsudan. Die Regierung hat bereits in den vergangenen Jahren militärische Kampagnen in einzelnen Teilen des Landes durchgeführt. Dazu hat sie entgegen den Vorschriften des Friedensabkommens ethnisch basierte Milizen unterstützt. Die Evakuierungsorder verwischt die Trennung zwischen Zivilisten und Kombattanten, die im humanitären Völkerrecht vorgesehen ist. Immer mehr Gemeinschaften erleben den Staat als Gefahr – und mobilisieren eigene Milizen, um sich zu schützen.

Auf ethnische Zusammengehörigkeit zu setzen, hat es Regierungen seit dem 19. Jahrhundert ermöglicht, die Bevölkerung zu spalten und politisch zu schwächen. Umgekehrt war auch die Rebellion der SPLM gegen den sudanesischen Staat von erheblicher Fragmentierung und Elitenkonkurrenz geprägt – Kiir und Machar waren bereits in den 1990er-Jahren einflussreiche Figuren. Kiir spielte eine zentrale Rolle unter SPLM-Führer John Garang de Mabior. Machar setzte sich 1991 von der SPLM ab und ließ sich von Khartum unterstützen.

Mehrere Runden von Rebellion und Eingliederung später sind beide Seiten erheblich geschwächt, auch im Vergleich zum letzten Bürgerkrieg (2013–18). Die SPLM-IO ist führungslos, da Machar im Hausarrest über keinerlei Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten verfügt. Sie hat seit dem Abkommen wichtige Kommandeure und Kämpfer verloren, die sich abspalteten und später eigene Deals mit der Regierung schlossen. Lokale Milizen wie die sogenannte White Army verfolgen ihre eigenen Ziele, die nicht notwendigerweise deckungsgleich mit jenen der verbliebenen Führungspersönlichkeiten der SPLM-IO sind. Sie selbst ist eine Koalition aus kleineren Gruppen, die nur nach Notwendigkeit auch gemeinsam agieren.

Kaum eine ausländische Regierung will eine andere unterstützen, die ein Friedensabkommen offen aufgibt

Die Regierung leidet unter einer erheblichen Finanzkrise, seit der Krieg in Sudan die Öleinnahmen stark einbrechen ließ. Den Sold an die Armee zahlt sie nur unregelmäßig aus, toleriert separate, nur oberflächlich integrierte Milizen und heuert ausländische Unterstützung durch ugandische Luftstreitkräfte an. Präsident Kiir ist ein politischer Überlebenskünstler, der selbst regierungsnahe Eliten im Unklaren über seine Unterstützung lässt. Vielmehr betreibt er einen komplexen, schwer zu durchschauenden Balance-Akt, indem er sowohl aufstrebende Politiker als auch deren Gegner unterstützt, um sie jeweils in Schach zu halten. Minister sind teilweise nur wenige Wochen im Amt, bevor sie ausgetauscht werden. Gekoppelt mit der ethnischen Logik der südsudanesischen Politik haben sie so einen Anreiz, in kurzer Zeit möglichst viel für ihre jeweiligen Unterstützerkreise herauszuholen.

Das 2018 unter Vermittlung von Uganda und Sudan sowie mit Unterstützung der Regionalorganisation IGAD geschlossene R-ARCSS erfüllt trotz der Gewalteskalation gewisse Zwecke für Regierung und Opposition. Es verleiht sowohl Kiir als auch Machars SPLM-IO Legitimität. Es eröffnet der Exekutive Patronage-Möglichkeiten bis hinunter auf die Landkreisebene. Eigentlich müsste Kiir dabei die Machtteilungsquoten des Abkommens berücksichtigen, aber mittlerweile setzt er sich darüber hinweg, ohne dass ihn jemand daran hindern kann. Machars Seite kann sich zumindest formal auf diese Quoten beziehen. Eine Neuaushandlung würde ihren Zugang zu Posten (und damit zu Patronage, Lizenzen und Einkünften verschiedener Art) wahrscheinlich eher reduzieren.

Die Regierung kann das R-ARCSS als Absicherung gegen internationalen Druck einsetzen. Schließlich will kaum eine ausländische Regierung eine andere unterstützen, die ein Friedensabkommen offen aufgibt. Organisierte Gewalt gegen viele lokale Rebellionen, die sich nicht zuletzt aus dem Kampf um knappere Ressourcen ergeben, muss daher als Verteidigung des Abkommens verkauft werden. Sowohl Umwelteinflüsse (vor allem regelmäßige Überflutungen), schwindende Öleinnahmen, geringere Hilfsgelder als auch die massive Korruption erzeugen hohen Druck auf die wenigen existenten Einkommensquellen für bewaffnete Akteure. Zu diesen gehören hunderte Checkpoints, an denen jegliche Güter (informell) besteuert werden.

