Author: Gerrit Kurtz

Researcher working on conflict prevention, diplomacy, peacekeeping and the United Nations, with a focus on the Horn of Africa. Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Rethinking Transitional Justice in Sudan

Drawing Lessons From the Transition Process and Finding an End to the War

Published in Verfassungsblog, 26 June 2025

The war that has plagued Sudan since 15 April 2023 is accompanied by massive violations and abuses of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Sudanese returning to their homes in Khartoum, which was recaptured by the army in late March, often find graves and decomposing bodies. The UN Fact-Finding Mission on Sudan, meanwhile, recently reported “a sharp rise in sexual and gender-based violence.” The Biden administration in the United States even formally determined that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide had taken place, a rare step. Sudan is no stranger to mass atrocities, as violence against civilians, including sexual violence and identity-based attacks on ethnic groups, have marked previous wars as well. Hardly any of the major perpetrators have faced justice.

Addressing this accumulated injustice has proven to be one of the most important stumbling blocs for previous peace and transition processes in Sudan and also remains a key obstacle now. Impunity with the persistence, and indeed rise, of alleged perpetrators is a key dimension of the current war. Many in Sudan associate transitional justice primarily with criminal justice instead of also addressing structural dimensions of atrocities. This has created uncertainty, resentment, and fear among armed actors as well as survivors.

A culture of impunity fueling conflict

Sudan has been plagued by conflict and violence against civilians for decades. For that reason, justice was a key demand of the protestors that helped topple President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019, after thirty years in power. The constitutional declaration that the military and a coalition of political parties, professional associations, and civil society signed in August 2019 to create a civil-military transitional government included a commitment to transitional justice, as had earlier peace agreements that had addressed previous conflicts. Little was ever implemented, though.

The culture of impunity, the lack of reparations for harm, left out institutional reforms, failed investigations, and missing public consensus about the country’s past as part of its national identity created grounds for conflict and the return of authoritarianism. Those responsible for violence against civilians not only remained in power, but benefited and prospered. Instead of gradually reducing the power and influence of the security sector, the 2019-2021 transition process ended up entrenching them even further.

This is particularly the case for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. The RSF emerged out of Arab militias locally known as Janjaweed, which were responsible for mass violence in Darfur in the early 2000s. Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s then President, used the RSF for border protection, counterinsurgency, mercenary services in Yemen, and regime security. Hemedti made himself into a key powerbroker when he joined the intelligence service and the Sudanese Armed Forces to replace Bashir in the face of sustained mass protests in April 2019. His forces likely led a subsequent attack on the main protest camp outside the military headquarters on 3 June 2019 that killed more than 120 people. Still, Hemedti became an influential member of the civil-military Sovereign Council (the transitional collective presidency), styling himself as its deputy chairman and de-facto vice president. In the following years, the RSF grew massively in military strength, with the help of the army and international partners like Russia (Wagner) and the UAE, as well as in economic influence. The RSF’s rivalry with the SAF increased notably after the coup in October 2021, with the army itself staffed by senior officers involved in past atrocities as well. The rivalry between the two armies culminated in the outbreak of open hostilities in the morning hours of Saturday 15 April 2023.

Lessons from Sudan’s transition process

Sudan’s most recent transition process underlines how transitional justice can fail – and what future efforts must learn. The civilian component of the transitional government took a top-down approach to transitional justice, with victim and survivor groups feeling insufficiently consulted. A key element was the so-called dismantling committee, which investigated the shadow system, assets and staff associated with the former regime, leading to the dismissal of thousands of public officials. They operated without sufficient regard to due process, however. The United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan warned that the Committee’s decisions “might degenerate into political purges”, as it had the right to dismiss all public employees based on their mere association with the former regime. The UN human rights office worked with the transitional authorities to improve the situation, but these concerns were not sufficiently addressed before the coup.

Furthermore, transitional justice became part of the bargaining process between armed groups and the security forces during the negotiations that led to the Juba Peace Agreement, signed in October 2020. The agreement includes a detailed chapter on “justice, accountability and reconciliation”, including a timeline of 60 days to establish a truth and reconciliation committee and 90 days to establish a special court for Darfur. None of those were ever established. Instead, representatives of the armed movements joined the government in Khartoum, brought back troops to Sudan and engaged in major recruitment drives in Darfur, incentivized by the promise of demobilization packages in the peace agreement.

The security institutions remained highly skeptical of transitional justice, increasing their motivation to remove the civilian component from the government. After the coup, they overturned many decisions by the dismantling committee. Investigations into the violent dispersal of the protest camp in June 2019 stopped.

When it came to a core demand of the revolutionary protest movement of December 2018, the transition not only delivered little in the way of justice but also created resentments and disappointments in many quarters. It failed to engage with the structural causes of Sudan’s atrocities and repression, ultimately contributing to the situation that led to a devastating war – one that has laid waste to the country’s institutions, livelihoods, and social fabric.

Dealing with power structures

Getting the full spectrum of measures that transitional justice entails right is therefore essential for any future political and peace process. Crucially, anyone engaging in transitional justice needs to acknowledge from the get-go that a transitional justice process reflects the prevailing power structures and is therefore inherently political.

