Author: Gerrit Kurtz

Researcher working on conflict prevention, diplomacy, peacekeeping and the United Nations, with a focus on the Horn of Africa. Associate, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).

Everybody’s Business

The War in Sudan as a Threat to International Peace and Security

This article was published by Verfassungsblog on 21 December 2023.

War has devastated Sudan since it first broke out on 15 April 2023. What started as a power play between the country’s two most powerful armies, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has since metastasized into a major civil war. International actors have not paid this war the high-level attention it requires and deserves. On 1 December, the UN Security Council decided to terminate the mandate of the UN International Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS), a political mission originally tasked with supporting Sudan’s transition to democracy. While the Council acted on a short-term request by the Sudanese authorities (controlled by SAF), it has not been able to agree on a substantive resolution since the war started. Driven by divisions, it has abdicated its responsibility under the UN Charter.

In this blog post, I explain why international actors need to pay more attention to what is happening in the strategically located country at the crossroads between the Red Sea and the Sahel, between the Arab and African worlds. The war threatens Sudan’s integrity as a state, displaces millions and draws in neighbouring and other regional countries, all in a region already in turmoil because of coups, insurgencies and violent extremism.

A War within the Security Sector

The conflict originates in a competition between the regular armed forces, the SAF, and the paramilitary force, RSF, for control over the security sector and ultimately the state as a whole. Having dislodged long-term ruler Omer al-Bashir from power in the face of broad public protests in April 2019, SAF and RSF agreed to share power with civilian parties a few months later. In October 2021, they felt the civilians were overreaching, arrested the civilian prime minister and declared a state of emergency. Since then, they have not been able to agree on forming a new government, trying instead to seize power yet again, this time from each other. This has led to the current hostilities.

While the conflict parties increasingly appeal to ethnic and racial identities to mobilize support, many Sudanese do not consider themselves truly represented by either armed force. The SAF, whose leadership comes from the riverine region of Central and Northern Sudan, are supported by elements of the former Islamist government as well as some armed groups. SAF generals look down on the RSF, whose commanders they consider uneducated. The RSF was created out of informal Arab militias, called “Janjaweed”, who embraced an ideology of Arab Supremacy already during the genocidal violence against non-Arab groups such as the Masalit and Zaghawa in Darfur in the West of Sudan twenty years ago. Since then, the RSF have recruited widely among Sudan’s peripheral communities, drawing on citizens of other Sahelian states (such as Chad) and co-opting units from SAF and other armed groups.

The Destruction of a Major African Capital

The war has wreaked havoc on Khartoum and the adjoining cities of Omdurman and Bahri. The RSF have captured most of the tri-state capital area, as they continue to engage in fierce artillery battles with the SAF. RSF troops occupy residential areas and loot vehicles and other valuables on a large scale. Around 37% of Khartoum state’s pre-war population of 9.4 million have left their homes. This will be the bulk of the country’s political and economic elite, its upper and middle class and others with means to make the journey. With records of their properties being deliberately destroyed, they will struggle to return. This is by design: Many RSF fighters, coming from the country’s poor peripheries, feel that the riverine elite that has dominated Sudan for decades has marginalized and instrumentalized them. Thus, while successive Sudanese governments have equipped and supported some Nomad communities, for example, to fight insurgencies for them, Nomad children go to primary school far less often than their peers from displaced communities. For those RSF fighters sensing a lack of respect, this is payback time. The result: a major African capital is falling apart in an effort to reshape the country. In time, this could lead to the split of Sudan into several territories, as the SAF-controlled ministries have already moved their administration to Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast.

The World’s Largest IDP Crisis

Sudan now also presents the world’s largest internal displacement crisis. Since the war started, out of a total population of around 49 million, 5.4 million people have been internally displaced, while more than 1.4 million have crossed into other countries (mainly Chad, Egypt and South Sudan). When fighting broke out, Sudan already had around 3.7 million IDPs, mainly in Darfur, and 800,000 Sudanese were already refugees in third countries. Sudan was also hosting more than a million refugees from other countries such as South Sudan. Many of the latter have now sought to return home (or make their way to third countries). All told, there are likely more than ten million Sudanese that have left their homes both before and after the war started. With every new offensive, there are going to be more people fleeing from one place to the next.

The Commission of International Crimes

What is more, the conflict parties are likely committing international crimes. SAF engages in indiscriminate bombing, killing civilians in the process. RSF fighters and allied Arab militias loot properties, engage in sexual and gender-based violence and kill members of non-Arab groups, in particular Masalit. 68 villages in the greater Darfur area showed signs of fire damage, some were burnt down almost completely.

Many of these atrocities have taken place in West Darfur, where most Masalit used to live. Now around half a million have fled over the border to Chad. A detailed Reuters investigation based on interviews with survivors and open-source information found that the SAF officers had deserted the base in Ardamata in early November when they could no longer defend it. The remaining SAF rank and file and members of an allied Masalit armed group negotiated a surrender with the dominant RSF troops and gave up their weapons in exchange for promises to be spared. Instead, the RSF ordered the men out of the houses and started shooting them, targeting mainly the Masalit. Perhaps 1300 people were killed within two or three days.

Several international actors have classified these and other acts by the belligerents as international crimes, i.e. as erga omnes violations of international law. This means that all states have an obligation to prevent them. On 6 December, the US State Department issued an “atrocity determination”, where it formally found that the SAF and the RSF had committed war crimes and the RSF had committed also crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing as laid out above. Previously, Alice Wairimi Nderitu, the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, observed after a visit to refugee camps in Chad that many risk factors of genocide were in place. “In Darfur, innocent civilians are being targeted on the basis of race,” she said earlier.

Adding Fuel to Fire

Regional actors further fuel the conflict by delivering arms or allowing those deliveries to take place via their respective territories. The UAE supports the RSF with weapons and vehicles through Chad. Libya (under Haftar), Kenya, Uganda, the Central African Republic and more recently Ethiopia also seem to be involved in facilitating such shipments, as have been Russian mercenaries in Libya and CAR. In contrast, Egypt supports the SAF with weapons and other military support, including guns for tens of thousands of newly recruited SAF soldiers as well as Turkish Bayraktar drones. There have also been reports about Ukrainian drones and special forces supporting SAF, although the sourcing was relatively thin.

Insofar as they enter Darfur, many of those arms deliveries are a violation of the UN Security Council arms embargo on Darfur originally imposed in 2005. Even though it was never very effective as it only applied to one region within a larger country, it still provides ground for in-depth investigations by the UN Panel of Experts whose next report is due in early 2024.

The Threat of Spill Over

The war in Sudan is likely to spill over to neighbouring countries in various ways. Currently, the most-watched case is Chad. President Deby plays a risky balancing game by allowing the UAE to use Chadian territory for arms supplies to the RSF. The RSF have incorporated a significant number of Chadian Arabs and are increasingly getting into conflict with the Zaghawa in Darfur, the same ethnic group of Deby’s governmental elite. Unrest within the Chadian elite may lead to a military coup, or returning Chadian Arab fighters may strengthen armed opposition groups and ignite a civil war.