Die Konfliktparteien können dabei auf die Ermüdung und Ablenkung möglicher Vermittler setzen. Das R-ARCSS von 2018 ist eine revitalisierte Form des ursprünglichen Abkommens von 2015, das im Juli 2016 kollabierte. Auch damals versuchte Kiir seinen Vize Machar an den Rand zu drängen. Während seine Armee Machar verfolgte, ernannte Kiir den Verhandlungsführer der SPLM-IO, Taban Deng Gai, zum neuen Vizepräsidenten. Nach Machars Verhaftung im März 2025 trieb Kiir ein ähnliches Spiel. Er erkannte eine Abspaltung von Machars Bewegung als deren legitime Vertretung an und beförderte deren Repräsentanten auf Regierungsposten.

Die RSF kontrollieren wichtige Teile der Pipelines aus den südsudanesischen Ölquellen zum Roten Meer

Die Eskalation in Südsudan steht in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Krieg in Sudan, der den Nachbarn seit April 2023 erschüttert. Die Regierung in Juba hat versucht, die Interessen der Hauptkonfliktparteien, der Sudanesischen Armee (SAF) und den »Rapid Support Forces« (RSF), auszubalancieren. Die RSF kontrollieren wichtige Teile der Pipelines aus den südsudanesischen Ölquellen zum Roten Meer, wohingegen die SAF in Port Sudan das Sagen hat. Die Aufteilung von Ressourceneinnahmen kann die Konfliktparteien zusammenbringen. Das zeigt etwa ein trilaterales Abkommen zwischen SAF, RSF und der südsudanesischen Regierung vom Dezember 2025, nachdem die RSF die sudanesischen Ölfelder in Heglig an der Grenze erobert hatten.

Es ist allerdings möglich, dass sich die regionalen Spaltungen auch stärker im südsudanesischen Bürgerkrieg manifestieren könnten. Kiir unterhält bereits sehr gute Beziehungen zu den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE), welche die RSF in Sudan militärisch unterstützen. Die VAE pflegen ein angespanntes Verhältnis zu Saudi-Arabien, das wiederum gerade eine regionale Allianz unter anderem mit Ägypten, der Türkei, Somalia, Eritrea und Pakistan aufbaut. Die SAF finden sich ebenfalls auf dieser Seite wieder.

Das trilaterale Abkommen und der Einsatz von südsudanesischen Truppen in Heglig lassen allerdings auch ein engeres Verhältnis zwischen Juba und Khartum vermuten. In diesen Kontext passt auch die Annäherung der südsudanesischen an die ägyptische Regierung, den wichtigsten Partner der SAF. Weitere für Südsudan wichtige Länder wie Äthiopien und Uganda betrachten den Krieg durch die Brille ihrer jeweiligen strategischen regionalen Interessen – ein allgemeiner Konsens zeichnet sich jedenfalls nicht ab.

Eine Neuauflage von umfassenden und inklusiven Friedensverhandlungen, wie sie Kenia vorgeschlagen hat, scheint derzeit wenig Aussicht auf Erfolg zu haben, so notwendig sie auch sein mögen. Es sieht vielmehr danach aus, dass bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen in Südsudan zunehmen werden, während der Rahmen des Friedensabkommens offiziell aufrechterhalten wird. Zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure wie die Kirchen könnten, wie bereits in der Vergangenheit, eine friedensstiftende Rolle spielen. Ein vollständiger Kollaps der südsudanesischen Armee oder des Friedensabkommens steht nicht unmittelbar bevor. Es besteht vielmehr das Risiko, das die organisierte Gewalt in Südsudan weiter zur Normalität wird.

Photo: President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in September 2019, source: UNMISS

“The wars in Sudan and South Sudan are increasingly intertwined”

Comments on the war in South Sudan, EFE Agency, 4 April 2025

“The wars in Sudan and South Sudan are increasingly intertwined, and each side is likely to support armed actors in the other territory,” I tell Spanish media.

…

Kurtz says that although “there is no solid evidence” that the Sudanese Army supports the White Army or groups linked to the South Sudanese opposition, “there are strong historical ties” between the Sudanese military and Machar.

However, he points out that the Sudanese Army “has an interest in preventing the South Sudanese government from allowing the RSF to operate in South Sudanese territory and receive weapons” through the neighbouring country, especially after the agreement between the paramilitaries and SPLM-N, Kiir’s ally.

The Sudanese military dome is also concerned about the opening of an UAE hospital in Madhol, in northern South Sudan, as they “suspect it could be used as a concentration point for RSF supplies, as well as for the treatment of its soldiers,” as happened with the Emirati medical centre in Amdjarass (Chad).

…
Although the expert points to a growing interconnection of both crises, he recalls that “neither the Sudanese or South Sudanese parties have much resources, they are unlikely to act as major material sponsors.”

Added to this is Uganda’s participation and the influence of the Emirates in the area, so “it is absolutely possible that the conflict will become increasingly regional.”

“But we are not seeing two clear blocks, but rather a complex tangle of contradictions,” he says.