This is an uneasy discussion. Given the previous experience of impunity, delayed implementation, and power-seeking elites, some associate transitional justice in Sudan with a so-called “soft landing” approach: perpetrators as well as benefactors of past crimes get to go scot-free if they make some superficial commitments to peace and human rights. As a result, they receive the legitimacy to either remain in positions of power or join the dominant kleptocratic system for their own benefit.

Acknowledging existing power structures does not mean accepting them. Rather, civilian actors (and those foreign governments wishing to support them) should anticipate and prepare for dealing with armed and authoritarian forces with their eyes open. Simply calling for justice, truth, reparations and comprehensive institutional reforms does not suffice, as important as a principled stance is.

This insight has guided recent efforts to rethink transitional justice in Sudan. In a series of workshops organized jointly by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Kampala and Addis Ababa between February2024 and May 2025, Sudanese and international leading experts on transitional justice and peace came together to consider some of the challenges, trade-offs and possibilities how transitional justice could contribute to ending the war, and to sustaining peace.

Balancing peace and justice demands in Sudan

One of the challenges of transitional justice globally has been that despite frequent commitments to be context-specific, victim-centered and nationally owned, it can be excessively driven by outside actors. This is particularly prevalent in cases where representatives of an ancien régime (like that of Bashir) or those responsible for atrocities during war time retain significant power, not least because most wars end through a negotiated agreement between warring parties, e.g. in Ethiopia and in South Sudan. In such contexts, in trying to reduce the sensitivity of the subject, transitional justice is often reduced to a technical exercise of consultations, legislation, institutions, and processes. Even in situations where, for example, a truth commission has been able to work – such as in Kenya –, the impact remains very limited. International criminal proceedings may be possible, for example at the International Criminal Court, specialized tribunals or in national courts based on universal jurisdiction, yet they remain distant from the communities and survivors involved.

In a situation of active hostilities as in Sudan, balancing the concurrent demands of peace and justice is key. This has been a lesson that one of the members of the expert group, Rifaat Makkawi, mentioned in a podcast of the INSAF campaign for transitional justice. “Our views shifted”, he said. “We used to believe that justice comes first.” Experiencing the devastation of the war firsthand, the campaign now seeks “a balance between justice and peace.”

The key here is that such a balance means aligning peace and justice as much as possible, not just seeking an immediate target instead of a seemingly more long-term one. Makkawi and Amal Hamdan, another member of the expert group, tackled one of the most controversial subjects in this area: amnesty. In a joint paper, they call for shaping conditional amnesty provisions in such a way that they facilitate peace while not precluding prosecutions, for example through a hybrid court with national and international elements. Conditional amnesty would be a novel instrument in Sudanese conflicts, as previous peace processes have always resulted in either explicit or de facto blanket amnesty due to lack of implementation.

The role of civil society

Furthermore, transitional justice is about much more than criminal trials. It also needs to speak to a sense of everyday peace and justice that helps not just elites but whole communities to co-exist. Reconciliation, an often-cited goal of transitional justice, seems almost far-fetched in the face of mass atrocities. Changing out leaders responsible for such crimes is important, as is transforming the relationship between state institutions and civilian populations.

Sudan has an extraordinarily active civil society. In many parts of the country, mutual aid networks provide basic services in areas that international aid organisations often do not reach. Women, youth and other civilian initiatives discuss ways with political and military leaders to halt violence and end the war. Even if the war’s polarization and displacement affect them deeply just like everyone else, they can still play important roles in transitional justice, and often already do. These roles include the documentation of violations, combating hate speech, trainings, rehabilitation, peace messaging, psychosocial as well as material support to victims and survivors, in addition to advocacy. They do not need to wait for the warring parties, donors, or international organisations to include them to make a difference.

Moving forward, seeking possibilities as well as creative entry points remain essential. Sudan’s war is a fundamental challenge to its social fabric, state integrity and regional stability. Ending the war and overcoming violence requires a combination of principles and innovation.

Note: The author co-organized the expert group on transitional justice and peace in Sudan with a workshop series on which parts of this analysis are based, a project in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Rethinking Mediation in Sudan

Contribution to “Ask the Experts”, Global Public Policy Institute, 27 June 2025

Any Leadership Welcome 

Gerrit Kurtz

Whether it be Saudi Arabia, the United States, Egypt, the African Union, the United Nations, IGAD, Türkiye, or Qatar – many countries and international organizations have been involved in mediation efforts in Sudan or have been suggested as potential mediators. The results: competition, forum-shopping, and ever more violence. Every mediator has weaknesses, be it their influence on, or bias toward one of the conflict parties, their lackluster approach, distraction, or lack of capacity. Ultimately, international actors (or, it seems, the Sudanese) have little influence on who will lead a peace process.

At the moment, no one party is really leading anything when it comes to Sudan. There has been a dearth of effective initiatives following frustration over the parties’ lack of commitment, the new government in the US and the battlefield advances of the Sudanese Armed Forces culminating in the recapture of central Khartoum in late March. Given the scale of the immense suffering in Sudan and the increasing regionalization of the conflict, this lack of leadership is an indictment of our current international order.

