United Nations – Dr. Gerrit Kurtz

Everybody’s Business

The War in Sudan as a Threat to International Peace and Security

This article was published by Verfassungsblog on 21 December 2023.

War has devastated Sudan since it first broke out on 15 April 2023. What started as a power play between the country’s two most powerful armies, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has since metastasized into a major civil war. International actors have not paid this war the high-level attention it requires and deserves. On 1 December, the UN Security Council decided to terminate the mandate of the UN International Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), a political mission originally tasked with supporting Sudan’s transition to democracy. While the Council acted on a short-term request by the Sudanese authorities (controlled by SAF), it has not been able to agree on a substantive resolution since the war started. Driven by divisions, it has abdicated its responsibility under the UN Charter.

In this blog post, I explain why international actors need to pay more attention to what is happening in the strategically located country at the crossroads between the Red Sea and the Sahel, between the Arab and African worlds. The war threatens Sudan’s integrity as a state, displaces millions and draws in neighbouring and other regional countries, all in a region already in turmoil because of coups, insurgencies and violent extremism.

A War within the Security Sector

The conflict originates in a competition between the regular armed forces, the SAF, and the paramilitary force, RSF, for control over the security sector and ultimately the state as a whole. Having dislodged long-term ruler Omer al-Bashir from power in the face of broad public protests in April 2019, SAF and RSF agreed to share power with civilian parties a few months later. In October 2021, they felt the civilians were overreaching, arrested the civilian prime minister and declared a state of emergency. Since then, they have not been able to agree on forming a new government, trying instead to seize power yet again, this time from each other. This has led to the current hostilities.

While the conflict parties increasingly appeal to ethnic and racial identities to mobilize support, many Sudanese do not consider themselves truly represented by either armed force. The SAF, whose leadership comes from the riverine region of Central and Northern Sudan, are supported by elements of the former Islamist government as well as some armed groups. SAF generals look down on the RSF, whose commanders they consider uneducated. The RSF was created out of informal Arab militias, called “Janjaweed”, who embraced an ideology of Arab Supremacy already during the genocidal violence against non-Arab groups such as the Masalit and Zaghawa in Darfur in the West of Sudan twenty years ago. Since then, the RSF have recruited widely among Sudan’s peripheral communities, drawing on citizens of other Sahelian states (such as Chad) and co-opting units from SAF and other armed groups.

The Destruction of a Major African Capital

The war has wreaked havoc on Khartoum and the adjoining cities of Omdurman and Bahri. The RSF have captured most of the tri-state capital area, as they continue to engage in fierce artillery battles with the SAF. RSF troops occupy residential areas and loot vehicles and other valuables on a large scale. Around 37% of Khartoum state’s pre-war population of 9.4 million have left their homes. This will be the bulk of the country’s political and economic elite, its upper and middle class and others with means to make the journey. With records of their properties being deliberately destroyed, they will struggle to return. This is by design: Many RSF fighters, coming from the country’s poor peripheries, feel that the riverine elite that has dominated Sudan for decades has marginalized and instrumentalized them. Thus, while successive Sudanese governments have equipped and supported some Nomad communities, for example, to fight insurgencies for them, Nomad children go to primary school far less often than their peers from displaced communities. For those RSF fighters sensing a lack of respect, this is payback time. The result: a major African capital is falling apart in an effort to reshape the country. In time, this could lead to the split of Sudan into several territories, as the SAF-controlled ministries have already moved their administration to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast.

The World’s Largest IDP Crisis

Sudan now also presents the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. Since the war started, out of a total population of around 49 million, 5.4 million people have been internally displaced, while more than 1.4 million have crossed into other countries (mainly Chad, Egypt and South Sudan). When fighting broke out, Sudan already had around 3.7 million IDPs, mainly in Darfur, and 800,000 Sudanese were already refugees in third countries. Sudan was also hosting more than a million refugees from other countries such as South Sudan. Many of the latter have now sought to return home (or make their way to third countries). All told, there are likely more than ten million Sudanese that have left their homes both before and after the war started. With every new offensive, there are going to be more people fleeing from one place to the next.

The Commission of International Crimes

What is more, the conflict parties are likely committing international crimes. SAF engages in indiscriminate bombing, killing civilians in the process. RSF fighters and allied Arab militias loot properties, engage in sexual and gender-based violence and kill members of non-Arab groups, in particular Masalit. 68 villages in the greater Darfur area showed signs of fire damage, some were burnt down almost completely.

Many of these atrocities have taken place in West Darfur, where most Masalit used to live. Now around half a million have fled over the border to Chad. A detailed Reuters investigation based on interviews with survivors and open-source information found that the SAF officers had deserted the base in Ardamata in early November when they could no longer defend it. The remaining SAF rank and file and members of an allied Masalit armed group negotiated a surrender with the dominant RSF troops and gave up their weapons in exchange for promises to be spared. Instead, the RSF ordered the men out of the houses and started shooting them, targeting mainly the Masalit. Perhaps 1300 people were killed within two or three days.

Several international actors have classified these and other acts by the belligerents as international crimes, i.e. as erga omnes violations of international law. This means that all states have an obligation to prevent them. On 6 December, the US State Department issued an “atrocity determination”, where it formally found that the SAF and the RSF had committed war crimes and the RSF had committed also crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing as laid out above. Previously, Alice Wairimi Nderitu, the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, observed after a visit to refugee camps in Chad that many risk factors of genocide were in place. “In Darfur, innocent civilians are being targeted on the basis of race,” she said earlier.

Adding Fuel to Fire

Regional actors further fuel the conflict by delivering arms or allowing those deliveries to take place via their respective territories. The UAE supports the RSF with weapons and vehicles through Chad. Libya (under Haftar), Kenya, Uganda, the Central African Republic and more recently Ethiopia also seem to be involved in facilitating such shipments, as have been Russian mercenaries in Libya and CAR. In contrast, Egypt supports the SAF with weapons and other military support, including guns for tens of thousands of newly recruited SAF soldiers as well as Turkish Bayraktar drones. There have also been reports about Ukrainian drones and special forces supporting SAF, although the sourcing was relatively thin.

Insofar as they enter Darfur, many of those arms deliveries are a violation of the UN Security Council arms embargo on Darfur originally imposed in 2005. Even though it was never very effective as it only applied to one region within a larger country, it still provides ground for in-depth investigations by the UN Panel of Experts whose next report is due in early 2024.

The Threat of Spill Over

The war in Sudan is likely to spill over to neighbouring countries in various ways. Currently, the most-watched case is Chad. President Deby plays a risky balancing game by allowing the UAE to use Chadian territory for arms supplies to the RSF. The RSF have incorporated a significant number of Chadian Arabs and are increasingly getting into conflict with the Zaghawa in Darfur, the same ethnic group of Deby’s governmental elite. Unrest within the Chadian elite may lead to a military coup, or returning Chadian Arab fighters may strengthen armed opposition groups and ignite a civil war.

South Sudan’s transitional government may also feel the heat from the war in Sudan. Angelina Teny, South Sudan’s interior minister, confirmed that South Sudanese have joined both SAF and RSF. These might later return to their home country with their military equipment and join any number of armed opposition groups. Furthermore, small arms are flooding informal markets in Sudan at cheap prices.

Moreover, the hostilities threaten to disrupt the export of oil from the South to markets via the pipelines to Port Sudan. This might bankrupt South Sudan’s kleptocratic government at a time this money is needed to smooth over differences resulting from planned but likely flawed elections in December 2024.

Flawed Mediation Efforts

Mediation efforts by international and regional actors have not succeeded in halting the violence so far. Their response has been lacklustre, with no sustained high-level commitment. Mediators also continue to follow a deeply flawed approach. They focus excessively on SAF and RSF as well as their respective leaders, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, SAF’s commander-in-chief, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, called Hemedti, RSF’s commander.

For example, on 9 December, an extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional organisation in the Horn of Africa, heard pledges from both Burhan and Hemedti for a personal one-on-one meeting as well as for an “unconditional ceasefire.” This ignores that neither of them appears capable of controlling the war on their own anymore, given the significant role of elements of the former regime, ethnic militias as well as other armed groups, some of which have increased the territory under their control in the Nuba mountains and in Central Darfur. Moreover, IGAD and AU member states lack leverage in holding the belligerents accountable. Within a week after these pledges, the SAF bombed Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, and the RSF started a major offensive in Al Jazeera state in central Sudan, a major humanitarian hub and breadbasket of the country. The RSF captured the state capital Wad Madani within four days.

What is urgently needed is a multi-stakeholder dialogue, something that a joint AU and IGAD team has been preparing for months. However, there are disagreements regarding the participation of the conflict parties as well as representatives of the former Bashir regime, which some civilian parties reject out of hand. It remains to be seen whether the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces or “Taqaddum”, a new civilian coalition whose preparatory committee was founded in Addis Abba in October, can prove more effective. They are in touch with the conflict parties based on their own roadmap.

A Threat to International Peace and Security

The war in Sudan poses a threat to international peace and security, requiring European actors including Germany to engage more forcefully. Encouraging regional actors to convene a credible multi-stakeholder and potentially sequenced dialogue is one way. States such as the UAE and Egypt that are fuelling the war with arms deliveries should also be held accountable, at least by calling them out. The EU should also start adding names to the sanctions regime on Sudan that it created in October and ensure that companies active in its common market do not interact with the RSF, SAF and their respective economic entities.

Mobilising diplomatic and political capital to stop the war in Sudan is not just the right thing to do, it should be everybody’s business given the high stakes involved.

Sudan: The Legitimization Strategies of Violence Entrepreneurs

Chapter in: Marianne Beisheim (Hg.): Country-level Politics around the SDGs. Analysing political will as a critical element of the Mid-Term Review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, SWP Research Paper 2023/RP 07, 10.07.2023

Sudan faces huge challenges to implementation of the SDGs: political instability following decades of authoritarian rule, armed conflict, a skewed economy in deep macroeconomic crisis, and the impacts of climate change. Consequently, Sudan is among states making the slowest progress towards the SDGs, with an SDG index ranking of 159 out of 163.¹

Sudan’s VNR report from 2022 does not pretend anything different. It acknowledges the country’s significant development shortcomings, the lack of sufficient current data and the state’s very weak implementation capacity in virtually all relevant areas. This apparent honesty is both selective and strategic, however. It omits the single most important factor keeping the Sudanese poor, namely the dominance of the security sector in politics and the economy. Appearing to care for the civilian population is a deliberate legitimization strategy on the part of the authors of the report, which was compiled by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). Its head, Sudan’s Minister of Finance Geibril Ibrahim, is a former rebel, an Islamist and a supporter of the military coup of October 2021. Any international support for sustainable development in Sudan thus needs to adopt an adaptive approach that includes peacebuilding and diplomacy.

Political instability and Sudan’s violent entrepreneurs

Pretending to promote broad-based development when actually engaging in politics that undermine it has a long tradition in Sudan, particularly among its armed movements. Peace agreements are full of normative language, as are the pronouncements of elite negotiators purporting to serve the interests of marginalized populations in the periphery. Power- and rent-sharing arrangements are the core objectives of Sudan’s violent entrepreneurs.² These include regular security forces, paramilitary forces, irregular militias and armed movements, who compete or cooperate on the basis of temporary shared interests.³

SDG implementation came to a halt in recent years as Sudan experienced considerable upheaval and lacked effective government. The breakdown culminated in military conflict in April 2023. Country-wide demonstrations in 2019, provided the motivation for a palace coup that ousted Omar al-Bashir after nearly thirty years in power. A civilian-military transitional government took the reins in August 2019, led by the former UN official Abdalla Hamdok. The military and security forces retained influence in the Sovereign Council (the collective presidency) and in security-related cabinet portfolios. In October 2020, the government signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) with thirteen armed movements across the country. They joined the government in February 2021, and Geibril Ibrahim became minister of finance.