South Sudan’s transitional government may also feel the heat from the war in Sudan. Angelina Teny, South Sudan’s interior minister, confirmed that South Sudanese have joined both SAF and RSF. These might later return to their home country with their military equipment and join any number of armed opposition groups. Furthermore, small arms are flooding informal markets in Sudan at cheap prices.

Moreover, the hostilities threaten to disrupt the export of oil from the South to markets via the pipelines to Port Sudan. This might bankrupt South Sudan’s kleptocratic government at a time this money is needed to smooth over differences resulting from planned but likely flawed elections in December 2024.

Flawed Mediation Efforts

Mediation efforts by international and regional actors have not succeeded in halting the violence so far. Their response has been lacklustre, with no sustained high-level commitment. Mediators also continue to follow a deeply flawed approach. They focus excessively on SAF and RSF as well as their respective leaders, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, SAF’s commander-in-chief, and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, called Hemedti, RSF’s commander.

For example, on 9 December, an extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional organisation in the Horn of Africa, heard pledges from both Burhan and Hemedti for a personal one-on-one meeting as well as for an “unconditional ceasefire.” This ignores that neither of them appears capable of controlling the war on their own anymore, given the significant role of elements of the former regime, ethnic militias as well as other armed groups, some of which have increased the territory under their control in the Nuba mountains and in Central Darfur. Moreover, IGAD and AU member states lack leverage in holding the belligerents accountable. Within a week after these pledges, the SAF bombed Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, and the RSF started a major offensive in Al Jazeera state in central Sudan, a major humanitarian hub and breadbasket of the country. The RSF captured the state capital Wad Madani within four days.

What is urgently needed is a multi-stakeholder dialogue, something that a joint AU and IGAD team has been preparing for months. However, there are disagreements regarding the participation of the conflict parties as well as representatives of the former Bashir regime, which some civilian parties reject out of hand. It remains to be seen whether the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces or “Taqaddum”, a new civilian coalition whose preparatory committee was founded in Addis Abba in October, can prove more effective. They are in touch with the conflict parties based on their own roadmap.

A Threat to International Peace and Security

The war in Sudan poses a threat to international peace and security, requiring European actors including Germany to engage more forcefully. Encouraging regional actors to convene a credible multi-stakeholder and potentially sequenced dialogue is one way. States such as the UAE and Egypt that are fuelling the war with arms deliveries should also be held accountable, at least by calling them out. The EU should also start adding names to the sanctions regime on Sudan that it created in October and ensure that companies active in its common market do not interact with the RSF, SAF and their respective economic entities.

Mobilising diplomatic and political capital to stop the war in Sudan is not just the right thing to do, it should be everybody’s business given the high stakes involved.

Die Folgen der Straflosigkeit im Sudan

Im Schatten des Kriegs zwischen den Sicherheitskräften im Sudan greifen die »Rapid Support Forces« (RSF) und verbündete Milizen immer wieder gezielt einzelne ethnische Gruppen an. Nun droht der Konflikt sich auf den Tschad auszuweiten.

Dieser Text erschien am 17.November 2023 bei Zenith Online.

In den vergangenen Wochen konnten die »Rapid Support Forces« (RSF) einige militärische Erfolge im Krieg gegen die Sudanesische Armee (SAF) erzielen. Sie eroberten Kasernen in drei Landeshauptstädten im westlichen Darfur: Nyala (Süd-Darfur), Zalingei (Zentral-Darfur) und El-Geneina (West-Darfur) sowie ein Ölfeld in West-Kordofan. Die paramilitärischen RSF kontrollieren mittlerweile weite Gebiete des Landes westlich des Nils sowie einen großen Teil von Khartum. Mehr als sieben Monate nach Beginn des Kriegs um die Vorherrschaft im Sicherheitssektor ist kein baldiges Ende in Sicht.

Die Gewalt beschränkt sich aber nicht auf Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Hauptkonfliktparteien RSF und SAF. Beide Seiten nehmen keine Rücksicht auf die Zivilbevölkerung. Die RSF plündern und besetzen private Wohnhäuser, während die SAF mit wenig präziser Artillerie und Luftschlägen auf RSF-Positionen zivile Opfer in Kauf nehmen.

Insbesondere gegen die RSF werden jedoch weit schwerwiegendere Vorwürfe laut: Im August schlugen UN-Experten, die vom UN-Menschenrechtsrat eingesetzt wurden, Alarm, dass die RSF sexuelle Gewalt einsetzten, um die Zivilbevölkerung »zu bestrafen und zu terrorisieren«. Laut Zeugenaussagen entführen RSF-Angehörige Frauen und halten sie unter »Sklaverei-ähnlichen Bedingungen«.

Politische Führer der Masalit sowie Anwälte und Aktivisten wurden gezielt ermordet

Die RSF und verbündete arabische Milizen gehen teilweise gezielt gegen Angehörige einiger ethnischer Gruppen vor. Dies betrifft insbesondere die Masalit, eine nicht-arabische Gruppe, die hauptsächlich in West-Darfur beheimatet ist. Seit dem Beginn des Kriegs sind mehrere Vorfälle bekannt geworden, in denen RSF und verbündete arabische Milizen (die nicht immer klar voneinander zu unterscheiden sind) für Massentötungen von Masalit verantwortlich gemacht werden. Ein erster Höhepunkt dieser Art von massenhafter Gewalt gegen die Masalit war zwischen Ende April und Juni, der zweite Anfang November.

Augenzeugen sprachen davon, dass Menschen in El-Geneina aufgrund ihrer Hautfarbe angegriffen wurden. Männer im wehrfähigen Alter wurden getötet, Frauen vergewaltigt, zivile Einrichtungen geplündert. Politische Führer der Masalit sowie Anwälte und Aktivisten wurden gezielt ermordet. Als Khamis Abdullah Abkar, der Gouverneur von West-Darfur und Führer der »Sudanese Alliance«, am 14. Juni in einem Interview davon sprach, dass die RSF für die massenhafte Gewalt der letzten Wochen verantwortlich sei, während die SAF tatenlos in ihrer Kaserne sitze, wurde er kurz darauf umgebracht. Eine unabhängige Konfliktbeobachtungsplattform, die vom US-Außenministerium unterstützt wird, stufte diese Tat als extralegale Tötung ein.

Angaben über die genauen Opferzahlen sind schwierig wegen des begrenzten Zugangs unabhängiger Akteure. Menschen, die mit den Vereinten Nationen kurz nach ihrer Ankunft in Tschad sprachen, berichteten jedoch übereinstimmend von verwesenden Leichen in den Straßen und am Wegesrand. Allein auf einem Friedhof in El-Geinena sollen mehr als 1.000 Tote bis Mitte Juni begraben worden sein. Die Analyse von Satellitenbildern zeigt, dass zwischen April und Mitte Oktober 68 Orte in der Region Darfur Feuerschäden aufweisen. Einige, die vor allem von nicht-arabischen Minderheiten bewohnt wurden, wurden fast vollständig niedergebrannt.