What Sudan needs in order to stop this madness is more coherent and effective international leadership. Everyone, including those in Europe, should be asking themselves what they can bring to the table and how they can contribute to shaping the mediation process. Effective mediation leadership would entail maintaining communication channels to the various parts of the armed coalitions, while being in continuous exchange with other diplomats about any openings and leads they may encounter. 

Increasing the cost (to meddle) for external sponsors can be just as essential as supporting civilian political organizing, ensuring humanitarian access, enabling mutual aid networks or establishing the documenting of human rights abuses.

No comprehensive and inclusive process is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, virtually any leadership that will help stop this catastrophe is welcome to apply.

Wie die Drohnenangriffe den Krieg in Sudan verändern

Die neue Fähigkeit der RSF, Ziele in ganz Sudan zu treffen, verändert die Dynamik des Kriegs aufs Neue. Ob sich daraus ein strategisches Patt ergibt, das Verhandlungen begünstigen könnte, hängt jedoch auch maßgeblich von den externen Unterstützern der Kriegsparteien ab.

Erschienen in Zenith, 26.05.2025

An einem frühen Sonntagmorgen begannen die Angriffe aus der Luft auf Port Sudan. Die Hafenstadt am Roten Meer, Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts von den britischen Kolonialherrschern in der Nähe einer alten osmanischen Siedlung für den Sues-Verkehr errichtet, galt bis zum 4. Mai 2025 als sicher.

Der Kampf in Sudan hatte gut zwei Jahre vorher im Zentrum von Militär, Politik und Wirtschaft in der Hauptstadt Khartum begonnen und sich auf weite Teile des Landes ausgebreitet – der Norden und Osten blieben bis auf wenige Ausnahmen sowie den Druck durch die Aufnahme vieler Vertriebener verschont. Die Ministerien und das herrschende Militär zogen nach Port Sudan um, da Khartum zur Kriegszone wurde. Auch internationale Hilfsorganisationen richteten Büros dort ein und landeten Personal und Güter an den einzigen internationalen See- und Flughäfen des Landes an.

Am 4. Mai stand eine massive Rauchwolke über dem militärischen Teil des etwas vom Stadtzentrum entfernten Flughafens, ein Munitionsdepot hatte sich in eine Feuerwolke verwandelt. Der Luftaum wurde gesperrt. In den nächsten Tagen trafen weitere Drohnen auch den Hafen, ein Treibstofflager, ein Kraftwerk, ein Radar, eine Marinebasis, ein Hotel in der Nähe des Militärhauptquartiers, und weitere offensichtlich sorgfältig ausgewählte Ziele. Es dauerte fünf Tage, bis das Feuer in dem Treibstofflager gelöscht war.

Erhebliche Beeinträchtigungen zu erwarten

Bewaffnete Drohnen sind keine neue Waffe im Sudan-Krieg. Sowohl die Sudanesischen Streitkräfte (SAF) als auch die Rapid Support Forces (RSF) setzen sie ein, und zwar kleine wie größere, fortgeschrittenere Modelle. Die RSF hatten in den vergangenen Monaten immer wieder militärische und zivile Infrastruktur weit hinter den Frontlinien getroffen, beispielsweise in Atbara oder Meroe. Diese Ziele liegen jedoch gerade einmal auf der Hälfte der fast 700 Kilometer langen Strecke zwischen der nächsten bekannten Position der RSF in Omdurman und Port Sudan. Kamikazedrohnen und Drohnen der Klasse »Medium Altitude Long Endurance« (MALE), über die die RSF verfügen, können noch erheblich weiter fliegen – doch sie so präzise, weit entfernt und zuvor unbemerkt zum Ziel zu bringen, war der RSF vorher nicht möglich gewesen. Zum Vergleich: Die Armee setzt zwar deutlich mehr Drohnen als die RSF ein, aber nur in Zentralsudan; für Angriffe in Darfur und Kordofan nutzt sie ihre – weitaus weniger präzise – Luftwaffe.

Dabei ist weiterhin unklar, von wo aus die Drohnen gestartet sind, um Port Sudan anzugreifen. Die Vertreter der Armee behaupten, die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate hätten die Drohnen von »Basen am Roten Meer« abgefeuert. In Expertenkreisen werden eher Orte im Westen Sudans, die von den RSF kontrolliert werden, diskutiert. Allein: Stichhaltige Belege für den geografischen Ursprung der Angriffe, die seit mehreren Wochen Port Sudan erreichen, gibt es nicht. Die RSF selbst haben auch kein offizielles Statement veröffentlicht, im Gegensatz zu ihren zahlreichen Propagandavideos und Statements von ihren Einheiten und Beratern über ihren Bodenkrieg. So deutet einiges auf eine mutmaßlich erhebliche Rolle eines externen Akteurs bei diesen Angriffen hin.

Ihre psychologische Wirkung verfehlten die Angriffe jedoch nicht. Sie verbreiteten Schrecken und Unsicherheit, in der Bevölkerung, aber auch beim sudanesischen Militär. Noch Ende März war Militärführer Abdelfattah Al-Burhan das erste Mal seit Kriegsbeginn mit dem Hubschrauber auf dem weitgehend zerstörten Flughafen von Khartum gelandet und hatte seinen Soldaten persönlich gratuliert, nachdem sie den Präsidentenpalast im Zentrum Khartums zurückerobert hatten. Einige Beobachter mag die Inszenierung an die berühmte Landung des damaligen US-Präsidenten George W. Bush auf dem Flugzeugträger USS Abraham Lincoln im Mai 2003 erinnert haben, um eine »mission accomplished« im Irak zu verkünden.