Having supported the military in sidelining civilians, he and fellow JPA signatories remained in office when security forces arrested Prime Minister Hamdok and some of his ministers on 25 October 2021.

Since the coup, Sudan has had no fully functioning government. The military did not replace civilian ministers who resigned, instead promoting undersecretaries to become acting ministers. General Fattah Abdel al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and chair of the Sovereign Council, claimed that he had seized power only to “correct” the path of the popular revolution that started in December 2018.⁴ When the military realized they could not succeed, Burhan announced he would be ready to hand over power to a civilian government that was either elected or created by “consensus”.⁵ On 5 December 2022, after months of behind-the-scenes negotiations, a framework agreement was finalized between the military and a coalition of civilian groups. Geibril and his allies rejected the framework agreement because it included a review of the earlier peace agreement, which guaranteed them their positions.⁶ Negotiations on outstanding issues for a final agreement escalated into armed conflict between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shortly before a planned handover to a civilian government in April 2023.

The VNR’s selective treatment of development challenges

The preparation of Sudan’s second VNR fell in the period after the October 2021 coup.⁷ This put the drafters in the interesting position of describing the achievements of a transitional government for whose demise their military allies were responsible. The fact that Sudan decided nevertheless to submit the VNR in such a volatile situation points to the main purpose of the report: courting international favour for an illegitimate government. The government also wanted to restart international financial support and debt relief, as highlighted in the VNR’s opening statement and again in the conclusion.

The main purpose of the report lies in courting international favour for an illegitimate government.

The report includes an initially perhaps surprisingly open acknowledgement of Sudan’s development challenges. It describes Sudan’s three-digit inflation and negative economic growth and mentions the escalation of “tribal and intercommunal violence”.⁸ Given that the process was still ongoing when the report was submitted, it can only acknowledge that “consultations with assistance from the international and regional partners to resolve the political crises and continue the path towards peace and democratic transition” were taking place.⁹

The report’s description of Sudan’s (lack of) achievements in ending extreme poverty (SDG1) demonstrates important characteristics that apply across its treatment of the Agenda 2030. It acknowledges the dire situation, citing data where available. On poverty, the only source is a projection based on the government’s last national household budget and poverty survey from 2014/15, which was prepared in the context of the transitional government’s work with the IMF and the World Bank on a poverty reduction strategy paper. According to the VNR, poverty increased to 64.2 percent in 2020, up from 46.5 percent in 2009.¹⁰ Even that could be an undercount according to the director of the then new Social Security Commission in 2020, who spoke of 77 percent of the population living on less than US$1.90 per day.¹¹

The disparities in the poverty count underline the lack of reliable current data. The VNR report acknowledges that gap and notes that the lack of disaggregated current socio-economic data makes it very difficult to identify those most affected by the lack of development and thus ensure that no one is left behind, a core objective of the Agenda 2030.¹²

The absence of regionally disaggregated economic data is not simply a consequence of the lack of state capacity, but is rooted in wilful government policy going back to colonial times. The British colonial administration wanted “to avoid publishing numbers about Sudan’s economy for fear of making regional inequities obvious to the public. Rather than buck this trend, subsequent post-independence regimes followed suit”, write Matthew Benson and Musan Alneel on the basis of their study of Sudan’s tax system.¹³

The transitional government had identified a strategy to reduce poverty, which the VNR presents as a response to the dire situation. The heart of that government’s development strategy – prepared in conjunction with its international partners – was abolition of the fuel subsidy and floating of the Sudanese currency. The short-term pain was to be alleviated by a broad cash-transfer programme funded by donors. The Sudan Family Support Programme or Thamarat was to provide up to 80 percent of the population with the equivalent of US$5 per month. Its roll-out was delayed because the US government first needed to delist Sudan from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Under enormous economic pressure, the Sudanese government cut the subsidies – resulting in huge price rises for transport and food. A pilot of the Thamarat project was launched in February 2021, but quickly stopped after the European Union, the United States, Germany and the World Bank halted their funding following the October coup, depriving 9.2 million registered beneficiaries of future assistance.¹⁴

As well as send a message to the coup leaders, donors wanted to prevent misuse of funds. International funding had flowed through a multi-donor trust fund into the coffers of the Sudanese Central Bank. The influx of foreign currency stabilized Sudan’s reserves, allowing the government to finance imports of food and other commodities, and thus stabilized the fragile transitional government. Aborting funding for the trust fund and thus for the Thamarat programme was intended to avoid propping up the coup authorities, whose ministry of finance also controlled the Central Bank.

The government’s narrative ignores the most significant obstacle to inclusive and sustainable development: the dominance of the security sector.

In short, the VNR describes Sudan’s dire situation relatively accurately, in a way that serves the interests of the government and in particular the armed movement–led ministry of finance.¹⁵ The report locates the causes of the problems in the long rule of the former Bashir regime, against which the armed movement fought and which the coup government purported to overcome in accordance with the Sudanese revolution. The programmes and projects of the transitional government of 2019 to 2021 are presented as still providing a response to this legacy. This narrative might suggest that all that is needed is for Sudan’s international partners to resume their funding. That, however, would be to ignore the most significant obstacle to inclusive and sustainable development: the dominance of the security sector, and the political system it has created to serve its interests.

Conflict and military repression as central development challenges

Sudan has been ruled by authoritarian military leaders for most of its post-independence history. Successive governments created an exploitative system based on the extraction of resources from the peripheries for the benefit of urban elites in the centre.¹⁶ Where populations resisted such extraction, governments deployed significant force to maintain the system. Sudan has experienced armed conflict for most of its history, with fighting and violence against civilians located almost exclusively in the peripheries.¹⁷

The Sudanese Armed Forces and other security actors became strongly engaged in the economy. This impeded the development of the private sector, but allowed the military to control vast swathes of the country’s resources and productive economy. Key stakeholders were appointed to positions of authority in exchange for their loyalty.

One of the armed movements formed in response to state violence was the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), led by Geibril Ibrahim from 2012. Once a considerable military force, JEM largely disintegrated over peace talks with the government and was defeated by government forces and expelled from Darfur in 2015. After that, it had only a few hundred troops in South Sudan and Libya.¹⁸ The JPA gave JEM and other signatories a new lease of life.

Against this background, Sudan’s 2022 VNR report serves a clear purpose. Both the coup government and Geibril personally have an incentive to emphasize their supposedly popular credentials, while distracting from their lack of legitimacy. Indeed, Geibril’s own support base is now so narrow that he travelled to Darfur in January 2023 “under heavy protection” for fear of attacks from his own Zaghawa tribe.¹⁹ Any international aid would allow him to bolster his leadership ambitions, both across Sudan and within Darfur.

Implications for donor governments

Ensuring effective international support for accelerated SDG implementation is immensely challenging in a situation of armed conflict and state capture by violence entrepreneurs. Donors need to ensure that their aid does not strengthen – even inadvertently or indirectly –the extremely exploitative and extractive system keeping most Sudanese poor. At the same time, a highly risk-averse approach would essentially shift the burden to humanitarian aid. Some communities, for example in IDP camps, have received food aid for decades, keeping whole generations aid dependent.

Since the October 2021 coup, international development partners have started to reorientate. International officials repeatedly warned the military government that time was running out to access the funds and programmes that had been granted to the transitional government but were blocked after the coup.²⁰ Sudan’s debt relief process under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) was effectively halted, as was progress on Sudan’s poverty reduction process agreed with the World Bank and IMF.²¹

Even if a civilian government is finally formed, its absorption and implementation capacity will remain very limited. In the past, donors found it difficult to get the detailed applications and reports needed to fulfil their funding requirements. As a result, it was easier to plan around the state structures. While such a procedure allows projects to proceed for the benefit of civilian populations, it undermines the government’s ownership and capacities. Any new government would need to revise or at least update the existing development planning documents.

Finally, the security sector will remain a significant impediment to any civilian government and to international donors willing to fund implementation of the SDGs. Supporting basic service delivery removes the government from its responsibility in that core area to some extent, especially when projects are implemented beyond government structures. International funding of schools, hospitals and utilities allows the government to continue spending large amounts of its own budget on the security sector and to maintain fiscal practices benefitting military-owned companies. Moreover, it is likely that the military will resist giving up its control of a large section of state-owned companies to a new civilian government; this was already a major sticking point during the 2019–2021 transitional government. Companies, banks and other entities owned or controlled by the paramilitary RSF may be even harder to transfer to civilian control. There is no transparency about their budgets and profits. As an indication of their wealth, the IMF reported a “non-transparent contribution of $2 billion from security sector owned companies” into the state budget in 2020.²²

The 2030 Agenda recommends more integrated approaches to sustainable development. In Sudan this would be a development approach that includes peacebuilding and humanitarian concerns (the “triple nexus”) and is guided by an adaptive political strategy.²³ An adaptive approach acknowledges complexity and uncertainty and thus allows for continuous monitoring, evaluation and learning processes above and beyond conventional project-based programming cycles. It could include, for example, small pilot projects with state-level or local governments, which could quickly be expanded or adjusted if they prove successful.

Recent research calls for a more fundamental rethink of development cooperation in conflict settings in general. Specifically, donors should take the existing coping mechanisms, perceptions and relationships of local communities more seriously in their programming decisions.²⁴ Unpacking the political economy of conflict-affected countries’ SDG reporting should be part of such reflections.

Sudan’s civilian leader resigned. Now the military has sole control of the government.

The October coup is faltering — here’s why.

This text appeared on 11 January 2022 on The Monkey Cage blog of the Washington Post.

On Monday, the U.N. mission in Sudan initiated consultations aimed at helping resurrect the country’s democratic transition, amid a growing political crisis after Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigned Jan. 2. His resignation followed months of turmoil after a military coup on Oct. 25 derailed Sudan’s two-year effort to transition toward democracy. Hamdok had agreed to return as prime minister after being placed under house arrest in October, but he quit after the military interfered in his governance.

Hamdok’s resignation leaves only Sudan’s military leaders in control, complicating U.S. and international efforts to facilitate the return to a civil-military power-sharing agreement. His return had failed to persuade a highly mobilized grass-roots movement that Sudan is back on track toward full civilian rule. Sudan’s coup leaders have yet to come to terms with the widespread protests, which have continued despite dozens of demonstrators killed and hundreds injured.

What just happened — and what’s ahead for Sudan? The country at the Horn of Africa is in a pivotal phase.

Why did the military seize power in the first place?

In the early hours of Oct. 25, military and security forces arrested Hamdok, along with several cabinet ministers and other government officials. By noon, Lt. Gen.Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the head of the armed forces, dissolved the cabinet and the Sovereign Council, the joint military and civilian leadership body created in 2019 to oversee key reforms during a transition toward democratic elections. He said he aimed to “rectify the revolution’s course” and pledged to hold elections by 2023.

Hamdok had led a transitional government since August 2019. That government was based on a carefully negotiated constitutional declaration that military and civilian political forces had agreed on after deposing longtime ruler Omar Hassan al-Bashir earlier that year, amid large-scale demonstrations against the regime.

The military takeover in 2021 did not come as a complete surprise. Had the transitional government’s program succeeded, military and security forces would have had to cede their control of large sections of the economy to enable inclusive growth. And the military leaders could have faced accountability for their involvement in past human rights violations.

The coup faced early roadblocks

But Sudan’s military appeared poorly prepared to rule, despite having reportedly considered such a coup several times.