Horn von Afrika: Die Zivilgesellschaft wird weiter geschwächt

Beitrag in: Nadine Biehler (Koord.), US ohne AID?, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 04.04.2025 (360 Grad)

Am Horn von Afrika sind die USA bislang der größte Geber gewesen, sowohl in der klassischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als auch in der humanitären Hilfe. 45 Prozent der Mittel für die von den Vereinten Nationen (UN) koordinierte Hilfe für Sudan, die weltweit größte humanitäre Krise, kamen im vergangenen Jahr aus den USA.

Hilfsorganisationen berichten, dass sie zwar Ausnahmen von den Kürzungen erhielten, die Mittel jedoch nicht bei ihnen ankommen, weil das Zahlungssystem von USAID nicht mehr funktioniert. Die Konsequenzen bekommt vor allem die Zivilbevölkerung zu spüren. Diese steht in einer von Konflikten, Klimaveränderungen, schwacher Infrastruktur und Repression geprägten Region ohnehin unter massivem Druck. Drei zentrale Folgen lassen sich identifizieren:

Erstens wird die extreme humanitäre Not weiter steigen. In Sudan herrscht bereits jetzt in wahrscheinlich zehn Gebieten eine Hungersnot. Ohne zusätzliche Mittel dürfte sich die Hungersnot auf weitere Teile des Landes ausbreiten. Rund 30 Millionen Sudanes:innen sind auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen, aber nur ein Teil wird sie bekommen. Dies betrifft nicht nur Lebensmittel. In der äthiopischen Region Tigray zum Beispiel musste eine Organisation ihre psychosoziale Hilfe für Opfer sexueller Gewalt abrupt einstellen. Dies kann das Trauma der Überlebenden verstärken.

Zweitens drohen die US-Kürzungen, den zivilgesellschaftlichen Sektor am Horn von Afrika massiv zu schwächen. Dies betrifft nicht nur Organisationen in Feldern wie Gesundheit und Ernährung, sondern auch solche, die sich für Frieden, Menschenrechte und Demokratie einsetzen. So mussten in Äthiopien 85 Prozent aller zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ihre Arbeit einstellen. In den vergangenen Monaten standen diese ohnehin unter Druck: Einigen wurde die Lizenz entzogen, andere wurden zeitweise verboten oder ihre Führung ausgetauscht. In Südsudan könnten 60 Prozent des Mediensektors kollabieren, einschließlich der Radiosender in lokalen Sprachen. Dies verschärft die ohnehin unzuverlässige Nachrichtenlage in einer Situation, in der falsche Gerüchte schnell bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen anheizen.

Drittens könnte der Ausfall internationaler Unterstützung zwar langfristig die dringend nötige Lokalisierung humanitärer Hilfe beschleunigen – kurzfristig ist jedoch das Gegenteil der Fall. So mussten rund 80 Prozent der Gemeinschaftsküchen im Sudan, die von Selbsthilfenetzwerken mithilfe von US-Mitteln betrieben wurden, schließen. Die Diaspora unterstützt diese Netzwerke ebenfalls, kann den Wegfall aber kurzfristig nicht kompensieren. Europäische Geber, die ebenfalls ihre Mittel zurückfahren, sollten sich darauf konzentrieren, solche Selbsthilfenetzwerke und lokale Helfer stärker zu unterstützen.

Droht ein Bürgerkrieg in Südsudan?

Im Südsudan sollten Staatschef Salva Kiir und sein Vize Riek Machar an der Spitze einer Übergangsregierung dem Land Stabilität bringen. Doch es brechen alte Rivalitäten auf. Afrikaspezialist Gerrit Kurtz ordnet die Gefahr für einen neuen Bürgerkrieg ein.

Interview im “Echo der Zeit”, SRF, 28.März 2025

Horn of Africa: Time for preventive diplomacy

In both Ethiopia and South Sudan, conflicts are escalating again. To prevent further regionalisation of the conflict landscape, Europe should support high-level diplomacy, says Gerrit Kurtz.

SWP Point of View, 21 March 2025. Also available in German.

In the Horn of Africa, two peace processes are in acute danger: Local power struggles in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Tigray region are at risk of escalating into regional crises. In South Sudan – as in 2013 at the beginning of the last civil war – a power struggle is raging over the possible successor to 73-year-old President Salva Kiir. He is already positioning his son-in-law as a potential replacement. At the same time, clashes between the White Army – a Nuer militia – and the South Sudanese army in the Upper Nile region are causing a stir after a United Nations helicopter was shot down and a high-ranking army general was killed.

During the civil war from 2013 to 2018, the White Army fought on the side of the main rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-in Opposition (SPLA/M-IO) under today’s First Vice President Riek Machar. Tensions between Kiir and Machar are intensifying once again – a dangerous déjà vu for the country, which has barely had time to recover after decades of conflict.

Ethiopia: Split within the TPLF and growing tensions with Eritrea

In Ethiopia, a local power struggle in the Tigray region threatens to escalate into a regional crisis between the federal government in Addis Ababa and Eritrea. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – once Ethiopia’s ruling party and the Ethiopian government’s opponent in the war between 2020 and 2022 – is divided: A faction led by chairman Debretsion Gebremichael is opposed by a reformist faction under the president of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, Getachew Reda.