Daneben beeinträchtigen die Drohnenangriffe Port Sudan auch materiell. Treibstoffpreise schnellten in die Höhe, die Stromversorgung wurde noch unzuverlässiger, Trinkwasser war Mangelware. Die Versorgung mit kommerziellen, humanitären und militärischen Gütern über den Seehafen und den Flughafen ist möglicherweise gefährdet. Entsprechend warnte auch die höchste UN-Repräsentantin in Sudan, Clementine Nkweta-Salami, dass die Angriffe auf zivile Infrastruktur in Port Sudan und anderen Teilen des Landes die logistischen Schwierigkeiten der Hilfsorganisationen weiter erschwerten.

Ein mögliches strategisches Patt

Die offensichtliche Fähigkeit der RSF, Ziele ganz im Osten Sudans zu treffen, könnte die strategische Aussicht des Krieges verändern. Nach der Rückeroberung Khartums plante die Armee, die militärischen Auseinandersetzungen in den Westen des Landes zu verlegen und dort die RSF in die Enge zu treiben. Tatsächlich ist es weiterhin unwahrscheinlich, dass es den RSF gelingen könnte, erneut Gelände in der Hauptstadtregion oder insgesamt auf der östlichen Seite des Nil zu erobern.

Dazu müssten sie wahrscheinlich deutlich besser in der Lage sein, ihre unterschiedlichen Verbände und militärischen Fähigkeiten – einschließlich aus der Luft – integriert und abgestimmt einzusetzen. Solange sie ihre Schlagkraft durch Drohnen (mit der entsprechenden externen Unterstützung) aufrechterhalten können, können die RSF jedoch die Armee nun stark unter Druck setzen, selbst wenn sie in Kordofan oder Darfur Boden verlieren sollten.

Theoretisch könnte sich aus diesem strategischen Patt also ein Fenster für Verhandlungen ergeben. Beide Seiten können ihren Willen auf absehbare Zeit nicht militärisch umsetzen, und die Weiterführung des Krieges erzeugt für sie erhebliche Risiken und Kosten.

Die Geister, die sie riefen

Die Aussichten auf belastbare Gespräche, um den Krieg zu beenden, sind bisher allerdings weiterhin getrübt. Multilaterale Organisationen wie die Vereinten Nationen, die Afrikanische Union (AU) oder die »Zwischenstaatliche Behörde für Entwicklung« (IGAD), die weiterhin den Anspruch vertreten, sich für Mediation einzusetzen, sind geschwächt und gespalten. Trotz entgegenlautender Versprechen arbeiten sie oft in Konkurrenz zueinander. Neben den Aktivitäten der jeweiligen Sekretariate liegt deren Schwäche in den widerstreitenden Interessen einflussreicher Mitgliedstaaten begründet, also Russland, den USA und Großbritannien im UN-Sicherheitsrat, oder Ägypten, Kenia und Äthiopien in der AU beziehungsweise IGAD.

Hinzu kommt, dass Zweiparteiengespräche zwischen SAF und RSF eine erhebliche Belastung für die Kohärenz ihrer jeweiligen Koalitionen sein könnten. Die Bündnisse der RSF mit der Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) sowie einigen Milizen und Politikern aus Darfur sowie der SAF mit anderen bewaffneten Gruppen aus Darfur um Mini Minawi und Geibril Ibrahim sind transaktionaler Natur. Ein Abkommen, das beispielsweise den RSF weite Teile des Westens, die sie bislang kontrollieren, zuschlüge, würde vermutlich auf erheblichen Widerstand bei Minawi, dem Gouverneur von Darfur und Führer der »Sudan Liberation Army« (SLA), und weiteren Bewegungen treffen.

Anders könnten sich die Dinge verhalten, wenn sich die wichtigsten externen Unterstützer der sudanesischen Kriegsparteien verständigen sollten, darunter die VAE, Ägypten, Saudi-Arabien, Katar und die Türkei. Allerdings spüren diese Mächte die Auswirkungen des Kriegs in sehr unterschiedlichem Maße – über eine Million Geflüchtete sind aus Sudan nach Ägypten gekommen, Port Sudan liegt auf der anderen Seite des Roten Meers, gegenüber der saudischen Hafenstadt Dschidda. Umgekehrt ist Abu Dhabi das Ziel von Goldexporten sowohl aus Gebieten der RSF als auch der Armee. Und das Vertrauen in einen möglichen Ausgleich von Interessen ist gering. So geht der Krieg in Sudan in die nächste Runde.

Sudan: Konflikt auf wichtige Hafenstadt übergegriffen

Interview in SRF Radio, 7.Mai 2025

Im Sudan tobt seit zwei Jahren ein Bürgerkrieg. Nun greifen die Rebellen die wichtigste Hafenstadt an: Port Sudan ist das Herz der sudanesischen Wirtschaft und Standort der internationalen Hilfsorganisationen. Das Gespräch mit Gerrit Kurtz von der Stiftung für Wissenschaft und Politik.