Burhan first promised the creation of a “technocratic” government without representatives of political parties by the end of the following week. By mid-November, he had appointed new members to the Sovereign Council, keeping himself as head of this collective leadership body, which he endowed with executive powers. The military authorities also appointed officials from the former Bashir regime to sub-cabinet positions as arrests continued.

The search for nonpartisan cabinet members has remained elusive, however. Only two former rebel movements that had joined the government — together with other armed movements involved in the implementation of the October 2020 Juba peace agreement — have remained allied to the coup plotters. No other notable civilian leaders joined the coup.

Burhan has also failed to attract international support, even from governments that tend to maintain close relations with Sudan’s military and security forces. Under U.S. and British pressure, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia co-signed a statement calling “for the full and immediate restoration of [Sudan’s] civilian-led transitional government and institutions.” Only Egypt, itself ruled by a military leader, and Russia, which has expressed interest in building a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast, were more supportive of the coup. The African Union suspended Sudan from regional activities.

Coup leaders hoped to co-opt civilian stakeholders

Sudan’s generals have been trying to produce a government that at least appears to be civilian-led and that can prepare elections at the end of the transition period. It’s likely the coup leaders are well aware that a government with military officers in top leadership roles would never be acceptable to the public or to Sudan’s international partners.

On Nov. 21, after international and Sudanese mediation, the generals released Hamdok from his house arrest. Hamdok then signed an agreement with Burhan, reinstating himself as prime minister and tasking him with forming a technocratic government.

Hamdok justified his decision, for which there was no legal basis, by citing his desire to avoid further bloodshed and salvage the economic and international gains of the transitional government. He said he planned to negotiate a new political agreement between all Sudanese stakeholders to put the transition on a more stable footing.

Sudan’s military maintains a tight hold

Hamdok’s hopes did not pan out. The military and security forces have reportedly continued to shoot, tear-gas, rape and detain peaceful demonstrators who have thronged to Sudan’s cities in the hundreds of thousands at frequent intervals since the October coup. In the western region of Darfur, security forces have failed to protect hundreds from being killed in a fresh wave of mass violence.

In Khartoum, Hamdok was unable to get political parties to settle on a new power-sharing agreement. The Nov. 21 agreement appears to have effectively destroyed Hamdok’s popularity among the activists who had demanded his release — many see his deal with Burhan as a betrayal.

With Hamdok out of the political picture, Sudan has no other civilian leader who could command similar legitimacy. This void may redirect attention to the neighborhood “resistance committees” at the heart of the protest movement. Protest organizers have mobilized despite Internet and phone shutdowns, and have adopted innovative tactics against military repression. They reportedly are preparing a political manifesto of their own, reaching out to established political parties to gain broad acceptance.

With the military in sole control of Sudan’s government, international efforts to help resolve the political crisis and salvage the democratic transition process have received a renewed sense of urgency.

Gerrit Kurtz is a nonresident fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute, a think tank in Berlin. Follow him @gerritkurtz.

Debunking Six Myths on Conflict Prevention

“There’s no glory in prevention”, one often hears in the debate on dealing with the corona pandemic: You don’t win elections with disasters that do not take place. This is not the only problem also for those aiming to prevent armed conflicts. It’s important to go beyond empty phrases though.

This text appeared on the website of Global Policy Journal on 3 December 2020. It is a translation of a piece originally published in Internationale Politik.

“Preventing crises is better than reacting to them. Who could doubt that?”

Quite a few people. That prevention is cheaper than reaction and intervention is one of the commonplaces popular in the UN Security Council or national parliaments. Who is not in favor of better early warning, early and anticipatory action and the use of civil means to prevent armed conflict? Especially since the best prevention against violent conflicts is a functioning state based on the rule of law that respects human rights, protects minorities, strives for social justice and enables equal participation in political decision-making.

But armed conflicts have the habit of breaking out in situations where these conditions are not present. Conflicts are usually based on tangible interests. Conflict parties resort to violence in pursuit of those interests. Things can escalate without the intention of any of the actors involved. Often, it is closed worldviews, authoritarian governments and a readiness to use violence that help to turn zero-sum politics into a confrontation that ultimately harms everyone.

When it becomes concrete, crisis prevention is highly controversial. In the United Nations, member states that want to protect the concept of sovereignty prevent early preventive action by UN country teams in fragile states. Germany exports weapons to authoritarian regimes and to fragile regions, even if these weapons end up in conflicts, as in the case of Libya, which the German government wants to bring to an end.

Crisis prevention has been a political endeavor from the outset. It cannot be pursued solely through technical cooperation and programmatic activities. It is always about the distribution of power, legitimacy and status issues. After all, prevention means intervening in the bargaining over power and positions. Conflict parties must be persuaded to either adapt their goals or the means by which they intend to achieve them.

“There’s no glory in prevention.”

That’s true, unfortunately. The observation making the rounds when it comes to fighting the corona virus has long been known in crisis prevention: The electorate rewards preventive policies less than reactive ones. Politicians are elected to deal with current problems that are already tangible. This also applies to foreign policy, even though it generally plays a minor roles in national elections.

Surveys show high approval rates for peace and prevention policies. But European voters won’t reward a concrete effort to calm tensions in a non-European country at the ballot box. In addition, it is usually difficult to attribute the success of prevention to individual measures taken by one actor, partly because sensitive negotiations usually take place in secret. If a foreign government should boast too much about having influenced political conditions in a third country, it could be counterproductive.

At the same time, it was not only the mass exodus to Europe in the years around 2015 that made it clear how much external crises and conflicts influence German and European domestic policy. But here, too, Europe’s policy is too often driven by short-term impulses such as sealing off borders or stabilizing more or less authoritarian regimes rather than by truly forward-looking policies.

The problem of the often invoked “political will” in international engagement can be seen precisely in how legitimate goals are weighed up when they compete. What to do when China, Europe’s most important trading partner, forces hundreds of thousands of its citizens into concentration camps in Xinjiang? How to deal with a government in Cairo that helps fight international terrorism but foments civil war in Libya? Clear principles are an important part of a preventive policy to find answers to such questions.

Coherence between different policy areas is therefore crucial. As long as crisis prevention remains its own niche rather than becoming an overarching priority, it will be difficult to win in balancing processes. Diplomatic pressure on governments to adhere to international human rights and peace agreements will fizzle out if bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, intelligence or development cooperation continues unabated. This is true both between different ministries and with close partners, for example in the EU.

Moreover, “political will” in democracies is not an abstract question for a political elite. Politicians are certainly aware when civil society movements are committed to certain issues. The “Fridays for Future” movement on the climate crisis is a good example of how commitment to a forward-looking policy can significantly increase its political relevance.

Chancellor Merkel astutely observed that only very few people in Germany had taken to the streets against the mass crimes in Aleppo, Syria, but hundreds of thousands protested against a free trade agreement with the USA. Those who call for preventive action in concrete situations, who organize themselves, write letters or go to demonstrations can attract political attention.

“When crises threaten to escalate into wars, it’s time for prevention.”

That’s too narrow. The idea that crisis prevention only takes place at a certain stage of a conflict, perhaps even thought of as a cycle or wave, is outdated. Especially in intra-state conflicts, the vast majority of conflicts worldwide, this linear idea of armed conflict does not correspond to the experience of the affected populations. For many people in marginalized or fragile regions, violence is an everyday phenomenon.

Moreover, wars themselves are extremely dynamic processes in which the level of violence fluctuates geographically and over time. For example, there are “islands of peace” in the midst of a war because some local communities manage not to join any of the parties to the conflict. Climatic conditions such as rainy and dry seasons, snow or heat make offensives easier or more difficult. During the rainy season, rebels need to take care of their fields or are slowed down on their advance by softened roads. Such factors offer opportunities to exert a moderating influence on the opponents.

After all, prevention not only aims to prevent armed conflicts, but also their further escalation. US President Barack Obama’s famous “red line” for Syria’s government not to use chemical weapons in the ongoing civil war was characterized by the idea that it would deter President Assad from using them. At the time, there was also criticism that Obama’s threat did not apply to mass violence against the civilian population with conventional weapons.

Preventing genocide and other mass crimes is a special concern of prevention, which also applies to ongoing armed conflicts. Institutions of international criminal law, such as the International Criminal Court in The Hague, not only pursue the goal of investigating past injustices, but also aim to influence the calculations of potential perpetrators worldwide, i.e. have a deterrent effect. However, once a mass crime has begun to unfold, the scope for action to contain it without military intervention is considerably reduced.

“We have known the instruments of prevention for a long time.”

That isn’t enough. It is a popular notion in ministries and international organizations that crisis prevention essentially consists of promoting projects that are tailored to the challenges of a specific context. For example, reforming police forces, improving the justice sector or local dialogue formats; projects such as those promoted by the German Federal Foreign Office as part of its civil prevention and stabilization work.

Such instruments can reduce social tensions and thus have a preventive effect – but this is not automatic. Police forces can be more effective, but continue to serve a repressive regime; courts can work more efficiently, but continue to be accessible only to a portion of the population; dialogue formats can function formally, but give impetus to radical demands when pluralistic forces are poorly organized.

As important as project work for peacebuilding is, it must never hide the fact that crisis prevention is not a technical or bureaucratic task, but a deeply political one. The relationship of communities among themselves and with the state, the network of different factions of a ruling elite or the relations between governments can be described approximately with the help of political science models and theories, but their protagonists retain their own will. Today, there is a growing realization that in fragile situations, “all good things” cannot be achieved simultaneously. It is a matter of balancing and setting priorities.

At its core, crisis prevention is not a collection of programmatic activities, but a matter of attitude. Preventive action is forward-looking, proactive and conflict-sensitive; it takes into account the effects of one’s own actions on the dynamics of a conflict. Although this insight is around 20 years old, the EU and other institutions continue to struggle with it.

Nevertheless, progress has been made. The World Bank, for example, is increasingly focusing on situations of fragility, conflict and violence, on which it adopted its first fully fledged strategy in 2020. Development cooperation and peace work are moving closer together.

If you want to engage in preventive activities, you first need a context and conflict analysis that is constantly updated. Which factors increase tensions, which limit them or promote the resilience of a socio-political system to internal and external challenges? What is the agenda of the main actors and what are their relationships with each other – not only at the national level, in the capital, but also with groups in other parts of the country and with international actors?

Before programmatic interventions take effect, diplomacy, the cultivation of networks and the use of relationships, remains the central instrument of prevention for governments and international organizations. Hands-on action is not made any easier when dealing with governments that are unwilling to reform or repressive. In the end, even the best programmatic offers to support police reforms or transitional justice are nothing more than that: proposals to which project partners may only react half-heartedly. While one partner ministry signs a cooperation agreement, sometimes other parts of the same government undermine progress on the same issue.

“In order to prevent crisis, it is mainly important to influence the actors on the ground.”

Not just. Many contributions to the political discourse on crisis prevention share an implicit dichotomy: “We” in Germany, in the EU, at the United Nations, take measures to prevent others from resorting to violence “on the ground”. In this way, violent tensions are primarily attributed to the parties involved, even if many apparently purely domestic political disputes have much to do with the international system or other governments.

German and European crisis prevention must take place on several levels and consider structural causes of conflict and their own role. The most important role in the prevention of violent crises is naturally played by the actors directly involved, the civil societies in which they are embedded, and their governments. But maintaining a peaceful society is a task for everyone. Polarization, discrimination, and poorly trained police forces are also present in rich countries – the wave of protests in the United States and around the world that followed the killing of George Floyd by a policeman in the summer of 2020 have seared such deep-seated problems in public memory.