Ardamata wäre mit bis zu 1.300 Toten das größte Einzelmassaker seit Beginn des Kriegs im April

Hundertausende entflohen dieser Gewalt, mittlerweile über eine halbe Million über die nahe Grenze nach Tschad. Einige Masalit wagten nicht die gefährliche Reise über die Grenze, sondern flohen in die SAF-Basis in Adarmata, einem Vorort von El-Geneina. Als die RSF die Kaserne der SAF dort schließlich am 4. November 2023 einnahmen, verübten sie innerhalb weniger Tage ein erneutes Massaker an den Masalit. Das Un-Flüchtlingshilfswerk UNHCR sprach von mehr als 800 Opfern, eine lokale NGO von 1.300 Menschen, deren Namen sie erfasst habe. Ardamata wäre damit das größte Einzelmassaker seit Beginn des Kriegs im April.

Diese identitätsbasierte Gewalt steht einerseits in einem engen Zusammenhang zum Krieg zwischen RSF und SAF, andererseits hat sie deutlich längere und tiefere Wurzeln. Beide Episoden massenhafter Gewalt ereigneten sich im Zusammenhang mit Kämpfen zwischen RSF und SAF in West-Darfur. Kämpfer der »Sudanese Alliance«, einer bewaffneten Gruppe, die Teil des Juba-Friedensabkommens (JPA) von 2020 ist, verstärkten nach der gezielten Gewalt gegen die Masalit im Frühjahr die Verteidigung der Kaserne, in die sich auch viele Zivilisten geflüchtet hatten.

Die UN wollen Vorwürfen nachgehen, nachdem es auch Angriffe von Masalit-Milizen auf arabische Personen in den letzten Wochen in Ardamata gegeben habe. Dies scheint aber wenig an der Überlegenheit der RSF und arabischen Milizen sowie an der Einseitigkeit der Gewalt gegen die Masalit zu ändern, wie es sie in West-Darfur seit 2019 episodenhaft mehrfach gegeben hat.

Die Gräueltaten der RSF und der mit ihnen verbündeten arabischen Milizen in Darfur verkomplizieren die Vermittlungsbemühungen. Mittlerweile gibt es zwar eindeutige Äußerungen internationaler Akteure, doch diesen Worten Nachdruck zu verleihen, erweist sich als schwieriger: »Was dort geschieht, grenzt an das pure Böse« (Clementine Nkweta-Salami, Stellvertretende Leiterin der UN-Mission in Sudan), » alle Kennzeichen ethnischer Säuberung« (Andrew Mitchell, britischer Staatssekretär für Afrika), »Die internationale Gemeinschaft kann nicht die Augen vor den Geschehnissen in Darfur verschließen und einen weiteren Völkermord in dieser Region zulassen.« (Josep Borell, Hoher Repräsentant der EU).

Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof sieht die derzeitigen Vorfälle als Teil seines 2005 für Darfur erteilten Mandats

Im Oktober setzte der UN-Menschenrechtsrat eine internationale Untersuchungsmission ein, die Beweise für Menschenrechtsverletzungen sammeln soll, die in zukünftigen Gerichtsprozessen genutzt werden könnten. Der Internationale Strafgerichtshof gab im Juli bekannt, dass er die derzeitigen Vorfälle als Teil seines 2005 für Darfur erteilten Mandats sieht. Dass diese Mechanismen abschreckend auf die RSF wirken könnten, ist bisher nicht abzusehen.

Internationale Vermittlungsbemühungen für den Krieg in Sudan haben bisher kein separates Augenmerk auf die besondere Art der Gewalt in Darfur gelegt. Die RSF scheinen sich ohnehin um ihre Versprechen wenig zu scheren. Währen ihre Delegierten in Dschidda sich zur Verbesserung des humanitären Zugangs bekannten, begingen die RSF-Milizen das Massaker von Ardamata. Abdelrahim Dagalo, der Stellvertretende Kommandeur der RSF, der bei den jüngsten militärischen Erfolgen in Darfur zugegen war, sprach kurz danach davon, die »Kriminellen«, die das Land für dreißig Jahre regiert hätten, »endgültig zu eliminieren«.

Derweil kündigt sich eine weitere Eskalation der Gewalt im Kampf um El-Fasher an, die Hauptstadt Nord-Darfurs und letzte Hochburg der SAF in der Region. Am 16. November verkündeten bewaffnete Gruppen aus Darfur, die um El-Fasher Tausende Kämpfer kontrollieren, dass sie ihre bisherige Neutralität aufgeben und auf der Seite der SAF in den Krieg einsteigen wollten. El-Fasher hat über eine Million Einwohner, davon eine halbe Million Binnenvertriebene. Die RSF könnten den Einstieg der bewaffneten Gruppen als Grund nehmen, auch gegen andere nicht-arabische Bevölkerungsgruppen wie die Zaghawa und Fur gezielt vorzugehen, wie bereits vor zwanzig Jahren.

Dies könnte nicht zuletzt die Regierung von Tschad vor weitere Herausforderungen stellen, da ihre Regierungselite aus Zaghawa besteht, aber gleichzeitig den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten erlaubt, über Amdjarass im Nordosten Tschads Waffen an die RSF zu liefern. Eine weitere regionale Eskalation des Kriegs in Sudan wird damit wahrscheinlicher.

Sudan: Wege aus der Krise

Podcast, Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 24.Oktober 2023

Link zum Podcast

Von 1989 bis 2019 wurde Sudan vom autoritären Staatspräsidenten Umar al-Baschir regiert. In diese Zeit fiel unter anderem der grausame Konflikt in der Darfur-Region, den die damalige US-Regierung als Völkermord bezeichnete. 2019 keimte kurz Hoffnung auf, nachdem al-Bashir nach Protesten der Bevölkerung gestürzt und eine Übergangsregierung gebildet wurde. In dieser Übergangsregierung saßen erstmals zivile und militärische Vertreter zusammen und die Hoffnung war groß, mittelfristig eine rein zivile Regierung bilden zu können, aber die bewaffneten Kräfte des Landes spielten hier nicht mit. Im Jahr 2021 kam es zu einem Militärputsch. Und im Jahr 2023 kam es dann noch schlimmer, als sich die zwei führenden Militärformationen des Sudans, die sich an die Macht geputscht hatten, überwarfen und das Land in einen Bürgerkrieg stürzten. Ein Gespräch über die verfahrene Lage im Sudan und Wege aus der Krise mit Gerrit Kurtz (SWP).

Internationales Krisenengagement: Raus aus den Pfadabhängigkeiten

SWP 360 Grad zur nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie, 4.September 2023 (zusammen mit Judith Vorrath)

Als Teil des Ansatzes der Integrierten Sicherheit bündelt das integrierte Friedensengagement Mittel und Instrumente für den Umgang mit Krisen und Gewaltkonflikten. Doch das entsprechende Kapitel in der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie enthält lediglich eine Aneinanderreihung bekannter Maßnahmen ohne Prioritätensetzung oder Innovation. Das zeigt sich schon in vorherrschenden Formulierungen wie „ausbauen“, „stärken“ oder „zusammenführen“. Dies verwundert, da das AA bereits in seinem Konzept für integriertes Friedensengagement vom Dezember 2022 Pragmatismus, Risikobereitschaft und flexible Steuerung propagierte. Ein „more of the same“ birgt dagegen die Gefahr, zentrale Lehren aus dem Engagement in Afghanistan und Mali auszublenden. Denn dort zeigte sich, dass starke Pfadabhängigkeiten bei Zielen und Instrumenten – etwa durch enge Anlehnung an internationale Partner – eigene Friedensanstrengungen unterminieren können.