Quelle des Photos hier.

Trotz des Erfolges der Armee ist ein Ende der Kämpfe nicht in Sicht

Zitate in den Salzburger Nachrichten, 16. April 2025

Ukraine, Israel, Gaza und die US-Regierung: Für den Sudan ist häufig kein Platz in den Schlagzeilen. Dabei sind dort mehr Menschen auf der Flucht, als Österreich Einwohner hat.

Gudrun Doringer Salzburg, Khartum. Die Konkurrenz der Krisen sei verantwortlich dafür, dass die Katastrophe im Sudan zur Kurzmeldung verkomme, sagt Gerrit Kurtz. Er ist Sudan-Experte bei der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Für ihn ist sie mehr als das. Er beschäftigt sich tagein, tagaus eben mit dem Krieg im Sudan, der nun ins dritte Jahr geht.

(…)

Warum wird überhaupt gekämpft in dem ostafrikanischen Land? Es ist der Machtkampf zweier Generäle, die einst verbündet waren. Gerrit Kurtz erklärt: „Abdel Fattah al-Burhan befehligt das Militär im Land. Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, bekannt als Hemeti, ist Chef der Rapid Support Forces, kurz RSF – eine Konkurrenzsicherheitskraft. Die RSF war unter dem früheren Herrscher Baschir aufgebaut worden, um sich vor Putschen zu schützen.“ Baschir war selbst unter einem solchen Putsch an die Macht gekommen. „Daher hat er Paramilitärs gefördert, um eine Konkurrenz herzustellen“, sagt Kurtz. „Die haben auch Aufstände [bekämpft] und Grenzen gesichert, aber sie waren von Anfang an als Konkurrenz angelegt. Als Baschir weg war, haben die beiden Kräfte erst einmal zusammengearbeitet, weil sie den Gegner in der zivilen Demokratiebewegung gesehen haben, mit der sie auch gut zwei Jahre lang mehr schlecht als recht zusammen regiert haben. Als sie dann geputscht haben im Oktober 2021, beide zusammen, da war der zivile Gegner in der Regierung nicht mehr da. Das Verhältnis zwischen diesen beiden Sicherheitskräften musste geklärt werden: Wer ist die Nummer eins?“ Zu einer Einigung kam es nicht. Daran entzündete sich im April 2023 der Kriegsausbruch.

(…)

Trotz des Erfolges der Armee ist ein Ende der Kämpfe nicht in Sicht. „Beide Seiten erhalten weiterhin reichlich Unterstützung von außen, um ihre Kämpfe fortzusetzen“, sagt Gerrit Kurtz. „Die RSF von den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten. Die Armee durch militärische Zusammenarbeit mit Ägypten, mit dem Iran, mit Russland und mit der Türkei.“ Für die Bevölkerung sind die Auswirkungen fatal. Hunger wird als Waffe eingesetzt. Sexuelle Gewalt ebenso. „Es ist ein Krieg, der die Körper von Frauen und Kindern als Kriegsstrategie benutzt“, sagt Hala al-Karib, Sudan-Direktorin der Frauenrechtsorganisation Siha.

(…)

Hätte das Grauen ein Ende – was würde der Sieg einer der beiden Kriegsparteien für das verwundete Land bedeuten?

Der Sudan sei die meiste Zeit seit seiner Unabhängigkeit vom Vereinigten Königreich von Militärregierungen regiert worden, sagt Kurtz. „Wenn also die Armee die Regierungsgewalt zurückerobern würde, dann wüssten wir, wie das aussieht: harte autoritäre Repression. In den Gebieten, die sie gerade zurückerobert haben, hören wir von Erschießungen der Leute, denen sie vorwerfen, sie hätten mit den RSF zusammengearbeitet.“ Kurtz erwähnt auch die Angehörigen des früheren islamistischen Regimes von Umar al-Baschir, die auch jetzt militärisch eine große Rolle für die Armee spielen. Sie könnten im Fall eines Armeesieges zurückkommen. „Davor haben viele Angst. Einige Menschen sehen die Armee dennoch als kleineres Übel. Die RSF wird mittlerweile zusammengehalten von einem Freibrief zu Plünderung und Rache. Wir sehen Massaker an der Zivilbevölkerung. Das ist Gewalt, die wir auf diese Weise von der Armee nicht sehen.“

Eine einberufene Konferenz am Dienstag in London sagte dem Sudan 660 Millionen Euro Hilfsgelder zu. „Die Konferenz ist der Versuch, ein Thema aufs Tapet zu heben, das sonst nicht vorkommt, weil es auch europäische Politiker nicht hoch hängen“, sagt Gerrit Kurtz. „Es birgt Frustpotenzial, weil es an Einflussmöglichkeiten mangelt.“ Für die Menschen im Sudan bedeutet der Beginn des dritten Kriegsjahres Aufmerksamkeit – für einen Tag.