And so, one insight from the past decades of international intervention in fragile contexts emerges: it is extremely difficult to permanently change a political and social system from the outside. Transformative change requires strong leadership from within society. It must be based on broad coalitions, on gradual reforms and on open dialogue with as many political forces as possible.

Two examples. In Afghanistan, after almost two decades of war, the USA and its allies had to realize that peace cannot be achieved without the Taliban. In contrast, the democratic transition process in Tunisia benefited from a strong commitment by the national dialogue quartet, which was able to achieve an understanding between Islamist and secular political forces. The Quartet, which consisted of the trade union federation, the trade and industry federation, the Tunisian League for Human Rights and the Association of Lawyers, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2015.

Nevertheless, international actors continue to play a key role in crisis prevention. At the structural level, they can work for an international order which promotes cooperation and where global problems such as the climate crisis or Covid-19 are tackled jointly.

They can influence other states that support parties to the conflict and, for example, decide and enforce arms embargoes through the UN Security Council. This was the basic idea of the Berlin Process on Libya. However, Europeans found it difficult to impartially sanction violations of the arms embargo.

Other international instruments include early warning systems of regional organizations, such as those created by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), preventive diplomacy and mediation by the African Union, UN blue helmet missions, election monitoring by the OSCE, and independent monitoring of peace agreements, as in Mali.

Such approaches are most effective when international, regional, state and local actors work together to strengthen peace capacities and neutralize risks at their respective levels.

“Politicians need earlier warnings of crises.”

More to the point: they need to organize early warning better. And show leadership themselves. One of the oldest calls for prevention is for more effective early warning that leads to decisive action. Although there are now plenty of good analyses of fragile situations around the world, there are many cases where decision-makers are hesitant to act.

And that has not so much to do with whether warnings are issued early, but rather with how warnings are formulated. Politicians want to be convinced that their actions can help counter risks effectively. To do this, warnings must be specific and actionable. The credibility of sources and evidence also plays an important role – decision-makers are more likely to believe political buddies who can report on their impressions during a visit to the affected country than external experts whose organizations they do not know.

In any case, prevention rarely depends on the one warning to set off the one decisive action. Rather, international organizations and national governments need institutional mechanisms to regularly discuss risk factors, including with non-governmental experts. Participants should be empowered to take action themselves before they need to pass on decisions to a higher hierarchical level. At the United Nations Secretariat, such meetings have been held for years.

Early crisis prevention does not require high-level political attention at all times. Embassies, UN or non-governmental organizations that have a permanent presence in fragile states can often send signals on their own accord to political opponents in the host country, strengthen civil society groups or promote the establishment of independent institutions such as national human rights commissions.

But to have the courage to raise uncomfortable issues, diplomats must have the backing of their superiors. Internal coherence and consistency are also needed. Ambitious rhetorical commitments to preventive policy are not enough; decision-makers must be measured by their action in concrete cases.

For example, as part of his “Human Rights up Front” initiative, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon called on his staff to be guided by principles and values when dealing with systematic human rights violations. Ban failed to support a human rights-based approach, however, when the UN development program and the political side of the United Nations contested the direction of UN policy on Myanmar. He did not decide the internal dispute between the two sides.

Leadership and sensitive mediation are indispensable in order to decide conflicts between the legitimate goals of different departments or parts of an organization. In addition to an open organizational culture, good preparation also includes flexible financing instruments, the ability to quickly dispatch qualified personnel, and the willingness to constantly question one’s own analyses.

Scenarios based on drivers of different futures have proven to be helpful, if they are specifically tailored to a context. A diverse composition of the scenario teams is important in order to question established assumptions. The Covid-19 crisis shows how quickly such assessments can be overtaken by reality.

Friedensabkommen in Sudan: Der Ertrag von Juba

Dieser Beitrag erschien am 16. Oktober 2020 bei Zenith.

Das Abkommen von Juba soll dem Krieg in Darfur und anderen Regionen Sudans ein Ende setzen. Die Aussicht auf Frieden bleibt trotzdem unsicher – doch die Machtverhältnisse in Khartum werden neu gemischt.

Ein Friedensvertrag zwischen Rebellengruppen und einer Regierung setzt der organisierten politischen Gewalt ein Ende und verbessert so die Leben jener Menschen, die von dem Konflikt betroffen sind – soweit die Theorie. Diese Hoffnung äußerten auch die sudanesischen Konfliktparteien und internationalen Beobachter, als sie das Friedensabkommen von Juba am 3. Oktober 2020 unterschrieben. Die Stimmung war emotional. Während der Zeremonie in Südsudans Hauptstadt, dessen Regierung das Abkommen vermittelt hatte, verkündete Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, der Vorsitzende des Souveränitätsrats, feierlich: »Sudan ist unser Land und wir sind alle Brüder.«

Worte der Aussöhnung sind schön, dürfen aber nicht von den Schwächen des Abkommens und von drohenden Unruhen ablenken. Immerhin: Verglichen mit früheren Abkommen ist das Vertrauen zwischen Regierung und Rebellen deutlich größer, nach der Revolution im letzten Jahr. Trotzdem wird das Juba-Abkommen allein nicht die allgegenwärtige Gewalt in Regionen wie Darfur oder Ost-Sudan beenden.

Denn: Die Unterzeichner repräsentieren nur einen Bruchteil der Bevölkerung, einige marginalisierte Gruppen waren nicht an den Verhandlungen beteiligt, die Ursachen der Spannungen wurden nicht ausreichend behandelt und die im Abkommen festgelegten Sicherheitsmaßnahmen könnten zu erneuten Gewaltausbrüchen führen. Dennoch ist das Abkommen wichtig, denn es verändert die Machtverhältnisse in Khartum und wird sich somit maßgeblich auf den politischen Übergangsprozess auswirken.

Hohe Ziele und neue Spannungen

Das Friedensabkommen beinhaltet mehrere Protokolle, die sich auf fünf geographische Schwerpunkte und verschiedene Mitgliedsgruppen der »Sudanesischen Revolutionsfront« (SRF) beziehen. Neben Vereinbarungen zum Osten, Norden und Zentrum Sudans betreffen die detailliertesten Vereinbarungen mit der Übergangsregierung in Khartum Darfur, Süd-Kordofan und den Blauen Nil – Gebiete, die in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten unter verheerenden Kriegen litten.

Die Inhalte der Protokolle erinnern an frühere Vereinbarungen zu Macht- und Vermögensteilungen, jedoch beinhalten sie auch Verpflichtungen zur Übergangsjustiz (wie beispielsweise die Kooperation mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof), Reparationszahlungen, Land- und Weiderechte sowie zur Rückkehr von Geflüchteten und Binnenvertriebenen.

Die Vereinbarungen umfassen somit mögliche Lösungen für einige der vielen Missstände in Sudan. Doch die mangelnde Einbeziehung lokaler Gruppen könnte erneut Ängste und Spannungen verursachen, etwa bei der Landverteilung. Solche Auswirkungen werden im Osten Sudans bereits sichtbar, wo Demonstranten Teile der Hafenstadt Port Sudan für mehrere Tage blockierten, um gegen die Bedingungen des Friedensabkommens in der Region zu protestieren.

In Darfur gehen die Kriegshandlungen weiter

Die zwei wichtigsten Rebellengruppen Sudans, die nach wie vor relevante Gebiete im Süden und Westen des Landes kontrollieren, haben das Abkommen nicht unterschrieben. Allerdings wächst nun der Druck auf diese Gruppen, sich an Friedensverhandlungen zu beteiligen.

Im Jebel Marra-Plateau in Zentral-Darfur bleibt die »Sudanesische Befreiungsarmee« unter Abdelwahid Al-Nur, kurz SLA-AW, der hartnäckigste Gegner der Friedensverhandlungen. Die Rebellengruppe befindet sich in einem Konflikt mit den sudanesischen Streitkräften, noch Ende September wurde gekämpft. In ihrem aktuellen Bericht identifizierte die gemeinsame Mission der Vereinten Nationen und der Afrikanischen Union in Darfur (UNAMID) 48 Sicherheitsvorkommnisse und 115 Tote allein zwischen Juni und August.

Da sie kaum Zugriff auf das Mobilfunk- oder Satellitennetz haben, sind die von Rebellen kontrollierten Gebiete in Jebel Marra fast vollkommen vom Rest des Landes abgeschnitten. Abdelwahid Al-Nur hat immer wieder eine eigene Friedensinitiative und eine Rückkehr aus seinem Exil in Paris nach Sudan angekündigt. Genauere Einzelheiten zu diesem Vorhaben bleiben jedoch vorerst im Unklaren.

Die andere der beiden Gruppen, die Fraktion der »Sudanesischen Volksbefreiungsbewegung – Nord« unter der Führung von Abdel-Aziz Al-Hilu, kurz SPLM-Nord (al-Hilu), kontrolliert Teile der Bundesstaaten Süd-Kordofan und Blauer Nil. Mögliche Spannungen ergeben sich unter anderem durch den Anspruch einer anderen Fraktion der SPLM-Nord unter der Führung von Malig Agar, die Gebiete in den Friedensverhandlungen zu vertreten, obwohl sie selbst praktisch keine Truppen dort unterhält.

Al-Hilu zweifelt an der Aufrichtigkeit der an der Übergangsregierung beteiligten Sicherheitskräfte, echten Wandel in Sudan einzuleiten. Dennoch unterzeichnete er am 3. September 2020 eine gesonderte Grundsatzerklärung mit Premierminister Abdalla Hamdok in Addis Abeba. Das Übereinkommen verlängert den Waffenstillstand in Süd-Kordofan und dem Blauen Nil und erlaubt der SPLM-Nord (al-Hilu) vorübergehend den Besitz ihrer Waffen.

Als wichtigster Erfolg gilt die in der Erklärung festgelegte Trennung von Religion und Staat. Diese Formulierung ist als Kompromissformel gedacht, um den umstrittenen Fokus auf einen säkularen Staat, den al-Hilu anstrebt, zu vermeiden. Am Tag vor der Unterzeichnung des Friedensabkommens trafen sich Hamdok und al-Hilu nochmals und beschlossen, die genaue Bedeutung dieses Kompromisses als Vorbereitung für offizielle Friedensverhandlungen weiter auszuhandeln.

Die Konfliktlage hat sich seit der Revolution gewandelt

Seit dem Sturz von Präsident Omar Al-Baschir im April 2019 ist die Anzahl der gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen in Darfur und Süd-Kordofan wieder deutlich gestiegen. Die bewaffneten Bewegungen, die das Juba-Friedensabkommen unterzeichneten, wie die SLA-Fraktion unter Führung von Minni Minawi, die »Bewegung für Gerechtigkeit und Gleichheit« (JEM) unter Jibril Ibrahim oder die SPLM-Nord-Fraktion unter Malik Agar, sind jedoch nicht für diese Entwicklung verantwortlich.

Vielmehr treiben irreguläre Milizgruppen und paramilitärische Gruppen die Gewalt an. Sie sind ein Nebenprodukt der staatlichen Aufstandsbekämpfung, die jahrzehntelang auf die Bewaffnung von Hirten setzte. Obwohl die bewaffneten Milizen in Darfur oft als Kollektiv mit dem Sammelbegriff »Dschandschawid« beschrieben werden, agieren diese Einheiten oft autonom und teilweise auch gegen staatliche Sicherheitskräfte.

Eine Analyse des »Armed Conflict Location Event Data Projects« (ACLED) kam im August zu dem Schluss, dass das Konfliktumfeld in Sudan in den letzten Jahren vielschichtige Veränderungen durchlaufen hat. Zwischen 2014 und 2016 vertrieb die Baschir-Regierung einen Großteil der Rebellengruppen im Rahmen ihrer Aufstandsbekämpfung. Zeitgleich nahmen jedoch die Konflikte zwischen Bauern und Hirten zu und halten immer noch an.