Für einen Primat der Prävention, den die Bundesregierung in der Sicherheitsstrategie erneut betont, sind Leitplanken und Prozesse unabdingbar, mit denen sich ein integriertes Friedensengagement entlang von Werten und strategischen Interessen steuern lässt. Zusätzlich bedarf es stärkerer politischer Impulse für die Administration, koordiniert und frühzeitig zu agieren. Für beides bietet die Sicherheitsstrategie wenig Orientierung. Freilich sind wissenschaftsbasierte Prozesse für Krisenfrüherkennung oder globale Partnerschaften relevante Ansatzpunkte. Hier stehen sie aber ohne inneren Zusammenhang neben Maßnahmen und Instrumenten, die teils besser in anderen Kapiteln aufgehoben wären, wie Migrationspartnerschaften und die Bekämpfung von Hungerkrisen.

Deutschland ist weltweit größter Geber im Bereich zivile Friedensförderung und einer der wichtigsten Finanziers von VN-Friedensmissionen, der Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur der Afrikanischen Union, humanitärer Hilfe und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Daher sollte die Bundesregierung eine Führungsrolle beim Friedensengagement übernehmen und eigene Vorschläge in internationalen Prozessen auch außenpolitisch konsequent nutzen. Es geht nicht nur um einen Zuwachs an Mitteln, sondern darum, wie (und wo) diese verwendet werden. Ein gemeinsamer Fonds für zivile Konfliktbearbeitung, gepaart mit Steuerungs- und Lernmechanismen, könnte mehr Ressortkohärenz zwischen AA und BMZ schaffen. Die Bundesregierung sollte in Abstimmung mit zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen zivile Planziele zur langfristigen Finanz- und Personalplanung entwickeln, wozu sie sich im Koalitionsvertrag verpflichtet hat. Diese würden zum Beispiel helfen, mehr Polizeikräfte für internationale Friedensmissionen verfügbar zu machen. Zivile Fähigkeiten könnten so perspektivisch leichter in Koordination mit militärischen Instrumenten wie Ertüchtigung eingesetzt werden.

Bei der Implementierung der Sicherheitsstrategie sollte die Bundesregierung das eigene Profil schärfen, Synergien nutzen und klare Prioritäten verfolgen.

Sudan: The Legitimization Strategies of Violence Entrepreneurs

Chapter in: Marianne Beisheim (Hg.): Country-level Politics around the SDGs. Analysing political will as a critical element of the Mid-Term Review of the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs, SWP Research Paper 2023/RP 07, 10.07.2023

Sudan faces huge challenges to implementation of the SDGs: political instability following decades of authoritarian rule, armed conflict, a skewed economy in deep macroeconomic crisis, and the impacts of climate change. Consequently, Sudan is among states making the slowest progress towards the SDGs, with an SDG index ranking of 159 out of 163.1

Sudan’s VNR report from 2022 does not pretend anything different. It acknowledges the country’s significant development shortcomings, the lack of suf­ficient current data and the state’s very weak im­plementation capacity in virtually all relevant areas. This apparent honesty is both selective and strategic, however. It omits the single most important factor keeping the Sudanese poor, namely the domi­nance of the security sector in politics and the econo­my. Appear­ing to care for the civilian population is a deliberate legitimization strategy on the part of the authors of the report, which was compiled by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). Its head, Sudan’s Minister of Finance Geibril Ibrahim, is a former rebel, an Islamist and a supporter of the military coup of October 2021. Any international support for sustainable development in Sudan thus needs to adopt an adaptive approach that includes peacebuilding and diplomacy.

Political instability and Sudan’s violent entrepreneurs

Pretending to promote broad-based development when actually engaging in politics that undermine it has a long tradition in Sudan, particularly among its armed movements. Peace agreements are full of nor­mative language, as are the pronouncements of elite negotiators purporting to serve the interests of mar­gin­alized populations in the periphery. Power- and rent-sharing arrangements are the core objectives of Sudan’s violent entrepreneurs.2 These include regular security forces, paramilitary forces, irregular militias and armed movements, who compete or cooperate on the basis of temporary shared interests.3

SDG implementation came to a halt in recent years as Sudan experienced considerable upheaval and lacked effective government. The breakdown culmi­nated in military conflict in April 2023. Country-wide demonstrations in 2019, provided the motivation for a palace coup that ousted Omar al-Bashir after nearly thirty years in power. A civilian-military transitional government took the reins in August 2019, led by the former UN official Abdalla Hamdok. The military and security forces retained influence in the Sovereign Coun­cil (the collective presidency) and in security-related cabinet portfolios. In October 2020, the gov­ernment signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) with thirteen armed movements across the country. They joined the government in February 2021, and Geibril Ibrahim became minister of finance.

Having supported the military in sidelining civil­ians, he and fellow JPA signatories remained in office when security forces arrested Prime Minister Hamdok and some of his ministers on 25 October 2021.

Since the coup, Sudan has had no fully functioning government. The military did not replace civilian min­is­ters who resigned, instead promoting undersecretaries to become acting ministers. General Fattah Abdel al-Burhan, the head of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and chair of the Sovereign Council, claimed that he had seized power only to “correct” the path of the popular revolution that started in December 2018.4 When the military realized they could not succeed, Burhan announced he would be ready to hand over power to a civilian government that was either elected or created by “consensus”.5 On 5 December 2022, after months of behind-the-scenes negotiations, a framework agreement was finalized between the military and a coalition of civilian groups. Geibril and his allies rejected the framework agree­ment because it included a review of the earlier peace agreement, which guaranteed them their positions.6 Negotiations on outstanding issues for a final agree­ment escalated into armed conflict between the SAF and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shortly before a planned handover to a civilian gov­ern­ment in April 2023.

The VNR’s selective treatment of development challenges

The preparation of Sudan’s second VNR fell in the period after the October 2021 coup.7 This put the draft­ers in the interesting position of describing the achievements of a transitional government for whose demise their military allies were responsible. The fact that Sudan decided nevertheless to submit the VNR in such a volatile situation points to the main purpose of the report: courting international favour for an ille­gitimate government. The government also wanted to restart international financial support and debt relief, as highlighted in the VNR’s opening statement and again in the conclusion.

The main purpose of the report lies in courting international favour for an illegitimate government.