The Debretsion faction has large parts of the Tigrayan military on its side and has been taking over local administrative structures for months, sometimes violently. In the meantime, it has also brought media and parts of the administration in the provincial capital, Mekelle, under its control. The TPLF’s Debretsion faction is said to have good relations with Eritrea, whereas Getachew is counting on Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have cooled markedly since the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war between the TPLF and the government in 2022. Both countries are accused of supporting opponents of the other’s regime.

Due to the increasing tensions, there is a risk that there will be a regionalisation of the conflict landscape. Uganda has already sent troops to support the South Sudanese government, as it did in 2013. Similar to previous clashes, Sudanese actors are also intervening. Over the weekend, militias of the Rapid Support Forces in South Sudan were already fighting against units of the SPLA/M-IO, which were apparently on their way to receive weapons from the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Failure of the peace agreements – fragmented international engagement

The current escalations are no coincidence. The respective agreements to end the civil wars in South Sudan and Ethiopia have only been implemented to a limited degree. Unilateral deviations by both governments from their obligations have de facto prevailed. Kiir rapidly replaced cabinet members and had high-ranking generals of the SPLA/M-IO arrested. In Ethiopia, important measures of the Pretoria Agreement, such as the demobilisation of militias and the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amharic troops from Tigray, have largely failed to materialise.

International engagement with the region is increasingly fragmented – as are the states of the region themselves. In Ethiopia, for example, there is a lack of credible guarantors for the peace process. At the recent extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan, only two countries took part at the level of their president. Whereas the United States used to be the most important international partner for peace in the region, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are now influential, but they tend to support certain sides rather than mediate in internal conflicts.

In view of the deteriorating situation, it is now time for high-level preventive diplomacy. A coordinated international approach could contain the escalation. An informal division of tasks would be conceivable: Influential countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could defuse tensions at the intergovernmental level, while European actors could support IGAD and the African Union in local mediation processes.

Picture: In better times in 2019, President Salva Kiir met the head of the SPLA/M-IO, Riek Machar, in Juba, to prepare the government of national unity. Source: UN Photo/Isaac Billy

Counter-Diplomacy: the many ways to say no

Book chapter published in: J.E.Spence/Claire York/Alastair Masser (eds.): New perspectives on Diplomacy. A new theory and practice of diplomacy, London, I.B.Tauris, p.141-159.

Rwandan troops arrive in South Sudan for deployment in Regional Protection Force, Juba, 8 August 2017. South Sudan’s obfuscation and deferment of international obligations regarding the deployment of the RPF is an example of counter-diplomacy. UN Photo UN7156547

Diplomacy as the professional practice of representing institutional interests, usually on behalf of states through negotiation and communication, builds on a rich corpus of conventions, rules, and norms. Over the past three decades or so, international society has seen an increasing legalization and institutionalization of world politics, including in the field of peace and security.[i] Human rights and human protection norms have gained considerable traction,[ii] even though their evolution is not linear, and their implementation is far from consistent. Faced with such depth of international interventionism, some states deploy what we can call counter-diplomacy. According to Barston, ‘the purpose of ‘counterdiplomacy’ is the use of diplomacy to evade or frustrate political solutions or international rules.’[iii] What are the main features of counter-diplomacy, its origins, practices and consequences for the conduct of principled diplomacy? That is the focus of this chapter.

[i] Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Duncan Snidal (2000), ‘The Concept of Legalization’, International Organization, 3 (54): 401-419.

[ii] Bellamy, Alex J. (2016), ‘The humanisation of security? Towards an International Human Protection Regime’, European Journal of International Security, 1 (1): 112-133, Kurtz, Gerrit and Philipp Rotmann (2016), ‘The Evolution of Norms of Protection: Major Powers Debate the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Society, 1 (30): 3-20.

[iii] Barston, Ronald Peter (2013), Modern diplomacy, 4th Ed., New York: Routledge, 5.

To read more, you can buy the book here.

Peace in South Sudan: Don’t repeat the same mistakes

Germany should advocate in the UN Security Council for a course correction on the international approach to peace in South Sudan. If high-level mediation, addressing impunity, and grassroots reconciliation are not prioritized, international pressure to form a transitional government by November 12, 2019, is likely to lead to renewed violence.

UN Security Council delegation visiting South Sudan, October 2019. Photo: Isaac Billy, UNMISS.

This text was published as DGAP Standpunkt on 29 October 2019.

In Juba, South Sudan’s capital, it seems to be Groundhog Day, with the same events reoccurring in a never-ending loop. The current run-up to a November 12 deadline to form a transitional government closely resembles the predicament of just half a year ago, when the parties had extended the initial deadline from May.

Under intense regional and international pressure after the collapse of the original peace agreement of August 2015, the government and opposition parties signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. It included a ceasefire, which largely still holds across the country, at least among signatories. R-ARCSS also foresaw the creation of a transitional government of national unity, with positions for the various negotiating parties, including five vice-presidential posts.