Binnenflüchtlinge, die zu ihren Feldern zurückkehren, treffen auf bewaffnete Viehhüter auf ihrem Land. Verhandlungen zwischen diesen Gruppen zum Schutz von Feldern können gelingen, aber ohne funktionierende staatliche Mechanismen und effektive Sicherheitskräfte sind gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen zu häufig das Ergebnis. Die Viehhirten fürchten den Verlust ihres privilegierten Status, den sie durch die neue Machtverteilung in Khartum in Gefahr sehen, und reagieren daher oft gewaltsam.

Zunehmend finden Auseinandersetzungen in dicht bevölkerten städtischen Regionen statt, da Flüchtlingscamps oft in der Nähe von Städten errichtet wurden. Angesichts scharfer ethnischer Identitätsunterschiede als Ergebnis von Baschirs Politik eskalieren kleinere Streitigkeiten leicht.

Wie die nun verabschiedeten Protokolle für Landnutzung und Weiderechte belegen, spielte diese Konfliktdynamik durchaus eine Rolle in den Verhandlungen in Juba. Dennoch könnten die für Darfur vorgesehenen Sicherheitsmaßnahmen den Boden für neue Gewalt bereiten. Die Unterzeichner vereinbarten die Gründung eines gemeinsamen Einsatzverbands mit 12.000 Soldaten, bestehend aus Truppen der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte und Rebellengruppen.

In Darfur verfügen die Unterzeichner jedoch über keine eigenen Kämpfer. Berichten zufolge werben sie nun neue Mitglieder für den gemeinsamen Einsatzverband sowie den Abrüstungs-, Demobilisierungs- und Reintegrationsprozess an. Das ist nicht nur teuer, sondern verfehlt auch den Zweck des Abkommens. Die zusätzliche Rekrutierung fördert politische Patronage und die Militarisierung der Konfliktregion.

Ein weiteres Problem ist, dass die sudanesische Regierung die Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens nicht bezahlen kann, und auch keine internationale finanzielle Unterstützung in Aussicht hat. Im Unterschied zu früheren Abkommen vermittelte nicht das reiche Katar, sondern der arme Südsudan. Die sudanesische Regierung hat Darfur zwar jährlich 750 Millionen US-Dollar zugesagt, angesichts seiner Schwierigkeiten für andere Ausgaben wie Nahrungsmittelimporte oder Gehälter im öffentlichen Dienst aufzukommen, ist jedoch unklar, wo diese Summe herkommen soll. Ohne Friedensdividende und Entwicklungsfonds werden die Ursachen des Konflikts weiter schwelen.

Der Einzug der bewaffneten Gruppen stärkt Sicherheitsakteure in der Regierung

Es wird deutlich: Die Hauptwirkung des Juba-Friedensabkommens ist nicht, nachhaltigen Frieden in den von Konflikt zerrütteten Gebieten Sudans zu bringen. Vielmehr zielt es auf den Übergangsprozess in Khartum. Das Abkommen wird in die Verfassungserklärung integriert, die den Übergangsprozess im August 2019 einleitete.

Zudem wird der Übergangsprozess um ein Jahr verlängert und die Vertreter der SRF werden den Übergangsinstitutionen beitreten. Sie erhalten drei zusätzliche Sitze im bisher elf Mitglieder umfassenden Souveränitätsrat (Sudans kollektiver Präsidentschaft während des Übergangsprozesses), sowie 25 Prozent der Sitze im Übergangsparlament, sobald dieses eingerichtet wird.

Fünf Sitze stehen den Rebellengruppen in einem erweiterten Kabinett von insgesamt 25 Ministerposten zu. Zudem dürfen die Vertreterinnen und Vertreter der Unterzeichner des Friedensabkommens bei zukünftigen Wahlen antreten, anders als noch in der Verfassungserklärung vorgesehen.

Die Integration bewaffneter Gruppen in die Politik wird die Machtverhältnisse in Khartum maßgeblich verändern. Es ist anzunehmen, dass Vertreter der bewaffneten Gruppen mit den Sicherheitskräften zusammenarbeiten werden, die sie als die wahren Machthaber ansehen. Dies wird zulasten der zivilen » Kräfte der Freiheit und des Wandels« (FFC) gehen. Die FFC als Koalition politischer Parteien und zivilgesellschaftlicher Organisationen sind ohnehin geschwächt und verlieren immer mehr ihren Anschluss an die Widerstandskomitees, die die Revolutionsbewegung 2018/2019 anführten.

Auch das Verhältnis zwischen den FFC, dem zivilen Kabinett und den Sicherheitskräften ist angespannt. Angesichts breiter Demonstrationen wegen der anhaltenden Wirtschaftskrise und fehlender Fortschritte des Reformprozesses deutete Burhan bereits Ende August eine vollständige Machtübernahme durch das Militär an. Diese Befürchtung äußerte damals auch ein Kontakt vor Ort mir gegenüber.

Die bevorstehende Eröffnung des Übergangsparlaments, die bislang aufgrund der Friedensverhandlungen aufgeschoben worden war, ist ein positiver Schritt für Partizipation während des Übergangsprozesses. Idealerweise wird sie Transparenz, Rechenschaft und Inklusion stärken. Die FFC haben versprochen, Abgeordnete aus allen Teilen Sudans zu ernennen. Öffentliche Beratungen im Übergangsparlament könnten ein Gegenmodel bilden zu den Ad-hoc-Kommissionen, welche die FFC, der Souveränitätsrat und das Kabinett in den letzten Monaten gegründet haben.

Außerdem haben die bewaffneten Gruppen und die FFC sich dazu verpflichtet, mindestens 40 Prozent weibliche Abgeordnete zu ernennen. Dies wäre ein wichtiger Schritt weg von der männlicher Dominanz im Friedens- und Übergangsprozess. Insgesamt muss das Übergangsparlament ein Ort werden, an dem die Übergangsregierung wieder Anschluss an die Widerstandskomitees und die Zivilgesellschaft findet, bevor diese sich ganz von dem Übergangsprozess verabschieden.

Internationale Partner sollten ihre finanzielle Unterstützung umsichtig anpassen

Die internationalen Partners Sudans sollten ihre Unterstützung bei der Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens gewissenhaft ausrichten. Obwohl das Abkommen alles andere als perfekt ist, stellt es doch einen wichtigen Meilenstein in Sudans Übergangsprozess dar. Finanzielle Förderungen dürfen keine Anreize für Neuanwerbungen seitens der Rebellen schaffen und sollten sich stattdessen auf die Fortbildung der bewaffneten Gruppen in demokratischen Prozessen, lokale Friedenskonsolidierung und Versöhnungsmaßnahmen konzentrieren.

Zusätzlich sollten die internationalen Partner ihre Zusagen für humanitäre Hilfe erhöhen. Momentan sind nur 47 Prozent des humanitären Plans der Vereinten Nationen für Sudan für das Jahr 2020 gedeckt.

Obwohl der Einfluss der Friedensmission von AU und UN auf die Sicherheitslage begrenzt ist, bleibt sie zumindest in den nächsten Monaten ein wichtiger Akteur für den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung, die Sicherung humanitären Zugangs und die Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens. Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen sollte sein Mandat für UNAMID über den 31. Dezember 2020, dem momentan geplanten Missionsende, verlängern.

Den seit Jahren eingeleiteten UNAMID-Rückzug in dieser Situation zu vollenden würde die von Ungewissheit und Ängsten lokaler Gruppen geprägte Situation in Darfur noch verschärfen. Die sudanesische Regierung hat sich zwar zu dem Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung verpflichtet, schafft es derzeit jedoch nicht, dem ausreichend nachzukommen, wie die Vorfälle der letzten Monate zeigen. Die UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), welche die Umsetzung des Friedensabkommens unterstützen soll, befindet sich derzeit noch in der Planungsphase und wird erst allmählich seine Arbeit im Januar 2021 aufnehmen.

Die UN-Mitgliedstaaten sollten eine ausreichende Ausstattung der neuen Mission mit genügend Expertinnen und Experten in den laufenden Haushaltsverhandlungen in New York sicherstellen. UNITAMS sollte die sudanesische Regierung unterstützen, auch lokale Friedensinitiativen in den peripheren Gebieten des Landes im Westen, Süden und Osten voranzutreiben.

Zuletzt bietet der Abschluss der aufwändigen Friedensverhandlungen in Juba eine Chance für die sudanesische Regierung und ihre internationalen Partner, die letztes Jahr vereinbarten Regierungs- und Wirtschaftsreformen mit neuem Schwung zu verfolgen. Denn nur wenn der Übergangsprozess einen Weg hin zu mehr Stabilität und Legitimität zeichnen kann, wird Sudan nachhaltigen Frieden finden.

How the New UN Mission in Sudan can succeed

This text first appeared on the Global Observatory of the International Peace Institute on 25 August 2020. It was written by Philipp Jahn, Gerrit Kurtz, and Peter Schumann.

After complex negotiations, the United Nations Security Council established the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) on June 3, 2020, asking Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to start planning the mission so that it can begin operations no later than the beginning of 2021. The special political mission (SPM) has four mandated tasks: supporting the democratic transition, the peace process, peacebuilding, and the mobilization of aid.

The polarized political landscape in Sudan has already affected the planning process. After the Sudanese government (as well as China and Russia) blocked the secretary-general’s initial suggestion for the mission head, and disagreements continued on the future role of the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), the existing peace operation in Darfur, UNITAMS has found itself on thin ice before even starting to work.

A Fragile Transition Process

Sudan’s internal competition for power will be an essential challenge for UNITAMS. As with any UN peace operation, the mission will need to work closely with the incumbent government, but also engage with civil society organizations, security forces, and armed groups—including those opposed to the government. However, the power-sharing coalition is polarized, its constituent parts are fragmented, and its legitimacy is thin. The constitutional declaration, which the Transitional Military Council and the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) signed in August 2019, is the binding foundation for the transition process, and includes tasks such as a comprehensive peace agreement with Sudan’s armed groups and wide-ranging economic reforms.

In principle, UNITAMS should assist and support the transitional authorities in these tasks. But that is not straightforward. While a fragmented political landscape is nothing unusual for a mission setting, Sudan’s main political forces represent competing political systems, each with their external backing. They range from, first, members of the former Islamist regime, whose adherents have frequently launched protests against the transitional authorities and retain sympathies from Turkey and Qatar. Second, the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Rapid Support Forces, special police, and internal security services, represent a model of military authoritarianism as in Egypt, on which they count as their regional ally together with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Finally, the civilian cabinet led by Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance and other political parties are proponents of a democratic system, with support from the European Union, the AU, and Ethiopia.

Hamdok’s cabinet, UNITAMS’ main interlocutor, is increasingly squeezed between internal fragmentation of the parties nominally supporting it, revisionist protests from the Islamist camp, and domestic expectations to improve the dire economic situation. For example, Sadiq al-Mahdi from the National Umma Party, who led Sudan’s last democratic government in the late 1980s and had supported the civilian government before, reached out to the military and security forces to form a “patriotic alliance” against Hamdok. The planned inclusion of representatives of armed groups in the government’s transitional institutions as part of an impending peace agreement is likely to complicate this picture further.