The report includes an initially perhaps surprisingly open acknowledgement of Sudan’s development chal­lenges. It describes Sudan’s three-digit inflation and negative economic growth and mentions the escala­tion of “tribal and intercommunal violence”.8 Given that the process was still ongoing when the report was submitted, it can only acknowledge that “consul­tations with assistance from the international and regional partners to resolve the political crises and con­tinue the path towards peace and democratic transition” were taking place.9

The report’s description of Sudan’s (lack of) achieve­ments in ending extreme poverty (SDG1) demonstrates important characteristics that apply across its treatment of the Agenda 2030. It acknowledges the dire situation, citing data where available. On poverty, the only source is a projection based on the government’s last national household budget and poverty survey from 2014/15, which was prepared in the con­text of the transitional government’s work with the IMF and the World Bank on a poverty reduction strat­egy paper. According to the VNR, poverty in­creased to 64.2 percent in 2020, up from 46.5 percent in 2009.10 Even that could be an undercount according to the director of the then new Social Security Commission in 2020, who spoke of 77 percent of the population living on less than US$1.90 per day.11

The disparities in the poverty count underline the lack of reliable current data. The VNR report acknowl­edges that gap and notes that the lack of disaggregated current socio-economic data makes it very difficult to identify those most affected by the lack of develop­ment and thus ensure that no one is left behind, a core objective of the Agenda 2030.12

The absence of regionally disaggregated economic data is not simply a consequence of the lack of state capacity, but is rooted in wilful government policy going back to colonial times. The British colonial administration wanted “to avoid publishing numbers about Sudan’s economy for fear of making regional inequities obvious to the public. Rather than buck this trend, subsequent post-independence regimes fol­lowed suit”, write Matthew Benson and Musan Alneel on the basis of their study of Sudan’s tax system.13

The transitional government had identified a strat­egy to reduce poverty, which the VNR presents as a response to the dire situation. The heart of that gov­ern­ment’s development strategy – prepared in con­junction with its international partners – was aboli­tion of the fuel subsidy and floating of the Sudanese currency. The short-term pain was to be alleviated by a broad cash-transfer programme funded by donors. The Sudan Family Support Programme or Thamarat was to provide up to 80 percent of the population with the equivalent of US$5 per month. Its roll-out was delayed because the US government first needed to delist Sudan from its list of State Sponsors of Ter­ror­ism. Under enormous economic pressure, the Sudanese government cut the subsidies – resulting in huge price rises for transport and food. A pilot of the Thamarat project was launched in February 2021, but quickly stopped after the European Union, the United States, Germany and the World Bank halted their funding following the October coup, depriving 9.2 million registered beneficiaries of future assis­tance.14

As well as send a message to the coup leaders, donors wanted to prevent misuse of funds. Inter­national funding had flowed through a multi-donor trust fund into the coffers of the Sudanese Central Bank. The influx of foreign currency stabilized Sudan’s reserves, allowing the government to finance imports of food and other commodities, and thus stabilized the fragile transitional government. Abort­ing funding for the trust fund and thus for the Thamarat programme was intended to avoid propping up the coup author­ities, whose ministry of finance also controlled the Central Bank.

The government’s narrative ignores the most significant obstacle to in­clusive and sustainable development: the dominance of the security sector.

In short, the VNR describes Sudan’s dire situation relatively accurately, in a way that serves the interests of the government and in particular the armed move­ment–led ministry of finance.15 The report locates the causes of the problems in the long rule of the for­mer Bashir regime, against which the armed move­ment fought and which the coup government pur­ported to overcome in accordance with the Sudanese revolution. The programmes and projects of the tran­sitional government of 2019 to 2021 are presented as still providing a response to this legacy. This narrative might suggest that all that is needed is for Sudan’s international partners to resume their funding. That, however, would be to ignore the most significant ob­stacle to inclusive and sustainable development: the dominance of the security sector, and the political sys­tem it has created to serve its interests.

Conflict and military repression as central development challenges

Sudan has been ruled by authoritarian military lead­ers for most of its post-independence history. Suc­cessive governments created an exploitative sys­tem based on the extraction of resources from the periph­eries for the benefit of urban elites in the centre.16 Where populations resisted such extraction, governments deployed significant force to maintain the sys­tem. Sudan has experienced armed conflict for most of its history, with fighting and violence against civil­ians located almost exclusively in the peripheries.17

The Sudanese Armed Forces and other security actors became strongly engaged in the economy. This impeded the development of the private sector, but allowed the military to control vast swathes of the country’s resources and productive economy. Key stakeholders were appointed to positions of authority in exchange for their loyalty.

One of the armed movements formed in response to state violence was the Justice and Equality Move­ment (JEM), led by Geibril Ibrahim from 2012. Once a considerable military force, JEM largely disintegrated over peace talks with the government and was defeated by government forces and expelled from Darfur in 2015. After that, it had only a few hundred troops in South Sudan and Libya.18 The JPA gave JEM and other signatories a new lease of life.

Against this background, Sudan’s 2022 VNR report serves a clear purpose. Both the coup government and Geibril personally have an incentive to emphasize their supposedly popular credentials, while distracting from their lack of legitimacy. Indeed, Geibril’s own support base is now so narrow that he travelled to Darfur in January 2023 “under heavy protection” for fear of attacks from his own Zaghawa tribe.19 Any international aid would allow him to bolster his lead­er­ship ambitions, both across Sudan and within Darfur.

Implications for donor governments

Ensuring effective international support for accelerated SDG implementation is immensely challenging in a situation of armed conflict and state capture by vio­lence entrepreneurs. Donors need to ensure that their aid does not strengthen – even inadvertently or in­directly –the extremely exploitative and extractive system keeping most Sudanese poor. At the same time, a highly risk-averse approach would essentially shift the burden to humanitarian aid. Some communities, for example in IDP camps, have received food aid for decades, keeping whole generations aid de­pend­ent.

Since the October 2021 coup, international devel­op­ment partners have started to reorientate. Inter­national officials repeatedly warned the military government that time was running out to access the funds and programmes that had been granted to the transitional government but were blocked after the coup.20 Sudan’s debt relief process under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) was effec­tive­ly halted, as was progress on Sudan’s poverty reduc­tion process agreed with the World Bank and IMF.21

Even if a civilian government is finally formed, its absorption and implementation capacity will remain very limited. In the past, donors found it difficult to get the detailed applications and reports needed to fulfil their funding requirements. As a result, it was easier to plan around the state structures. While such a procedure allows projects to proceed for the benefit of civilian populations, it undermines the govern­ment’s ownership and capacities. Any new government would need to revise or at least update the existing development planning documents.

Finally, the security sector will remain a significant impediment to any civilian government and to inter­national donors willing to fund implementation of the SDGs. Supporting basic service delivery removes the government from its responsibility in that core area to some extent, especially when projects are implemented beyond government structures. Inter­national funding of schools, hospitals and utilities allows the government to continue spending large amounts of its own budget on the security sector and to maintain fiscal practices benefitting military-owned companies. Moreover, it is likely that the military will resist giving up its control of a large section of state-owned companies to a new civilian government; this was already a major sticking point during the 2019–2021 transitional government. Com­panies, banks and other entities owned or con­trolled by the paramilitary RSF may be even harder to transfer to civilian control. There is no transparency about their budgets and profits. As an indication of their wealth, the IMF reported a “non-transparent con­tribution of $2 billion from security sector owned companies” into the state budget in 2020.22

The 2030 Agenda recommends more integrated approaches to sustainable development. In Sudan this would be a development approach that includes peace­building and humanitarian concerns (the “triple nexus”) and is guided by an adaptive political strat­egy.23 An adaptive approach acknowledges complexity and uncertainty and thus allows for continuous moni­toring, evaluation and learning processes above and beyond conventional project-based programming cycles. It could include, for example, small pilot projects with state-level or local governments, which could quickly be expanded or adjusted if they prove successful.

Recent research calls for a more fundamental re­think of development cooperation in conflict settings in general. Specifically, donors should take the exist­ing coping mechanisms, perceptions and relationships of local communities more seriously in their programming decisions.24 Unpacking the political economy of conflict-affected countries’ SDG reporting should be part of such reflections.