A delegation of the UN Security Council, led by the United States and South Africa, visited Juba on October 20, 2019. Its mission: impress upon all signatories to the R-ARCSS the need to abide by their commitments, including forming the transitional government by the agreed deadline. The United States has already hinted at additional sanctions if the parties fail. Yet with no adequate security arrangements and political agreements in place, such international pressure risks repeating the same mistakes made at key junctures since the start of South Sudan’s civil war in December 2013.

The issues hindering the peace process and the formation of the transitional government of national unity are well-known. In a statement from early October 2019, the UN Security Council listed them itself: not only is there no agreement between the parties on the internal borders of South Sudan’s federal states and the cantonment and training of government and opposition security forces, but the government is also dragging its feet in releasing funds to support these processes.

Unsatisfied with the lack of progress, the most prominent opposition group – the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) led by Riek Machar – announced in early October that it would not participate in the transition government. Machar maintained his objection during the Security Council’s mid-October visit. Similarly, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, another signatory of the peace agreement, said that its participation hinged on the resolution of the outstanding issues. President Salva Kiir has maintained that he will form the transitional government even if some opposition groups choose not to participate. Meanwhile, there are already allegations that Kiir is training new forces.

Déjà Vu of the Original Peace Agreement

The current peace deal risks sharing the fate of the original peace agreement of August 2015, which quickly collapsed three years ago amid the escalation of fighting, spread of violence, and fragmentation of the parties involved. Then, international pressure brought Kiir, Machar, and a smaller opposition group together to sign this agreement, which included a ceasefire, a power-sharing arrangement, and a commitment to establish a hybrid court under the aegis of the African Union. As became clear in the following months, the parties never intended to follow through with many of these commitments. Worse, the regional and international guarantors of the agreement let them get away with it.

Barely two months after he signed the peace agreement, President Kiir announced the reorganization of South Sudan’s federal states, increasing their number from 10 to 28. As the power-sharing arrangements were tied to the original number, his move was a clear violation of the peace agreement. Furthermore, the government failed to withdraw the bulk of its security forces from Juba to cantonment sites on its periphery. Machar and Kiir agreed on security arrangements that brought hundreds of opposition forces to Juba to guarantee the safety of Machar and his team, further militarizing the capital.

Under international pressure and in a weak military position, Machar went to Juba in April 2016 to form a unity government. The arrangement proved to be deeply dysfunctional. When Machar’s and Kiir’s forces clashed at an illegal checkpoint in the city in July of that year, heavy fighting broke out, during which hundreds of civilians and fighters were killed. Machar fled Juba accompanied by a contingent of his rebels, with government security forces in close pursuit. The government later revealed that it had paid Paul Malong, then chief of military staff, five million US dollars directly from the central bank to pursue and kill Machar, then the country’s first vice president.

International and regional reactions to these events were underwhelming. Beyond verbal criticism, there were neither repercussions for Kiir’s reorganization of state borders, nor for the July 2016 crisis. In addition, international and regional partners implicitly accepted that Taban Deng Gai, who had represented the opposition during the peace negotiations, had replaced Machar as first vice president while Machar was on the run.

Waking Up from Groundhog Day

Around 380,000 people are estimated to have died because of South Sudan’s civil war. The South Sudanese need a different international engagement. Germany supported the negotiations that led to the revitalized peace agreement last year with expertise and additional staff for the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional organization in the Horn of Africa. As a donor and a current non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Germany – along with its European partners – now has the chance to steer international policymaking on South Sudan in new, more effective directions.

First of all, in partnership with the AU and IGAD, the Security Council needs to push for continuous mediation between the parties. Security arrangements and the internal political order were already at the heart of the failure of the previous transitional government. Therefore, it is baffling that IGAD has not yet managed to appoint a permanent head of the peace agreement’s monitoring body. South Sudan should not just be seen as an issue to shape US Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft’s public profile; rather, it deserves sustained political attention from the region, as well as from international decision-makers, including in Europe. There is no shortcut around negotiations between the parties. High-level mediators not only need to bring all the main players to the negotiating table until there is a consensus, but they also need to quickly follow-up with sanctions in the event of serious violations.

Secondly, donor countries like Germany need to spell out their conditions for support of the peace process more explicitly. Right now, the South Sudanese parties shape the narrative by calling for international donors to release further funds for the implementation of the peace agreement, in particular the retraining of government and opposition forces. Instead, donors should insist on the South Sudanese government’s pledge to release 100 million US dollars for this process. While the government currently spends millions on a presidential jet and foreign medical treatment for MPs, it is neither paying security services nor providing sufficient food and water at cantonment sites. Any support of the peace process by external donors should be bound to financial audits and transparency of South Sudan’s oil sector.