The UN and Local Ownership

Implementing strong local ownership is a structural challenge for UN peace operations, especially for an integrated mission like UNITAMS, which is meant to carry out relevant functions of the UN Country Team. Peace operations, under the overall guidance of the UN Security Council and the UN secretary-general, have more leeway in implementing their mandate than UN agencies, funds, and programs, which rely on the host government’s consent for every project that they devise and implement. The close role of state authorities in planning and reviewing UN development and peacebuilding projects fosters their ownership though, whereas peace operations often remain tied to a top-down approach with national ownership at a much more abstract level, despite their efforts to consult communities and survey local perceptions. In the past, straying from the narrow line dictated by Sudan’s regime has often resulted in the expulsion of UN officials.

In Sudan, the UN cannot count on the government alone. Dominated by external advisors and (former) international officials, Prime Minister Hamdok’s government is hamstrung by the extremely low capacity of public administration. For example, the transitional government struggles to develop project proposals at the level of detail requested by donors and ensure efficient implementation of transition objectives. In early July, Hamdok appointed a 15-member-committee to manage negotiations with UNITAMS. While the body is largely civilian (except one member representing military intelligence), it does not involve members of the FFC or other civil society organizations.

From countless examples of international interventionism, we know today that external actors cannot impose a framework on a society to resolve a conflict, if the fundamental causes of polarization and conflict remain. That was the experience of the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) in 2015, which collapsed less than a year after the parties signed it under heavy regional and international pressure. UNAMID, for its part, came into being because of such international pressure, and was hampered to implement its mandate effectively by the intransigent government of President Omar al-Bashir, and ended up serving the political objectives of the past regime.

An Adaptive Approach

If UNITAMS is to avoid the fate of those peace efforts, it needs to adopt an adaptive approach. This peacebuilding approach recognizes that, as Cedric de Coning writes, “social systems are highly dynamic, non-linear and emergent.” It chimes well with Prime Minister Hamdok’s frequent insistence that Sudan’s transition process is “messy and non-linear.” An adaptive peacebuilding strategy takes a highly participatory approach, experiments with different options, and pays close attention to feedback from the local political environment, reviewing and adjusting its programming frequently in response to that feedback. Specifically, UNITAMS should heed four considerations.

First, in planning and implementing the mission, UN officials should account for the rapidly evolving situation and relatively short scheduled lifespan of the mission tracking the (now probably four-year) transition period. Instead of rigid budgets and work plans common in a UN peace operation, as much authority for recruitment, coordination, and project design should be delegated to the country-level as possible. Only with enough flexibility and Sudanese participation will the mission be able to respond to evolving dynamics and local needs. Specifically, the mission should institutionalize a regular advisory and monitoring mechanism, not just with the government’s committee, but with the FFC and civil society organizations as well. In doing so, the UN can build on its engagement with those groups since the start of the revolution in 2019. Knowledge management experts should ensure a smooth transition to the UN Country Team, while the mission should employ political and civil affairs officers with relevant regional and country expertise.

Second, UNITAMS should foster resilience, i.e., the ability to withstand and manage shocks to the transition process. There are likely going to be further delays and setbacks in the transition process, even a complete take-over by the security sector cannot be ruled out. UNITAMS has the mandate to support institution-building through providing technical expertise and advise for the constitutional process and independent commissions. As many actors are already present in this field, UNITAMS must avoid contributing to donor competition for attractive lighthouse projects. It should concentrate on strengthening the ability of the civilian authorities to exert control over the security sector and its economic activities, as the transitional government has planned. This will require the mission to put parliamentarians and political parties at the center of their stakeholder engagement. Only they can ensure functional civilian oversight of the security sector. The Sudanese private sector will be needed to restructure the assets of the security sector.

Third, UNITAMS should contribute to ensuring international coherence, in particular regarding the UN’s activities in Sudan and international financing of the transition. Extending basic services and supplies to the whole population is a key element of the transition’s success. More donor funds are expected to flow into Sudan in the wake of the Sudan Berlin Conference, where attendants pledged around 1.8 billion dollars (plus up to a further 400 million dollars in a pre-arrears clearance grant from the World Bank) on June 25, 2020. Ensuring a consistent follow-up process that will see further partnership conferences and coordination of pledges as well as operational activities in a way that considers the nexus between humanitarian and development activities in addition to peacebuilding will be crucial for UNITAMS.

As an integrated mission, some tasks that UNITAMS undertakes will continue after it is scheduled to leave Sudan with the completion of democratic elections, such as the reform of the civil service and public administration. As these developmental tasks will take many years, UNITAMS should leave the building of these vital state capacities to those organizations that are going to stay in Sudan for the long run, and concentrate on overall strategic coordination and ensure peace and stability of the transition process itself. Structurally, the existing donor coordination mechanisms supported by the UN Country Team can ensure Sudanese ownership more effectively than a peace operation. Given the remaining threats to civilians in Darfur and elsewhere, the Security Council may decide to extend UNAMID beyond December 2020. For UNITAMS, this would mean that it would have to revisit its mission plan and even raison d’être.

Finally, the mission should facilitate the flow of information and promote transparency regarding its own activities and those of development partners and government authorities. Sudan is swirling with rumors and speculation, including about the work of international actors. With offices around the country, logistical capacities, and the protection of a status-of-forces agreement, the mission should empower marginalized voices through dialogue processes, local conflict management, and reconciliation, and encourage communication between Sudan’s federal states and Khartoum.

UNITAMS can provide a platform for sharing information and can facilitate communication beyond its regular reporting to the UN Security Council, including public information efforts in Sudan. This includes managing expectations what a political mission can and cannot deliver, especially when it comes to protection of civilians and accountability. Establishing such processes could also help shine a light on the often-unclear support of Sudan’s non-traditional donors, including from the Gulf.

Becoming a Central Focal Point

The success of UNITAMS hinges on the ability and capacity of mission leadership and staff to provide substantive technical professional inputs to the transition process otherwise not available to Sudanese institutions, and to ensure strong Sudanese ownership of the mission. Adopting a flexible, adaptive approach will be difficult for a UN system full of inertia. Given the right policies, resources, leadership, and political backing, the mission still has the chance to become a focal point for the international support to Sudan’s transition.

Philipp Jahn heads the office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Khartoum. Gerrit Kurtz is research fellow for crisis prevention and diplomacy in Africa at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. Peter Schumann is a former UN official, who served as Acting Deputy Joint Special Representative with UNAMID in 2017/18.

Kriegsverbrechen in Sri Lanka: Aufarbeitung nicht in Sicht

26 Jahre lang tobte ein Bürgerkrieg in dem Inselstaat Sri Lanka. Zehntausende Zivilisten starben zwischen den Fronten. Unzählige Menschen verschwanden spurlos. Eine Aufklärung der Kriegsverbrechen mit Hilfe der Vereinten Nationen scheint heute unwahrscheinlicher denn je – und die Situation für Minderheiten im Land verschärft sich.

Dieser Text erschien am 28. Februar 2020 in der Zeitschrift Pogrom der Gesellschaft für bedrohte Völker.

Wellen plätschern an einen feinen Sandstrand, der sich in der Ferne biegt. Hinter dem Strand ist die Erde aufgewühlt. Etwas weiter ragen Palmyrapalmen und struppige Büsche auf. Hier, am Strand von Mullivaikal, endete der sri-lankische Bürgerkrieg im Mai 2009. Damals waren zuletzt 130.000 tamilische Zivilisten auf einem winzigen Flecken Land eingepfercht. Von mehreren Seiten regneten Geschosse der sri-lankischen Armee auf sie nieder. Wollten sie fliehen, drohten Kugeln der Rebellen der Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (dt.: Befreiungstiger von Tamil Eelam; kurz: Tamil Tigers), die im Bürgerkrieg von 1983 bis 2009 für die Unabhängigkeit des von Tamilen dominierten Nordens und Ostens Sri Lankas kämpften.

Mehr als ein Jahrzehnt später sind die gesellschaftlichen Wunden noch roh. Zehntausende Menschen, viele von ihnen Tamilen, sind nach dem 26-jährigen Bürgerkrieg nie wieder aufgetaucht. Das Land ist tief gespalten. In den vergangenen Jahren schien eine rechtliche Aufarbeitung des Kriegs und eine Bearbeitung der tieferen Konfliktursachen zwar möglich. Doch mit der Wahl des neuen Präsidenten, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, am 16. November 2019 sind sie wieder in weite Ferne gerückt. Im Januar 2020 erklärte er, die mindestens 24.000 vermissten Personen seien tot, und gab den Tamil Tigers die Schuld, ohne einzelne Beweise vorzulegen. Rajapaksa war ab 2005 Verteidigungsstaatssekretär des Inselstaats. Unter seiner Zuständigkeit fanden schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen gerade in der Endphase des Krieges statt. Sein älterer Bruder Mahinda war zu jener Zeit Präsident. Die Brüder nehmen den „Sieg gegen den Terrorismus“ für sich in Anspruch.

Sri Lanka 2009: eine hochanspruchsvolle Situation für das UN-System

Die Vereinten Nationen (UN) gaben in den letzten Kriegsmonaten 2008 und 2009 kein gutes Bild ab. Ein Beispiel: Auf eigene Faust sammelte eine Gruppe engagierter Mitarbeiter im UN-Landesteam Daten über zivile Opfer, soweit sie über Kontakte und Satellitendaten an Informationen gelangen konnten. Dem höchsten UN-Mitarbeiter in Sri Lanka, Neil Buhne, fehlte es jedoch an abgestimmten politischen Anweisungen aus New York und an Erfahrung in solchen Situationen. Bei einem Briefing am 9. März 2009 präsentierte er Diplomaten in der sri-lankischen Hauptstadt Colombo die Opferzahlen – erwähnte aber dabei nicht, dass laut UN-Informationen die Regierung für den Großteil der zivilen Opfer zu dem Zeitpunkt verantwortlich gewesen sei.

Das UN-Hochkommissariat für Menschenrechte (OHCHR) machte diese Zahlen dagegen öffentlich, um Druck auf die Regierung auszuüben. Andere Teile des UN-Systems fürchteten wiederum, ihr humanitärer Zugang zu den umkämpften Gebieten Sri Lankas könnte (noch) weiter eingeschränkt werden. Gegenüber dem sri-lankischen Außenminister bezeichnete Buhne die Zahlen als unzuverlässig. Das Ergebnis war ein inkohärentes Auftreten des gesamten UN-Systems gegenüber der sri-lankischen Regierung.

Sri Lanka 2009 war eine hochanspruchsvolle Situation für das UN-System. Vor Ort arbeiteten hauptsächlich humanitäre und Entwicklungsorganisationen. Praktisch keine Vertreter der politischen und menschenrechtlichen Seiten des Systems waren zugegen. Gleichzeitig hatten viele UN-Mitgliedsstaaten die sri-lankische Regierung lange Zeit im Kampf gegen die Tamil Tigers unterstützt, die ihrerseits Anschläge gegen zivile Ziele mit massenhaften Opfern verübt hatten. Erst wenige Monate vor Ende der Kriegshandlungen, unter Druck von großen Demonstrationen der tamilischen Diaspora in Städten wie London und Toronto, übten einige Staaten mehr Druck auf die sri-lankische Regierung aus. Doch Sri Lanka war noch nicht einmal formal auf der Agenda des UN-Sicherheitsrats. Die Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrats zogen nicht an einem Strang.

Lehren aus der Inkohärenz

Unter der Führung von UN-Generalsekretär Ban Ki-moon und seinem Stellvertreter Jan Eliasson bemühten sich die Vereinten Nationen, ihre Lehren aus der Erfahrung der Inkohärenz in Sri Lanka 2009 zu ziehen. Gegenüber der sri-lankischen Regierung setzte sich der Generalsekretär mit Nachdruck bereits wenige Tage nach dem formalen Ende der Feindseligkeiten für eine Aufarbeitung der mutmaßlichen Kriegsverbrechen ein. Ein Jahr später ernannte er eine eigene Expertenkommission, um ihn in dieser Frage zu beraten. Eliasson beaufsichtigte Reformen des Maschinenraums des UN-Systems, um mit der Initiative „Human Rights up Front“ (dt.: Menschenrechte im Vordergrund) mehr Anreize für regelmäßige Zusammenarbeit der verschiedenen Teile des UN-Systems zu setzen. Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter sollten gestärkt werden, auch kritische Fragen mit Mitgliedsstaaten zu besprechen.