Stopping the War in Sudan

Civilian actors, not just the parties to the conflict, should lead the peace negotiations

SWP Comment 2023/C 28, 22.05.2023, co-authored with Hager Ali

Sudan’s two main security forces are fighting each other. A swift military outcome is not to be expected in view of the relatively balanced power between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This strategic stalemate means that the chances for successful mediation are not hopeless. For this to happen, how­ever, Sudan’s international partners would have to abandon the approach that domi­nated negotiations for decades, namely giving violent actors a leading role in nego­tiations. Civilian actors formed a broad anti-war coalition that should set the tone for peace talks from the very beginning. This could well be in the interest of the parties to the conflict, as they will need a third actor to arbitrate their relationship in the future. The German government should strive for stronger coordination of the inter­national mediation approaches under civilian leadership from Sudan, while the Euro­pean Union (EU) should initiate constrains on the financial leeway of Sudan’s violent actors.

Fierce fighting has rocked Sudan since 15 April 2023. The worst-case scenario that had long been feared has occurred: an open armed struggle between the SAF, led by Gen­eral Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and the RSF, which is under the command of General Mo­hamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti.

In contrast to previous wars, these clashes are not only taking place in Sudan’s long-suffering periphery, but also in the greater metropolitan area formed by the megacities of Khartoum, Omdurman, and Bahri. The fighting makes it difficult to supply the popu­lation and already led to massive price in­creases for everyday goods.

If the fighting continues, the dangers for the country and the region are immense. Hunger, a lack of basic services, and mas­sive refugee movements would be the result. The Islamist movement in Sudan could gain further influence. Civilians who feel threatened could arm themselves for self-protection, while the existing armed groups could join either side. The fragile neighbouring countries could be destabi­lised themselves, and provide space for jihadist actors.

Interests of the conflict parties

The long-standing rivalry between the SAF and the RSF has intensified with Hemedti’s political rise after the ouster of dictator Omar al-Bashir. Bashir deliberately created the RSF in 2013 as a counterweight to the SAF and the equally powerful National Intel­li­gence and Security Service (NISS, now Gen­eral Intelligence Service, GIS). Compe­tition in the security sector was meant to stabilise Bashir’s rule in one of the most coup-prone countries in the world. The com­plementary operational specialisation of the SAF and the RSF allowed the two military organisations to co-exist in the same state.

Bashir’s strategy of securing power failed because he ran out of resources to continue funding subsidies to the population and loyalty payments to the security sector. His closest allies turned against him in the face of nationwide protests that began in De­cem­ber 2018, not least because some SAF units also showed sympathy with the demonstrators (including children of influential SAF generals). Although the alleged architect of the plot, NISS chief Salah Gosh, went into exile, the Islamist loyalists of Bashir’s regime held Hemedti, in particular, respon­sible for the overthrow of the system, as he had made a 180-degree turn from being Bashir’s protector to his opponent.

In April 2019, the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Burhan – de­pend­ing on the battle-hardened and ruth­less RSF – made Hemedti the Vice-Chair­man of the Transitional Military Council. But the marriage of convenience between the two generals set the collision course between the SAF and the RSF.

For the SAF and Islamist forces among them especially, it is unacceptable that the RSF, as a de facto parallel army, can operate independently and with its own sources of income within the same state. The relative strength of the RSF also makes it difficult for the SAF to gain full control over the execu­tive, as Sudan’s previous authoritarian governments have been able to do. There­fore, the SAF’s goal is to dissolve the com­peting security force. Successfully integrat­ing the RSF would increase the military’s effectiveness and minimise coup risks.

Conversely, Hemedti wants to maintain the independence of his RSF for as long as possible and not be subordinated to a mili­tary that is riddled with officers who dislike him and his troops. After the military coup in October 2021, Burhan brought back thousands of civil servants who had pre­viously been dismissed for their loyalty to the Bashir regime. High-ranking represen­tatives of the former regime were released from prison. The Sudanese Islamist Move­ment under former Foreign Minister Ali Karti makes no secret of its support for the SAF.

Hemedti is said to have political ambitions for the highest state office. For this, he would have to considerably broaden his political base, which would become more difficult if his RSF were to be absorbed into the armed forces. Experts estimate that the economic empire of the RSF and the Dagalo family accounts for half of Sudan’s eco­nomic output. Hemedti thus benefits direct­ly from the RSF’s military capabilities and has de­ployed them in Darfur to forcibly capture gold mines.

The SAF and the RSF are equally concerned with preserving their privileges and achieving dominance in a future political order in Sudan. To that end, they are seek­ing legitimacy among the Sudanese public and international actors.

Strategic stalemate

Both the SAF and RSF will emerge from this war weakened even if one of the two par­ties should succeed. Presently, neither stands to win this conflict militarily or politically in the near future. The sooner they realise that they are in a strategic stalemate, the sooner they could gear up for serious peace talks.

Estimates for troop numbers in the SAF and RSF vary widely, especially as both have recruited heavily recently. However, the SAF and RSF control a comparable num­ber of troops, with the SAF additionally drawing on units from the GIS and the Cen­tral Reserve Police. The military specialisations of the SAF and RSF make it difficult for either force to gain the upper hand; the SAF is designed for conventional warfare with heavy weapons and the defence of fixed positions. The RSF, as a pure ground force, operates in a highly mobile manner with selective attacks that are often accom­panied by marauding.

Consequently, neither the SAF nor the RSF are adequately prepared for extended urban warfare in Greater Khartoum. The SAF is unable to chase the much more mobile RSF through the streets, whereas the SAF’s air superiority led the RSF to evacuate its bases in the capital and invade the pri­vate homes of civilians. The RSF, on the other hand, is having difficulty with their supply lines. In Khartoum, both are fiercely battling over strategic locations such as the presidential palace, the military head­quarters, and the bridges over the Nile.

The RSF and the SAF run the risk of frag­mentation due to the war and the possible involvement of other armed groups. Through recruitment and alliances, the RSF has troops from many parts of Sudan other than its area of origin in Darfur. RSF per­sonnel also includes members of third coun­tries, such as Chad and other Sahelian countries, who act primarily in an oppor­tunistic manner. Islamist forces within the SAF may operate on their own after a certain point. The battle of attrition is ruinous for the military capabilities of the two opponents.

Politically, the SAF and RSF will emerge weakened from the violent conflict in any case. Consolidating their coup attempt had already failed before because they did not succeed in co-opting civilian political par­ties, unlike military governments before them. Burhan did bring members of the banned National Congress Party back into public life, but he could not afford to pub­licise the partnership. For that, protests of Sudanese civil society against his actions were too strong. Moreover, an openly Islamist government would have led to fric­tion with Sudan’s most important partners in the region – such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Although the UAE and Saudi Arabia had promised the military regime under Burhan and Hemedti a financial injection of $3 bil­lion after Bashir’s fall, donors are now show­ing more restraint. A multi-billion dollar in­vestment from the UAE in a port with sur­rounding industrial estate has been re­peat­ed­ly postponed and was only announced after an agreement in principle on a civil­ian government in December 2022.