Thirdly, peacemaking in South Sudan needs to move away from a purely transactional model of power-sharing, in which government positions are meted out to the parties according to their negotiating strength. As Lotje de Vries and Mareike Schomerus argued in 2017, a peace deal alone will not end the war in South Sudan. Europe needs to follow the US example by going after the cash flows funding the violence more aggressively than in the past. Thanks to investigations by the Sentry, a US civil society organization; the panel of experts appointed by the UN Security Council; and the UN Human Rights Commission on South Sudan, detailed evidence already exists of the patronage networks benefiting from the civil war. The EU should freeze the assets of more corrupt members of the South Sudanese elite. Addressing impunity by getting the proposed hybrid court on South Sudan up and running under the aegis of the African Union also deserves a higher priority.

International pressure on the parties needs to focus on resolving the outstanding issues, not on forming a bloated transitional government with minimal trust. Machar can be forgiven for not trusting the UN’s assurance of his and his team’s safety if they return to Juba. In July 2016, UN troops were bogged down amid the urban fighting in the city and did not even intervene to halt an assault on humanitarian and UN workers at a nearby compound, let alone protect civilians in the vicinity of its camps. While the UN Mission has been bumped up to include additional forces with a robust mandate and improved procedures, it is unclear whether these forces would be able to engage with the thousands of government troops stationed in Juba if the 2016 scenario were to repeat itself.

For the moment, sustaining the ceasefire needs to have priority. It has enabled the conclusion of more than 130 local reconciliation efforts in South Sudan’s myriad inter- and intra-communal conflicts. The UN Mission in South Sudan, as well as the South Sudanese Council of Churches, has supported many of these efforts. Both deserve the Security Council’s full political support. Over time, local peace agreements can help build national peace and development from the ground up – until, one day, South Sudan can break the loop of renewed violence for good.

Preventive Diplomacy: Invest in the Skills of Frontline Diplomats

In conflict-prone countries, diplomats must employ a special skill-set that allows them to escape from biased conventional wisdoms and balance the personal and the professional in negotiations. Ministries and international organizations should foster mechanisms such as structured spaces for reflection and frequent exchange with fellow diplomats from relevant missions in the region.

This post summarizing some key insights from my PhD thesis was first published on the PeaceLab Blog on 4 July 2019.

European diplomats visiting Abyei, May 2019. Source: https://twitter.com/SWalshEU/media.

Conflict prevention is an important objective for international organizations as well as in many countries’ foreign policies. However, engaging in state-society conflicts presents a fundamental challenge for diplomats and United Nations (UN) officials posted in “at risk” countries – those on the precipice of violence. State-society conflicts are defined as those relating to the distribution of power between and within societal groups as well as their respective access to state resources; in other words, nothing could be more political. Diplomats, however, are supposed to refrain – by law and convention – from meddling in another country’s domestic affairs. At the same time, for a reform process to be credible and sustainable, it ultimately needs to be driven by local actors – not outsiders. In short: diplomats are caught in a conundrum of seemingly contradictory conventions and political objectives.

So, how do frontline diplomatic actors handle this fundamental challenge on a practical level? This question was central to my PhD research, in which I found that such situations require careful balancing acts. Engaging in state-society conflicts is always marred by trade-offs, e.g. between inclusion and exclusion or legitimacy and effectiveness. There is hardly ever a perfect combination of international objectives. It often falls to frontline diplomats posted in countries experiencing such conflicts to balance the trade-offs presented by those objectives. Trying to influence state-society relations also involves balancing the level of coerciveness and the level of intrusion in diplomatic interventions. Fostering this duality in a competent manner requires closer attention to the ways in which frontline diplomats make sense of conflicts, interact with national stakeholders, and coordinate with their diplomatic peers.

This analysis is based on an empirical analysis of diplomacy in South Sudan since independence as well as in post-war Sri Lanka, where I interrogated the views and everyday practices of frontline diplomats. In total, I conducted 165 semi-structured interviews with diplomats, UN officials, civil society representatives, policymakers, and experts.

Prevention needs to balance actors and structures

As the American academic Barnett Rubin poignantly observed in 2002, “all prevention is political”: Constraining the repertoire of elite actions is inherently disruptive. Preventive action rests on a forward-looking, proactive and conflict-sensitive attitude, requiring courage and close interaction with people in the target society. International influence, though, is heavily circumscribed, and may be subject to geopolitical interests, regional rivalries, economic priorities, and divergent political preferences of local elites. Prevention is also disruptive within bureaucratic organizations, as it often entails questioning established relationships and accepted analyses in addition to imagining scenarios and new ways of engaging. In short: Prevention is not a separate activity, but rather a normative objective that affects diplomatic interactions across conflict stages.

Politics in countries at risk of armed conflict is often highly personal and informal. A thorough understanding of the nature of elite bargains by national stakeholders must incorporate both psychological factors and an analysis of a conflict’s political economy. Leaders in state-society conflicts may be geared more towards immediate political survival than reputational concerns, which has consequences for preventive diplomacy. Standard diplomatic appeals to leaders’ legacy or long-term interests may thus be ineffective. Diplomats need to balance the respective roles of structures and actors operating within them. In my research, I discuss how they do so across three levels of the diplomatic process at the country level: Knowledge production, political engagement, and international coordination.