Mediation Efforts on Sudan: Beware the Pitfalls of Diplomatic Coordination

Establishing an informal but regular contact group of like-minded states and international organizations on Sudan would be an important outcome of the April 15 Sudan conference in London. It should learn lessons from the Friends of Sudan and other international coordination efforts, in the way it engages with Sudanese actors as well as external supporters of the conflict parties.

Commentary at ISPI, 15 April 2025

As the war in Sudan approaches its two-year anniversary, the conflict is set to enter a new phase. Regaining the heart of the capital Khartoum has been a major success – and a morale booster just ahead of the end of Ramadan – for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), for their part, still control vast swathes of Sudan’s territory west of the Nile. Military action won’t end the war anytime soon. This could be an entry point for a renewed push for a ceasefire. 

Given this prospect, more effective international coordination is essential. There is currently no unified, regular diplomatic contact group on Sudan, the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world with more than 30 million peopleneeding assistance (and much less getting it). The so-called Extended Mechanism created by the African Union (AU) in the first weeks of the war has only met infrequently and is probably also too unwieldy as a workable mechanism. Sudan special envoys have met in various configurations, including convened by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the sub-regional body for the Horn of Africa, and by Ramtane Lamamra, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Sudan Envoy. However, none of these have yet resulted in a regular mechanism. 

An overall aim of such a mechanism should be to provide regular updates of the members’ activities and create a platform to provide a modicum of coordination wherever possible. Ideally, it would also lead to more coherence, unity and sincerity in support of a negotiated end to the war, help mobilizing resources to avert (further) famine, and prevent the polarization of regional and international actors that are increasingly taking sides in the war. However, the current geopolitical context means that these objectives are probably no more than wishful thinking.

Why international efforts to end the war have failed so far

The war in Sudan is becoming increasingly protracted. SAF and RSF lead coalitions of armed actors over which they do not have complete control, but whose interests they have to consider in their political positions. Both Abdelfattah al-Burhan as head of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti) as head of the RSF made clear in their respective Eid speeches at the end of March 2025 that there would be no negotiations. In contrast to previous declarations by the RSF over their readiness to talks, Hemedti now said there would be “only the language of the gun”. The roadmap for peace published by Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a national dialogue and a cabinet of technocrats, but also makes the laying down of arms and withdrawal from all areas currently controlled by the RSF a prerequisite: a negotiated surrender in all but name. 

So, there is no easy opening for mediation. In view of these rejections, international efforts so far relied essentially on three different approaches: security talks focused on a ceasefire and protection of civilians; personal accommodation through a face-to-face meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti; and mobilizing a civilian bloc as alternative “third force”.

Talks in Jeddah led by the US and Saudi Arabia in May 2023 resulted in a declaration on the protection of civiliansand a one-week ceasefire signed by SAF and RSF. Nevertheless, the parties did not adhere to their commitments, with no consequences for them. At the next round in October/November 2023, the parties did not confirm the ceasefire, and failed to follow through on their individual commitments for improved humanitarian access. Instead of a third round, the US tried to convene a slightly broader group of states and the two belligerents in Geneva in August 2024. However, the SAF delegation did not want to be treated on the same level as the RSF (and avoid exposing its internal differences) and declined the invitation. Lowering their ambition, the US-led coalition of facilitators founded in Geneva focused on improving humanitarian access instead. However, these efforts had limited success, as humanitarian access to fighting zones remained severely hampered in their search for a pragmatic approach, the US were prepared to accord the authorities in Port Sudan more legitimacy by treating al-Burhan as Head of the Transitional Sovereign Council and not just as head of the military. The supposed lead mediator, US Special Envoy Thomas Periello, was, for US security reasons, only able to travel to Port Sudan and meet al-Burhan in November 2024 though, when the result of the presidential elections signaled the foreseeable end of his term with the outgoing Biden administration, weakening the scope of this initiative.

AU and IGAD created several mechanisms for mediation, but were not fully accepted by the SAF: firstly, Sudan remains suspended from the AU because of the coup in October 2021; SAF withdrew from the IGAD initiative after a failed one-on-one meeting with Hemedti was followed by Hemedti attending an IGAD summit in Kampala in January 2024. SAF also rejected Kenya’s role as chair of IGAD’s quartet, a skepticism which only grew in light of the founding of a new RSF-led political alliance with Nairobi’s blessing in February 2025. The AU’s high-level panel on Sudan was very slow to organize talks with civilian actors, which has been its main objective, and failed to follow-up with them for months after two roundtables in the summer of 2024. The AU’s presidential ad hoc committee aims to organize a face-to-face meeting between Burhan and Hemedti, but has never met.

Competition between mediators did not help. Egypt distrusts IGAD as a mediation channel – both because it is not a member state, and because of the dominant role played in it by Ethiopia. It pushes for Sudan’s readmission to the AU (so far unsuccessfully) and organized its own initiative of Sudan’s neighboring countries (in July 2023), with no impact. Being non-African, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, major players in Sudan, are not part of the AU, and are also skeptical of pushing for a renewed civilian-led government in Sudan. When the UAE and Egypt facilitated a secret meeting in Bahrain, SAF and RSF both sent their respective deputy leaders and got relatively far. Yes, negotiations stalled again, and SAF withdrew from the talks, pointing to the RSF’s failed commitment to the Jeddah declaration. Cooperation between the AU and UN envoys remains difficult on the Sudan file. So-called “proximity talks” (i.e. indirect) talks set up by UN Special Envoy Ramtane Lamamra did not bring a breakthrough. Finally, a draft resolution in the UN Security Council co-signed by the UK and Sierra Leone, that would have asked the UN Secretary-General to develop a compliance mechanism for the protection of civilians and called for a cessation of hostilities, was vetoed by Russia in November 2024.