The Gulf states know that the Sudanese economy will continue to deteriorate with­out continued macro-economic reform programmes from the International Mone­tary Fund, a reduction of Sudan’s foreign debt of more than $50 billion, and without support from the World Bank and Western governments – which would be bad for their investments.

These prospects were known long before the fighting broke out in Khartoum. A pro­longed war would not be in the interest of both, the SAF and the RSF. There are indi­cations that neither party to the conflict wanted this kind of confrontation, even though both mobilised and escalated the situation. It is likely that one side saw an opportunity for a decisive victory or to pre-empt a foreseeable attack by the other. Similar escalation dynamics have occurred in the past, most recently in February and early March. However, Sudanese and inter­national mediators had managed to defuse those situations before force was used. Some observers, such as Sudanese analyst Kholood Khair, suspected that this postur­ing of escalation and de-escalation was a tactic by the security sector to avoid un­welcome compromises in the negotiations for a civilian government. At the time, Khair also warned of an armed confrontation between the two forces with “disastrous consequences”.

Deals with violent actors have failed

The peace and transition processes that Sudan engaged in over the past decades have always given a disproportionate role to violent actors. The use of violence as a means of asserting interests is often rewarded within the logic of agreements that are initiated under such auspices and reached through international mediation. Rebel groups have long learnt this lesson: If you want attention and a place at the negotiating table, be as aggressive as pos­sible.

This dynamic is widespread in the Horn of Africa, and the SAF and RSF behave ac­cordingly. They are used to deploying brute force to deliberately violate the rules – and to get their way.

Diplomats usually justify their approach to these perpetrators with pragmatism and realpolitik, believing that any agreement is better than war and violence. Sudan is a good example of the flaws in this argu­ment. Conflict-related violence in Darfur increased after the Juba 2020 peace agree­ment; the deal revitalised rebel groups that no longer had troops or relevant constituencies in Sudan itself, and it brought them into the transitional government.

Sudanese security forces were able to gain more and more power during the interim civil–military government estab­lished in 2019, even as Sudanese civil society proved its organising power in spite of massive violence by security forces. This was partly due to the behaviour of the Forces of Freedom and Change, which could not agree on how to distribute seats in the new transitional legislative assembly. In­stead, they allowed Hemedti and Burhan to influence the day-to-day affairs of gov­ern­ment. The military not only co-wrote the rules, but interpreted them arbitrarily as well.

It is no wonder that former international diplomats, such as the former US special envoy to the Horn of Africa, Jeffrey Felt­man, now reject this supposedly pragmatic approach. It presumes that the generals are well-intentioned actors who abide by agree­ments. They are not.

Competition for mediation

The conflict parties will likely become more serious about peace talks when they realise that they can no longer make advances through military force.

The many regional and international actors pursuing interests in and with Sudan would therefore have to pursue a unified line. Above all, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia should signal to the conflict parties that they should not expect any military support from them.

This is quite possible. No country in the region has stands to gain from a full-blown civil war in Sudan. Many foreign governments have sympathies for one side or the other, but none has yet officially expressed support for any party. On the contrary, at the initiative of the African Union (AU), neigh­bouring countries and relevant other governments – including all permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Secu­rity Council – condemned the war and opposed external interference.

Nevertheless, competition for the leadership of peace talks is already taking shape. In the end, that will only benefit the violent actors themselves who will choose the frame­work that preserves their greatest pos­sible freedom, whether individually or in relation to civilian parties.

The United States and Saudi Arabia suc­ceeded in convincing the SAF and the RSF to send delegations to Jeddah, where the opponents have been negotiating a humani­tarian ceasefire since 6 May 2023. Although the mediators are in contact with the civil­ian Forces of Freedom and Change, they are not directly involved in the talks, which are not supposed to be about ending the war. Washington and Riyadh ultimately rep­resent the same approach to elite deals that have failed time and again. The US govern­ment’s pressure on the military to stick to the timetable to establish a civilian gov­ern­ment contributed to the escalation, even though there was no full agreement on the core issue of security-sector reform before­hand. The United States’ Africa envoy and chief negotiator, Molly Phee, was partly responsible for the peace processes in South Sudan and Afghanistan that failed spec­tacularly.

From the perspective of the conflict par­ties, the invitation for talks in Juba by South Sudan’s president, Salva Kiir Mayar­dit, is even more attractive. Although Kiir is acting on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), he has his own interests; he is concerned about the security of oil exports via Port Sudan, on which South Sudan’s national budget depends almost exclusively. Sudan and South Sudan already negotiated several peace agreements. But since agreements were purely transactional power-sharing arrangements between violent entrepreneurs, civilian actors were, at most, mar­ginally involved.

IGAD mediations stand a better chance if Kenya’s president, William Ruto, were to become more involved. Together with the heads of government of South Sudan and Djibouti, Ruto was mandated by an IGAD summit for peace talks in Sudan, and he already spoke out against continued mili­tary rule in Sudan. Kenya also plays a con­structive mediation role in Ethiopia and eastern Congo.

The US-Saudi-led initiative at least brings together very influential countries. Other mediation offers from Turkey, Ethiopia, Israel, and AU Commission President Moussa Faki Mahamat would have less of a chance, especially because these actors are very close to the Sudanese security sector themselves.

It is, therefore, even more important that the EU and the German government ad­vocate a different approach to negotiations with the international partners men­tioned above. Germany could build on its leading role at the beginning of the Suda­nese transition process, when the German government helped establish the diplomatic contact group “Friends of Sudan”, organised the first partnership conference with and for Sudan, and, together with the United Kingdom, led the negotiations of the UN Mission in Sudan’s (UNITAMS) mandate in the UN Security Council. The “Friends of Sudan” bring together Sudan’s key Western and Arab partner countries in informal but regular exchanges.

Putting civil actors in the lead

What could an alternative approach look like? It would have to start with a different attitude towards the instigators of violence. Mediators should not believe their promises. Instead, mediators should assume that they will use every opportunity to their own advantage and disregard the rules. The repeatedly broken ceasefires are an expres­sion of this dynamic.

From this stance, greater pressure would have to be exerted on the perpetrators of violence, also to limit their financial and diplomatic room for manoeuvre. The United States and the EU should impose financial and travel sanctions on selected individuals and institutions. However, they should be careful not to further complicate daily life for the citizens of Sudan. For exam­ple, civilians also have accounts in banks that are majority-owned by the security sector.

The parties to the conflict may well devel­op a vested interest in deferring to a civilian government. They cannot just go back to the status quo ante in which they shared power between themselves. Since no military victory is expected soon, they will need a third party to moderate their mutual relationship after the war. A civilian gov­ern­ment and unified international actors could play this mediating role. They could moderate a structured process that both frees the SAF from Islamist influence and integrates all militias, including the RSF, thus gradually dissolving them.

Germany should push for a leading role among the political parties and other civil society actors in possible peace talks. Major parties, trade unions, resistance commit­tees, women’s organisations, and other non-governmental initiatives and associations have already formed a broad anti-war coalition. This Civil Front offers a credible, constructive counterweight to the generals. Efforts by traditional leaders and local vol­unteer committees to negotiate and moni­tor geographically limited ceasefires are en­couraging, too. Volunteers also provide first aid to victims of armed confrontation, safe escape routes, and organise assistance.