Frontline diplomats are exposed to cognitive short cuts

When analyzing the politics of their host countries, frontline diplomats are exposed to cognitive shortcuts. Knowledge production involves balancing countervailing interpretations. Organizational rules and professional conventions dispose frontline diplomats towards a bias favoring the legitimacy held by formal state institutions. Even beyond the state, external actors easily assume a strong link between national stakeholders and local sources of power, and patron-client relations are often difficult to identify for outsiders. Diplomats need to reconcile structural forces such as ethnicity, religion, economic inequality, and ideology with the agency of their local interlocutors: Is their behavior an aberration or an expression of the governing political economy? Diplomats with long-term expertise are often more adept at recognizing such structural forces – but may also fail to update their beliefs and perceptions with changing elite incentives. This was the case following the independence of South Sudan in 2011, when many long-term observers struggled to recognize how the creation of the state had exacerbated internal tensions in the ruling elite. Such changes can be difficult to identify in bureaucratic systems that talk to each other mainly in writing, and that value conformity over questioning an internal consensus.

Diplomatic engagement with national stakeholders is often most effective when it is based on dialogue and clear principles. Mediating the intra-party dispute in South Sudan before the start of the war, a seasoned diplomat insisted, was essential – but it was absolutely integral to ensure transparency and avoid even the impression of favoring one contestant over the other. When domestic leaders find themselves in a hole, external actors need to hand them a ladder to climb out rather than a shovel to dig deeper. If nationalist leaders insulate themselves, working through interlocutors can help to create space for constructive dialogue. At the same time, the risk of constructive engagement is abuse and impunity that normalizes extra-legal methods in political competition. Following the protocol of state-to-state relations is thereby no longer neutral, but may end up legitimizing the concentration of power in a central government. Informal politics often require personal engagement, using institutional networks and individual experience to gain access to key people and facts. When diplomats engage on a personal level, they may increase their risk of being dragged into domestic political fights.

Diplomatic coordination can provide the political cover for preventive diplomacy and reduce the exposure of informal engagement. This often poses a dilemma for principled engagement: Those international actors with the most influence may not be those with the most transformative approach. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)-led mediation in South Sudan was a prime example of this phenomenon, with its member states deeply divided and opposed to freezing the assets of certain South Sudanese elites. At the same time, international pressure is more effective when there exists a broad consensus. Shifting geopolitical power structures mean that alternative sources of legitimacy are readily available, as China’s role in Sri Lanka and its close support for former President Mahinda Rajapaksa demonstrates. International organizations such as a UN Country Team may convene a range of diplomats, and maintain a long-term knowledge base of international engagement – if diplomats regularly share and reflect upon their experiences.

Promoting skills to balance trade-offs and creating spaces for reflection

As my research project demonstrates, the individuals engaged in preventive diplomacy matter. Governments and the UN, which have both committed themselves to conflict prevention, should promote mechanisms, policies, and skill-sets that foster diplomats’ ability to make judgements about balancing trade-offs, weighing countervailing interpretations, savvy engagement, and efficient coordination.

Bureaucratic organizations should establish mechanisms to regularly reflect on the disruptive nature of threats and preventive possibilities. Escaping conventional wisdom requires structured spaces for reflection within missions and across government and international organizations. Too often, missions and regional desks are too thinly stretched to be able to conduct structured conflict analyses regularly. External expertise, regular facilitation, and dedicated support mechanisms from capital/HQ can help overcome the limited capacity of missions in at-risk countries.

In situations with strong regional dimensions such as South Sudan, diplomats from all relevant missions in the region should hold frequent videoconferences and meet for internal workshops. Bureaucracies would do well to revamp human resources practices to ensure that diplomats with appropriate experience and skills are deployed where they are needed. At least for heads of missions, experience in a similar context and some basic country training should be compulsory. Top policymakers must give more weight to principled engagement in at-risk countries and foster an organizational culture that encourages individual responsibility, accepts risks, and allows dissent.

Frontline diplomats, in turn, can benefit from maintaining a detailed overview of national stakeholders, including possible agents of change and spoilers. They need to be prepared to combine personal and professional interactions, based on consistency, integrity, and transparency. For them, what matters is a clear-eyed awareness of risks and benefits, and the readiness to seize opportunities where they arise.

South Sudan’s Peace Process Needs New Thinking

This piece originally appeared on the Global Observatory that is run by the International Peace Institute.

Today marks the end of the fourth year of civil war in the youngest state on earth, South Sudan. Over the years, attempts to build a lasting peace agreement have faltered. The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS)—facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—was signed by President Salva Kiir Mayardit and former Vice President Riek Machar Teny in August 2015, but by July 2016 the deal broke apart after several days of heavy fighting between Kiir’s and Machar’s troops in Juba. Current attempts to revitalize the ARCSS, although welcome, face an array of obstacles. To overcome these and to avoid repeating the same mistakes that led to the demise of the ARCSS, new thinking and approaches are needed.