The fractured nature of the warring parties has been a major challenge. The mediation efforts failed to sufficiently account for the complex dynamics within the conflict parties as well as between them and their external backers, including in response to the situation on the battlefield. Competition between would-be mediators allowed Sudanese warring parties to decline invitations, withdraw from negotiations, and to avoid making compromises that could fracture their coalitions of militias, regular forces and mercenaries.

Learning from the Friends of Sudan experience

On April 15, 2025, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy is hosting a ministerial conference on Sudan in London, organised with Germany, France and the European Union. Lammy has vowed to make Sudan a foreign policy priority. The conference is billed as a follow-up to a similar conference in Paris a year earlier, which was co-hosted by the EU, France and Germany, all three of which will co-convene the London meeting with the UK as well. In contrast to Paris, there won’t be a humanitarian pledging element, nor will there be a parallel meeting of Sudanese civilian actors. Instead, the UK will convene around 20 foreign ministers and representatives of international organizations. Better coordination among this group is a central objective.

In doing so, the UK should reflect on the experience of previous coordination mechanisms on Sudan. For decades, the UK was itself part of the Troika (with the US and Norway), which supported negotiations to end Sudan’s Second Civil war and South Sudan’s path to independence in 2011, among other issues. However, the Troika doesn’t appear to be an appropriate grouping on Sudan any longer, given the drastic aid cuts by the US and the Trump administration’s disregard for multilateralism and preference of optics over lasting results.

After the fall of Sudan’s thirty-year dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the UK was also part of the Friends of Sudan. This was an informal diplomatic group, co-founded by Germany and the US, whose primary purpose was to support Sudan’s transition process. Notably, it included also Egypt, the UAE, Saudi-Arabia, Qatar and the AU, among others. For a while, the Friends of Sudan met regularly at the level of Sudan envoys or senior officials, focusing mainly on coordinating the economic and financial support to the transitional government, including debt relief and setting up a cash transfer program for the parts of the population hit hard by the withdrawal of subsidies and high inflation. After the coup in October 2021, it lost its civilian Sudanese counterpart, and it petered out once the war started and the Sudanese authorities pushed out the UN mission – which had taken over a regular convening role of the Friends of Sudan – a few months later.

Key issues going forward

None of the mediation initiatives so far did have any major impact. Four points will be critical if any new diplomatic coordination mechanism is to even have the chance to influence events in Sudan. 

First, any high-profile conference on Sudan needs to have a link to Sudanese civilian actors. UK diplomats held meetings with Sudanese civil society in the Horn of Africa and the British Director General of African Affairs spoke with the authorities in Port Sudan to collect their perspectives. Still, Sudanese will always question the legitimacy of an international Sudan conference without any Sudanese present. The Paris conference organized a roundtable of around 50 people that represented different types of stakeholders, not just one civilian coalition. Attendees told me that they found it useful, because it had been rare for those diverse perspectives to be in the same room since the start of the war.

Second, any coordination mechanism resulting from the London conference should be nimble and relatively informal. There needs to be some agreement on who to include and how frequently to convene them, but perhaps not much more. It is unlikely to develop strong agency for joint actions. The main multilateral organizations – the UN, the AU, IGAD, perhaps the EU – should be in the lead, if they can be made to act jointly. Like-minded actors need to focus on tangible support to the Sudanese population, especially in light of the massive aid cuts by the US and other countries. While they won’t be able to fill all gaps, they should concentrate on stepping in to fully support the appeal of the Emergency Response Rooms, mutual aid networks. To function, this initiative would need 12 m USD per month, hardly any of which they have received so far. This won’t be enough – the UN appeals for Sudan and the neighboring countries are around 6 bn USD for 2025 – but the ERRs work particularly in areas hardly reached by international aid, where the risk of starvation is among the greatest.

Third, a new diplomatic group as well as the London conference should refrain from normalizing external interference. The Paris conference included a joint communiqué that urged “all foreign actors to cease providing armed support or materiel to the warring parties”. Egypt and the UAE signed this statement – yet, they have continued their support to SAF and RSF. If they were able to sign onto a similar statement, they could do so confident that a lack of commitment would remain without consequences. The foreign ministers present at the meeting should hold these foreign sponsors accountable for supporting warring parties. They should single out the UAE in particular because of their support to the RSF, as described by U.S. Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs, citing a US government briefing. Just this weekend, the RSF captured Zam-Zam camp, Sudan’s biggest displacement camp, after besieging it and neighbouring El-Fasher for many months. The RSF operates advanced drones and artillery to attack El-Fasher and Zam-Zam camp, which it most likely acquired from abroad. 