Unter der Führung der USA begann der UN-Menschenrechtsrat 2012 sich mit Sri Lanka zu befassen. Eine europäische Initiative hatte die sri-lankische Regierung im Mai 2009 zum eigenen Nutzen zuvor gekapert. 2014 begann OHCHR eine Untersuchung, wurde aber von der Rajapaksa-Regierung nicht ins Land gelassen. Das Blatt wendete sich, als die sri-lankische Bevölkerung 2015 eine reformwillige Regierung unter der Führung von Präsident Maithripala Sirisena und Premierminister Ranil Wickremesinghe ins Amt wählte. Die neue Regierung bekannte sich im Menschenrechtsrat zu einem umfangreichen Programm der Übergangsjustiz (Transitional Justice), allerdings ohne Zeitplan.

Die Umsetzung zog sich hin. Bis Ende 2019 richtete die Regierung lediglich eine Behörde zur Untersuchung der verschwundenen Personen (Office of Missing Persons) und ein Reparationsbüro ein, jedoch keine Wahrheitskommission oder gerichtlichen Mechanismus. Auch eine umfangreiche Verfassungsreform einschließlich mehr Autonomierechte für die Provinzen blieb im Parlament stecken. Stattdessen rieb sich die Regierung im inneren Streit auf, der in einer Verfassungskrise im Herbst 2018 gipfelte.

Gewalt gegen Minderheiten

Die Situation der Minderheiten in Sri Lanka – vor allem Muslime, Tamilen und Christen – bleibt angespannt. Der Nationalismus der numerischen Mehrheit der singhalesischen Buddhisten prägt seit Jahrzehnten die Politik des Landes. Dies macht sich beispielsweise in der Sprachenpolitik in Sicherheitsorganen und Verwaltung bemerkbar: Selbst im Norden des Landes, in dem überwiegend Tamilen leben, sprechen nur wenige Polizisten die Sprache der Menschen, die sie schützen sollen. Gleichzeitig hat es in den vergangenen Jahren immer wieder Übergriffe von organisierten Mobs insbesondere auf Muslime gegeben – sowohl unter Präsident Mahinda Rajapaksa als auch unter Sirisena.

Ostersonntag 2019 verloren bei der größten Terroranschlagsserie seit Kriegsende mehr als 250 Menschen ihr Leben, viele von ihnen Christen im Gottesdienst. Die Sicherheitsorgane ignorierten Warnungen aus der muslimischen Gemeinschaft und vom indischen Geheimdienst über die extreme Radikalisierung einer abgeschotteten Gruppe im Osten, wie ein parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuss feststellte. In der Folgezeit schürte Sirisena die aufgeheizte Stimmung gegen Muslime noch. So begnadigte er zum Beispiel einen verurteilten Scharfmacher einer radikalen buddhistischen Gruppe.

Präsident Gotabaja Rajapaksa hat angekündigt, dass er sich nicht an die Bekenntnisse der Vorgängerregierung hinsichtlich der Aufarbeitung der Menschenrechtsverletzungen während des Bürgerkriegs gebunden fühlt. Sofort nach seiner Wahl berichteten zivilgesellschaftliche Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten über Drohungen und Beeinträchtigungen ihrer Arbeit. Sri Lanka steht bei der 43. Sitzung des UN-Menschenrechtsrats im Februar/März 2020 wieder auf der Tagesordnung. Das Fenster für Reformen hat sich jedoch geschlossen.

Mehr als Friedensrufer: Die Rolle der Vereinten Nationen im Irankonflikt

Die Vereinten Nationen haben trotz gescheiterter Vermittlungsversuche über verschiedene Kanäle weiterhin Einfluss in der Konfliktregion. Die Europäer sollten die VN als zentralen Ort für die internationale Konfliktvermittlung stärken.

Diesen Beitrag schrieb ich zusammen mit Carina Böttcher. Er erschien als DGAP Web-Beitrag am 16. Januar 2020.

„Das neue Jahr hat damit begonnen, dass unsere Welt in Aufruhr ist“, kommentierte UN-Generalsekretär António Guterres die Eskalation zwischen dem Iran und den USA. „Und meine Botschaft ist einfach und klar: Stoppen Sie die Eskalation. Üben Sie maximale Zurückhaltung. Nehmen Sie den Dialog wieder auf. Erneuern Sie die internationale Zusammenarbeit“. Eine Absage an die Vereinten Nationen als Mediator kam in diesem Fall von den USA. Die Regierung unter US-Präsident Donald Trump lehnte in der ersten Januarwoche ein Visum für den iranischen Außenminister Javad Zarif ab – auch wenn dies gegen die Pflichten der USA als Gaststaat der Vereinten Nationen verstößt. Die Vereinten Nationen sind jedoch nicht handlungsunfähig.

Überwachen, berichten, vermitteln, Kapazitäten aufbauen

Die Verhandlungen für das 2015 geschlossene Nuklearabkommen zum Iran fanden zwar im E3+3-Format (Großbritannien, Frankreich, Deutschland, EU, China, Russland und USA) ohne direkte Beteiligung der Vereinten Nationen statt. Doch es sind die regelmäßigen Berichte der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde (IAEO), die Informationen über die Einhaltung liefern, denen alle Seiten vertrauen können. Trotz seiner jüngsten Ankündigung, sich nicht mehr an die Beschränkungen des Atomprogrammes gebunden zu fühlen, arbeitet der Iran weiterhin mit der IAEO zusammen. Besuche der IAEO-Inspektoren bei iranischen Einrichtungen gehen weiter.

Die Vereinten Nationen erfüllen in der Region unerlässliche Funktionen, teils wenig beachtet von einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit. Die regionalen Konflikte, in denen der Iran über seine Verbündeten involviert ist, werden weiterhin im Sicherheitsrat verhandelt. Im Irak unterhalten die Vereinten Nationen seit 2003 die zivile Friedensmission UNAMI. Mit ihrer Arbeit wirkt die Mission auf eine stabile und pluralistische irakische Staatsorganisation und Gesellschaft hin. Das macht es für den Iran schwerer, seinen Einfluss in der Region weiter zu vergrößern. UNAMI beobachtet unter anderem die Menschenrechtslage und veröffentlicht Untersuchungsberichte zur Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung, zuletzt im Kontext der breiten Anti-Regierungsdemonstrationen im Herbst 2019.

Im Libanon hat die UN-Friedensmission UNIFIL den Auftrag, die Zone an der Grenze zu Israel zu Land und zu See zu kontrollieren. Die Mission hat Schwierigkeiten, Waffenkontrollen flächendeckend durchzuführen und sie wird routinemäßig am Zugang zu kritischen Orten gehindert. Der Sicherheitsrat sollte sich dafür einsetzen, die Mission zu stärken. Dann könnte UNIFIL einen Beitrag dazu leisten, die militärischen Fähigkeiten von Hisbollah, der vom Iran unterstützten schiitischen Miliz im Libanon, tatsächlich einzudämmen.

Auch im Jemen-Krieg vermitteln die Vereinten Nationen. Seit 2015 kämpfen die mit dem Iran verbündeten Houthis gegen die international anerkannte Regierung und die von Saudi-Arabien angeführte Militärkoalition. Der UN-Sondergesandte Martin Griffiths berichtete im Dezember 2019, die Konfliktparteien kämen allmählich zu der Erkenntnis, dass der Konflikt nicht mit einem militärischen Sieg für eine der Seiten enden könne.

Europäer sollten UN-Fähigkeiten stärken

Keines der genannten Aufgabenfelder der Vereinten Nationen funktioniert problemlos. Dennoch bieten sie Möglichkeiten, Aspekte der regionalen Rolle des Iran zu diskutieren, staatliche und gesellschaftliche Institutionen in ihrer Unabhängigkeit zu stärken, Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu dokumentieren und den Dialog auch mit schwierigen Gesprächspartnern zu führen. Während die USA und Iran seit 1980 keine diplomatischen Beziehungen pflegen, erlaubt die ständige Vertretung Irans bei den Vereinten Nationen in New York einen – seltenen – direkten Gesprächskanal.

Die Europäer geraten zunehmend unter Druck, sich in dem Konflikt eindeutig zugunsten der USA zu positionieren. Dies zeigte sich bereits darin, dass die Außenminister der E3-Staaten sowie die EU-Kommission nur den Iran zur Mäßigung aufriefen. Das hat die Glaubwürdigkeit der EU als neutrale Vermittlerin geschwächt. Die europäischen Regierungen sollten daher die Fähigkeiten der Vereinten Nationen im Umgang mit dem Iran und seinen Verbündeten stärken.

Zwei Szenarien scheinen derzeit im Rahmen der Weltorganisation möglich:

Zunächst könnten in New York informelle Gespräche auf Botschafter-Ebene mit allen relevanten Parteien stattfinden. Solche Gespräche unterhalb der großen politischen Aufmerksamkeitsschwelle sind für die USA relativ unproblematisch, da sie kein Signal der Schwäche an innenpolitische Beobachter senden. Sollten die Gespräche gut verlaufen, könnte später der iranische Außenminister nach New York reisen. Es ist aber fraglich, ob die US-Regierung nach ihrer vorherigen Absage dies im Jahr der Präsidentschaftswahl nachträglich zulassen würden.
Die europäischen Staaten im UN-Sicherheitsrat können eine Sitzung an einem anderen Ort als New York initiieren, beispielsweise in Genf, so dass die Teilnahme von Außenminister Zarif nicht von den USA blockiert werden kann. Im Februar wird Belgien turnusgemäß den Vorsitz im Sicherheitsrat übernehmen. Die existierenden Themen auf der Agenda des Sicherheitsrats bieten Anknüpfungspunkte für strukturierte Diskussionen über geopolitische Interessen des Iran, seiner Verbündeten und der anderen Regionalmächte. Eine Mediation im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen ermöglicht es, den Gesprächsfaden auch über Gipfeltreffen hinaus zu verfolgen.

Die Europäer müssen die Vereinten Nationen wieder zum zentralen Schauplatz der Vermittlung internationaler Spannungen machen. Mit Unterstützung wichtiger Mitgliedstaaten gibt es dort die Chance, mit ihren Gesprächskanälen und Fähigkeiten zur Konfliktbearbeitung den Friedensrufen von Generalsekretär Guterres Nachdruck zu verleihen.

Prävention braucht politische Führung

Dr. Gerrit Kurtz ist Research Fellow bei der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V. (DGAP). Angesichts eines Untersuchungsberichts zum Verhalten der Vereinten Nationen in Myanmar fordert er größeren Mut auf Seiten des UN-Führungspersonals bei der Prävention von Krieg und Gewalt.

Dieser Standpunkt erschien in der Zeitschrift Vereinte Nationen 6/2019.