Obstacles to a Lasting Peace Agreement

The model of peacemaking thus far has been characterized as “big tent”: after several rounds of fighting lead to a stalemate, the government provides rebel leaders with an opportunity to control and disperse resources, and to integrate their militia into the national army. This policy formed the basis of the ARCSS. In June 2017, the IGAD council of ministers called for a “high-level revitalization forum” of the ARCSS. The initiative has support within the government and from all major opposition groups who have expressed their readiness to participate in the negotiations. However, IGAD diplomats face a delicate balancing act. Some provisions of the peace agreement, including the security arrangements, are clearly obsolete and need to be reviewed. At the same time, opening the whole agreement for renegotiation risks drawing out the process and potentially losing some of the commitments to constitutional reform, economic management, and transitional justice that are included.

More importantly, it is fundamentally unclear how “revitalization” will look. Since the July 2016 crisis, political and military realities have changed considerably. After Riek Machar fled the country, President Kiir appointed the opposition politician Taban Deng Gai to replace him. Yet the government’s expectation that he would be able to bring along opposition fighters with him has not been met. Most of Riek Machar’s troops remain loyal to him. His involvement in the process remains a major stumbling block for the negotiations. No one in the diplomatic community in Juba that I spoke to during a recent research trip expects Machar to return to Juba, after SPLA units tried to kill him twice, in 2013 and 2016. Accommodating Machar in the government thus seems impossible, though marginalizing him has also not worked.

The underlying problem remains the logic of dividing the spoils. Positions of authority in South Sudan have served the self-enrichment of office-holders and the accumulation of political budgets. As a result of the insecurity in the country and the macroeconomic crisis, the resources that could be allocated are becoming smaller. Moreover, the lack of accountability of officials and politicians is a core challenge that contributed to the outbreak of the civil war in the first place. If there is no overarching political vision for South Sudan, another purely transactional power-sharing deal will inevitably result in dissent and confrontation just as in 2016.

No Easy Solutions

The last few years have made clear that there are no quick fixes in South Sudan. No single process will be able to bring a comprehensive peace to the country in the foreseeable future. For the time being, a number of measures can be taken that may mitigate and contain the scale and brutality of the violence, and even create space for a long-term peace agreement.

The first is for IGAD mediators and international interlocutors to make clear that perpetrators will face justice. Looting, sexual violence, and mass atrocities need to have consequences. Regional support for asset freezes and anti-money laundering measures, for example, is growing. In September, the African Union Peace and Security Council warned that the revitalization process represented “a last chance for the Parties” and threatened unspecified sanctions against spoilers. After the United States strengthened its unilateral sanctions regime, the Kenyan Central Bank instructed its banks to implement asset freezes that the UN Security Council had passed in 2015.

Second, international actors, such as the Troika—the three-nation group supporting negotiations consisting of Norway, the UK, and the US—but also Germany and the EU, could lobby other countries for an informal arms embargo on South Sudan. US pressure has already stopped Sudanese arms deliveries for Machar’s troops. Engaging with Ukraine, Uganda, and Egypt, which the UN Panel of Experts sees as the government’s arms dealers, would be crucial as well. A commitment to a ceasefire at the beginning of the revitalization forum could provide the diplomatic backing for those states to reconsider their covert arms shipments.

Third, empowering civil society and other constructive forces will be crucial. The churches play a very important role in peacemaking and reconciliation as they are the only institutions with a reach in all corners of the country. They also have the patience and stamina to stay engaged when national and international actors have long left. Their biggest advantage is also a challenge though. Part and parcel of South Sudanese society, they are not immune to the polarization that has divided the country. Work on intercommunal conflicts by the churches, the UN mission, and non-governmental organizations needs donor support, including for targeted early recovery measures.

A Need for International Introspection

Finally, Western countries, and in particular the Troika, will contribute more positively to negotiations if they are aware of their own impact on the conflict and the peace process. For example, Troika acceptance of the replacement of Riek Machar with Taban Deng Gai lent legitimacy to the process. On the other hand, the rushed and failed effort of the US to expand the UN sanctions regime and create an arms embargo “gave Juba a degree of increased confidence,” in one Western diplomat’s perception. The government then continued its operations in Equatoria that displaced hundreds of thousands of civilians, and obstructed humanitarian access. Another example is the disappointment of South Sudanese civil society organizations when German foreign minister Sigmar Gabriel stood them up during a visit in August 2017.

Ultimately, there is no silver bullet to ending the civil war in South Sudan. At the very least, international actors should ensure that their actions and omissions do not prolong the suffering, however unintentionally. Overcoming the tendency to broker conventional transactional power-sharing agreements would be an important start.

Gerrit Kurtz is a PhD candidate at King’s College London and a non-resident fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin. His research focuses on conflict prevention diplomacy in South Sudan and Sri Lanka.