Finally, those international actors that have not picked a side in Sudan’s devastating civil war should not do so now. Normalizing relations with SAF-led authorities in Port Sudan won’t help people trapped in RSF-held areas nor will it help end the war. Assembling in London, foreign ministers will call global attention to the catastrophe that is the war in Sudan. Outrage without any of these actions would just underline their collective weakness. It is time to take responsibility. 

Die Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung in Sudan ist leider kein Einzelfall

Interview mit NDR Info, 15.April 2025.

Ein baldiger Frieden sei nicht in Sicht. Sowohl Armee als auch RSF greifen Zivilisten gezielt an, sagt Gerrit Kurz von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

“The wars in Sudan and South Sudan are increasingly intertwined”

Comments on the war in South Sudan, EFE Agency, 4 April 2025

“The wars in Sudan and South Sudan are increasingly intertwined, and each side is likely to support armed actors in the other territory,” I tell Spanish media.

…

Kurtz says that although “there is no solid evidence” that the Sudanese Army supports the White Army or groups linked to the South Sudanese opposition, “there are strong historical ties” between the Sudanese military and Machar.

However, he points out that the Sudanese Army “has an interest in preventing the South Sudanese government from allowing the RSF to operate in South Sudanese territory and receive weapons” through the neighbouring country, especially after the agreement between the paramilitaries and SPLM-N, Kiir’s ally.

The Sudanese military dome is also concerned about the opening of an UAE hospital in Madhol, in northern South Sudan, as they “suspect it could be used as a concentration point for RSF supplies, as well as for the treatment of its soldiers,” as happened with the Emirati medical centre in Amdjarass (Chad).

…
Although the expert points to a growing interconnection of both crises, he recalls that “neither the Sudanese or South Sudanese parties have much resources, they are unlikely to act as major material sponsors.”

Added to this is Uganda’s participation and the influence of the Emirates in the area, so “it is absolutely possible that the conflict will become increasingly regional.”

“But we are not seeing two clear blocks, but rather a complex tangle of contradictions,” he says.

Horn von Afrika: Die Zivilgesellschaft wird weiter geschwächt

Beitrag in: Nadine Biehler (Koord.), US ohne AID?, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 04.04.2025 (360 Grad)

Am Horn von Afrika sind die USA bislang der größte Geber gewesen, sowohl in der klassischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als auch in der humanitären Hilfe. 45 Prozent der Mittel für die von den Vereinten Nationen (UN) koordinierte Hilfe für Sudan, die weltweit größte humanitäre Krise, kamen im vergangenen Jahr aus den USA. 

Hilfsorganisationen berichten, dass sie zwar Ausnahmen von den Kürzungen erhielten, die Mittel jedoch nicht bei ihnen ankommen, weil das Zahlungssystem von USAID nicht mehr funktioniert. Die Konsequenzen bekommt vor allem die Zivilbevölkerung zu spüren. Diese steht in einer von Konflikten, Klimaveränderungen, schwacher Infrastruktur und Repression geprägten Region ohnehin unter massivem Druck. Drei zentrale Folgen lassen sich identifizieren: 

Erstens wird die extreme humanitäre Not weiter steigen. In Sudan herrscht bereits jetzt in wahrscheinlich zehn Gebieten eine Hungersnot. Ohne zusätzliche Mittel dürfte sich die Hungersnot auf weitere Teile des Landes ausbreiten. Rund 30 Millionen Sudanes:innen sind auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen, aber nur ein Teil wird sie bekommen. Dies betrifft nicht nur Lebensmittel. In der äthiopischen Region Tigray zum Beispiel musste eine Organisation ihre psychosoziale Hilfe für Opfer sexueller Gewalt abrupt einstellen. Dies kann das Trauma der Überlebenden verstärken.

Zweitens drohen die US-Kürzungen, den zivilgesellschaftlichen Sektor am Horn von Afrika massiv zu schwächen. Dies betrifft nicht nur Organisationen in Feldern wie Gesundheit und Ernährung, sondern auch solche, die sich für Frieden, Menschenrechte und Demokratie einsetzen. So mussten in Äthiopien 85 Prozent aller zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ihre Arbeit einstellen. In den vergangenen Monaten standen diese ohnehin unter Druck: Einigen wurde die Lizenz entzogen, andere wurden zeitweise verboten oder ihre Führung ausgetauscht. In Südsudan könnten 60 Prozent des Mediensektors kollabieren, einschließlich der Radiosender in lokalen Sprachen. Dies verschärft die ohnehin unzuverlässige Nachrichtenlage in einer Situation, in der falsche Gerüchte schnell bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen anheizen.

Drittens könnte der Ausfall internationaler Unterstützung zwar langfristig die dringend nötige Lokalisierung humanitärer Hilfe beschleunigen – kurzfristig ist jedoch das Gegenteil der Fall. So mussten rund 80 Prozent der Gemeinschaftsküchen im Sudan, die von Selbsthilfenetzwerken mithilfe von US-Mitteln betrieben wurden, schließen. Die Diaspora unterstützt diese Netzwerke ebenfalls, kann den Wegfall aber kurzfristig nicht kompensieren. Europäische Geber, die ebenfalls ihre Mittel zurückfahren, sollten sich darauf konzentrieren, solche Selbsthilfenetzwerke und lokale Helfer stärker zu unterstützen.