Eine Familie der Rohingya im Flüchtlingscamp Kutupalong Rohingya in Bangladesch. UN Photo: KM Asad

Kollektives und systemisches Versagen – das war die Schlussfolgerung eines unabhängigen Berichts, der im Auftrag von Generalsekretär António Guterres das Verhalten der Vereinten Nationen in Bezug auf die staatliche Diskriminierung, Vertreibung und Ermordung tausender Rohingya in Myanmar im Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2018 untersuchte. Der Autor des Berichts, Gert Rosenthal, identifizierte fünf Hauptkritikpunkte: mangelhafte Unterstützung der UN durch die Mitgliedstaaten, keine gemeinsame Strategie des UN-Systems, schwache Koordinationsmechanismen, ein dysfunktionales UN-Landesteam mit einer überforderten Residierenden Koordinatorin sowie widersprüchliche Kommunikationskanäle zwischen Myanmar und New York.

Rosenthals Befund ist umso bemerkenswerter, da das kritisierte Verhalten in die Zeit eines wichtigen Reformvorhabens des damaligen UN-Generalsekretärs Ban Ki-moon fällt. Die ›Human Rights up Front‹-Initiative (HRUF) war Bans Konsequenz aus einem ähnlichen Untersuchungsbericht zum Verhalten des UN-Systems während des Bürgerkriegsendes in Sri Lanka in den Jahren 2008 und 2009. Bestandteile der Initiative waren zum einen organisatorische Maßnahmen für eine besser abgestimmte Analyse und Zusammenarbeit zwischen den UN-Einheiten. Zum anderen sollte die HRUF einen Wandel der UN-Organisationskultur herbeiführen sowie die Mitgliedstaaten in die Pflicht nehmen. Belegt der Rosenthal-Bericht nun ein Scheitern dieser Reformanstrengungen?

Wie sollen Bedienstete der Vereinten Nationen Menschenrechtsverletzungen kritisieren, wenn ihr Chef keine klare Linie vorgibt?

Diese Schlussfolgerung wäre zu kurz gegriffen. Innerhalb des UN-Landesteams in Myanmar gab es widerstreitende Vorstellungen davon, welche Prioritäten die UN-Organisationen verfolgen sollten, um die Situation der Rohingya zu verbessern. Humanitärer Zugang und Unterstützung des demokratischen Übergangsprozesses wurden eine höhere Priorität als die öffentliche Kritik an Menschenrechtsverletzungen beigemessen.

Die gröbste Fehlleistung passierte jedoch nicht in Rangun, sondern in New York. Die Uneinigkeit, wann öffentliche Kritik und wann private Diplomatie angezeigt sei, setzte sich auf der Leitungsebene zwischen dem UN-Entwicklungsprogramm (United Nations Development Programm – UNDP), dem Sonderberater für Myanmar und dem stellvertretenden Generalsekretär fort. In seinem Bericht stellt Rosenthal fest, dass Ban zu keinem Zeitpunkt diesen Konflikt entschied. Doch wie sollen UN-Bedienstete unter strenger Beobachtung der Gastregierung offen Menschenrechtsverletzungen kritisieren, wenn ihr oberster Chef keine klare Linie vorgibt?

Zunehmender Nationalismus, Autokratie und Souveränitätsdenken erschweren es den UN, Menschenrechte im Gleichklang mit Entwicklung und Sicherheit zu verfolgen. Prävention kann jedoch nur ganzheitlich gelingen. Ohne kohärente Unterstützung der Mitgliedstaaten ist es für die UN schwierig, Einfluss auf Regime wie in Myanmar zu nehmen. Umso wichtiger ist es, sich beständig Gedanken über mögliche Hebel zu machen. Dazu braucht es Mut, Gestaltungswillen und Konsistenz.

Indem er die Konfliktprävention zur wichtigsten Aufgabe seiner Amtszeit gemacht hat, hat Guterres Führungsfähigkeit bewiesen. Doch muss er erstens dafür sorgen, dass die Menschenrechtsmechanismen besser mit der Agenda 2030 und der Friedensarbeit vernetzt werden. Zweitens muss er dafür sorgen, dass die Residierenden Koordinatorinnen und Koordinatoren das passende Profil zur Situation im Land haben und im Zweifel ausgetauscht werden. Dank der Reform des UN-Entwicklungssystems hat Guterres einen direkten Draht zu diesen wichtigen Schaltstellen. Schließlich sollten die UN-Mitgliedstaaten die Aufarbeitung seitens des UN-Systems zum Anlass nehmen, ihr eigenes Verhalten in Situationen staatlicher Diskriminierung kritisch zu untersuchen – nicht nur in Myanmar.

Peace in South Sudan: Don’t repeat the same mistakes

Germany should advocate in the UN Security Council for a course correction on the international approach to peace in South Sudan. If high-level mediation, addressing impunity, and grassroots reconciliation are not prioritized, international pressure to form a transitional government by November 12, 2019, is likely to lead to renewed violence.

UN Security Council delegation visiting South Sudan, October 2019. Photo: Isaac Billy, UNMISS.

This text was published as DGAP Standpunkt on 29 October 2019.

In Juba, South Sudan’s capital, it seems to be Groundhog Day, with the same events reoccurring in a never-ending loop. The current run-up to a November 12 deadline to form a transitional government closely resembles the predicament of just half a year ago, when the parties had extended the initial deadline from May.

Under intense regional and international pressure after the collapse of the original peace agreement of August 2015, the government and opposition parties signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. It included a ceasefire, which largely still holds across the country, at least among signatories. R-ARCSS also foresaw the creation of a transitional government of national unity, with positions for the various negotiating parties, including five vice-presidential posts.

A delegation of the UN Security Council, led by the United States and South Africa, visited Juba on October 20, 2019. Its mission: impress upon all signatories to the R-ARCSS the need to abide by their commitments, including forming the transitional government by the agreed deadline. The United States has already hinted at additional sanctions if the parties fail. Yet with no adequate security arrangements and political agreements in place, such international pressure risks repeating the same mistakes made at key junctures since the start of South Sudan’s civil war in December 2013.

The issues hindering the peace process and the formation of the transitional government of national unity are well-known. In a statement from early October 2019, the UN Security Council listed them itself: not only is there no agreement between the parties on the internal borders of South Sudan’s federal states and the cantonment and training of government and opposition security forces, but the government is also dragging its feet in releasing funds to support these processes.

Unsatisfied with the lack of progress, the most prominent opposition group – the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) led by Riek Machar – announced in early October that it would not participate in the transition government. Machar maintained his objection during the Security Council’s mid-October visit. Similarly, the South Sudan Opposition Alliance, another signatory of the peace agreement, said that its participation hinged on the resolution of the outstanding issues. President Salva Kiir has maintained that he will form the transitional government even if some opposition groups choose not to participate. Meanwhile, there are already allegations that Kiir is training new forces.

Déjà Vu of the Original Peace Agreement

The current peace deal risks sharing the fate of the original peace agreement of August 2015, which quickly collapsed three years ago amid the escalation of fighting, spread of violence, and fragmentation of the parties involved. Then, international pressure brought Kiir, Machar, and a smaller opposition group together to sign this agreement, which included a ceasefire, a power-sharing arrangement, and a commitment to establish a hybrid court under the aegis of the African Union. As became clear in the following months, the parties never intended to follow through with many of these commitments. Worse, the regional and international guarantors of the agreement let them get away with it.

Barely two months after he signed the peace agreement, President Kiir announced the reorganization of South Sudan’s federal states, increasing their number from 10 to 28. As the power-sharing arrangements were tied to the original number, his move was a clear violation of the peace agreement. Furthermore, the government failed to withdraw the bulk of its security forces from Juba to cantonment sites on its periphery. Machar and Kiir agreed on security arrangements that brought hundreds of opposition forces to Juba to guarantee the safety of Machar and his team, further militarizing the capital.

Under international pressure and in a weak military position, Machar went to Juba in April 2016 to form a unity government. The arrangement proved to be deeply dysfunctional. When Machar’s and Kiir’s forces clashed at an illegal checkpoint in the city in July of that year, heavy fighting broke out, during which hundreds of civilians and fighters were killed. Machar fled Juba accompanied by a contingent of his rebels, with government security forces in close pursuit. The government later revealed that it had paid Paul Malong, then chief of military staff, five million US dollars directly from the central bank to pursue and kill Machar, then the country’s first vice president.

International and regional reactions to these events were underwhelming. Beyond verbal criticism, there were neither repercussions for Kiir’s reorganization of state borders, nor for the July 2016 crisis. In addition, international and regional partners implicitly accepted that Taban Deng Gai, who had represented the opposition during the peace negotiations, had replaced Machar as first vice president while Machar was on the run.

Waking Up from Groundhog Day

Around 380,000 people are estimated to have died because of South Sudan’s civil war. The South Sudanese need a different international engagement. Germany supported the negotiations that led to the revitalized peace agreement last year with expertise and additional staff for the African Union (AU) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional organization in the Horn of Africa. As a donor and a current non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, Germany – along with its European partners – now has the chance to steer international policymaking on South Sudan in new, more effective directions.

First of all, in partnership with the AU and IGAD, the Security Council needs to push for continuous mediation between the parties. Security arrangements and the internal political order were already at the heart of the failure of the previous transitional government. Therefore, it is baffling that IGAD has not yet managed to appoint a permanent head of the peace agreement’s monitoring body. South Sudan should not just be seen as an issue to shape US Ambassador to the UN Kelly Craft’s public profile; rather, it deserves sustained political attention from the region, as well as from international decision-makers, including in Europe. There is no shortcut around negotiations between the parties. High-level mediators not only need to bring all the main players to the negotiating table until there is a consensus, but they also need to quickly follow-up with sanctions in the event of serious violations.

Secondly, donor countries like Germany need to spell out their conditions for support of the peace process more explicitly. Right now, the South Sudanese parties shape the narrative by calling for international donors to release further funds for the implementation of the peace agreement, in particular the retraining of government and opposition forces. Instead, donors should insist on the South Sudanese government’s pledge to release 100 million US dollars for this process. While the government currently spends millions on a presidential jet and foreign medical treatment for MPs, it is neither paying security services nor providing sufficient food and water at cantonment sites. Any support of the peace process by external donors should be bound to financial audits and transparency of South Sudan’s oil sector.

Thirdly, peacemaking in South Sudan needs to move away from a purely transactional model of power-sharing, in which government positions are meted out to the parties according to their negotiating strength. As Lotje de Vries and Mareike Schomerus argued in 2017, a peace deal alone will not end the war in South Sudan. Europe needs to follow the US example by going after the cash flows funding the violence more aggressively than in the past. Thanks to investigations by the Sentry, a US civil society organization; the panel of experts appointed by the UN Security Council; and the UN Human Rights Commission on South Sudan, detailed evidence already exists of the patronage networks benefiting from the civil war. The EU should freeze the assets of more corrupt members of the South Sudanese elite. Addressing impunity by getting the proposed hybrid court on South Sudan up and running under the aegis of the African Union also deserves a higher priority.

International pressure on the parties needs to focus on resolving the outstanding issues, not on forming a bloated transitional government with minimal trust. Machar can be forgiven for not trusting the UN’s assurance of his and his team’s safety if they return to Juba. In July 2016, UN troops were bogged down amid the urban fighting in the city and did not even intervene to halt an assault on humanitarian and UN workers at a nearby compound, let alone protect civilians in the vicinity of its camps. While the UN Mission has been bumped up to include additional forces with a robust mandate and improved procedures, it is unclear whether these forces would be able to engage with the thousands of government troops stationed in Juba if the 2016 scenario were to repeat itself.

For the moment, sustaining the ceasefire needs to have priority. It has enabled the conclusion of more than 130 local reconciliation efforts in South Sudan’s myriad inter- and intra-communal conflicts. The UN Mission in South Sudan, as well as the South Sudanese Council of Churches, has supported many of these efforts. Both deserve the Security Council’s full political support. Over time, local peace agreements can help build national peace and development from the ground up – until, one day, South Sudan can break the loop of renewed violence for good.