Within the Friends of Sudan, which it co-initiated, the German government should argue against taking any side among the con­flict parties and work to ensure that the Sudanese anti-war coalition is quickly given the leading role in negotiations. International pressure should not exacerbate the confrontation between the violent actors any further, as it did in the weeks before the war broke out. Rather, the newly formed Civil Front should decide what kind of in­ter­national support it wants, and which form of support would be more detri­mental to its cause.

Conclusion

Undoing the influence of the security forces in the economy, politics, and society will take a long time. The minimum ambition of any civilian government should be to stop the growing hegemony of the security sector in the short term. The unity of the civilian anti-war coalition could easily falter in new negotiations if political parties try to outmanoeuvre each other again. The experi­ence of the massive fighting in recent weeks should therefore also lead to a re­think among Sudanese politicians.

Setbacks, including renewed coup attempts, are probable, given authoritarian instincts of violent actors. A new approach in Sudan would not immediately and fully lead to freedom, peace, and justice – the slogan of the 2018/19 revolution. But it offers the best hope that Sudan will take a more stable path towards it. Putting civilian actors at the centre is thus more “realistic” than any deal that only involves the generals.

Hager Ali is a Research Fellow at the GIGA Institute for Middle East Studies and in the GIGA PhD Programme. Dr Gerrit Kurtz is an Associate in the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP.

Den Krieg in Sudan stoppen

Zivile Akteure, nicht allein die Konfliktparteien, sollten die Friedensverhandlungen führen

SWP-Aktuell zusammen mit Hager Ali (GIGA Institut), erschienen am 15.5.2023

In Sudan kämpfen die wichtigsten Sicherheitskräfte des Landes gegeneinander. Eine schnelle militärische Entscheidung ist angesichts des relativ ausgeglichenen Kräfteverhältnisses zwischen den Sudanesischen Streitkräften (SAF) und den Rapid Support Forces (RSF) nicht zu erwarten. Durch dieses strategische Patt sind die Chancen auf eine erfolgreiche Vermittlung nicht ausweglos. Dafür müssten Sudans internationale Partner aber von dem seit Jahrzehnten dominierenden Ansatz Abstand nehmen, Gewaltakteuren die Hauptrolle in Verhandlungen zuzugestehen. Zivile Akteure haben eine breite Anti-Kriegs-Koalition gebildet, die bei Friedensgesprächen von Anfang an den Ton angeben sollte. Dies könnte durchaus auch im Interesse der Konfliktparteien sein, denn diese brauchen einen dritten Akteur, der ihr Verhältnis in Zukunft mode­rieren kann. Die Bundesregierung sollte sich um eine stärkere Koordination inter­nationaler Vermittlungsansätze unter ziviler Führung aus Sudan bemühen. In der EU sollte sie eine Initiative zur Eingrenzung des finanziellen Spielraums der sudanesischen Gewaltakteure anstoßen.

Seit dem 15. April 2023 erschüttern heftige Kämpfe Sudan. Das schon lange befürchtete schlechteste Szenario ist eingetreten: ein offener bewaffneter Kampf zwischen den SAF unter Führung von General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan und den RSF, die unter dem Befehl von General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, genannt Hemedti, stehen.

Im Gegensatz zu früheren Kriegen finden diese Auseinandersetzungen nicht nur in Sudans leidgeplagter Peripherie statt, son­dern auch in der Agglomeration, die von den Millionenstädten Khartum, Omdurman und Bahri gebildet wird. Die Kämpfe er­schweren die Versorgung der Bevölkerung und haben bereits zu massiven Preisanstie­gen für Güter des täglichen Bedarfs geführt.

Falls die Kämpfe länger andauern sollten, sind die Gefahren für das Land und die Region immens. Hunger, Unterversorgung und massive Fluchtbewegungen sind zu befürchten. Die islamistische Bewegung in Sudan könnte weiter an Einfluss gewinnen. Zivilisten, die sich bedroht fühlen, könnten sich zum Selbstschutz bewaffnen, während die schon existierenden bewaffneten Grup­pen sich auf eine der beiden Seiten schlagen könnten. Die fragilen Nachbarländer könn­ten selbst destabilisiert werden und Raum bieten für jihadistische Akteure.

Interessen der Konfliktparteien

Die seit langem bestehende Konkurrenz zwischen den SAF und den RSF hat sich durch Hemedtis politischen Aufstieg nach dem Fall des Diktators Omar al-Bashir ver­schärft. Bashir hatte die RSF 2013 bewusst als Gegengewicht gegen die SAF und den ebenfalls mächtigen National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS, heute General Intelligence Service, GIS) aufgebaut. Der Wettbewerb im Sicherheitssektor sollte Bashirs Herrschaft in einem der putsch­anfälligsten Länder der Welt stabilisieren. Die komplementären Einsatzfelder der SAF und der RSF ermöglichten es den beiden Militärorganisationen, im selben Staat zu koexistieren.

Bashirs Strategie der Machtsicherung miss­lang, weil ihm die Ressourcen ausgingen, um weiter Subventionen an die Bevölkerung und Loyalitätszahlungen für den Sicherheitssektor zu finanzieren. Seine engsten Verbündeten wandten sich an­gesichts landesweiter Proteste seit Dezember 2018 gegen ihn, nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil auch einige SAF-Einheiten Sympathie mit den Demonstrierenden (darunter Kinder einfluss­reicher SAF-Generäle) zeigten. Wäh­rend sich der mutmaßliche Architekt des Kom­plotts, NISS-Chef Salah Gosh, ins Exil ab­setzte, machten die islamistischen Anhän­ger von Bashirs Regime insbesondere Hemedti, der eine 180-Grad-Volte von Bashirs Be­schützer zu dessen Gegner voll­zog, für den Sturz des Systems verantwortlich.

Angewiesen auf die kampferprobten und skrupellosen RSF machte Burhan als neuer Oberbefehlshaber der Streitkräfte Hemedti im April 2019 zum Stellvertretenden Vor­sitzenden des Übergangsmilitärrats. Doch die Zweck­gemeinschaft der beiden Generäle stellte bereits die Weichen für den Kolli­sionskurs zwischen den SAF und den RSF.

Für die SAF und vor allem für islamistische Kräfte in ihrer Mitte ist es nicht hin­nehmbar, dass mit der RSF eine De-facto-Parallelarmee unabhängig und mit eigenen Einkommensquellen im gleichen Staat ope­rieren kann. Die relative Stärke der RSF er­schwert es den SAF auch perspektivisch, die volle Kontrolle über die Exekutive auszuüben, wie die bisherigen autoritären Regie­rungen Sudans es vermochten. Daher ist es das Ziel der SAF, die konkurrierende Sicher­heitskraft aufzulösen. Eine erfolgreiche In­tegration der RSF würde die Effektivität des Militärs erhöhen und das Putschrisiko mini­mieren.

Umgekehrt will Hemedti die Unabhängig­keit seiner RSF so lange wie möglich erhal­ten und sich nicht einem Militär unterord­nen, das durchsetzt ist mit Offizieren, die ihn und seine Truppe ablehnen. Nach dem Militärputsch im Oktober 2021 hat Burhan Tausende Bedienstete zurück in den öffent­lichen Dienst geholt, die wegen ihrer Loya­lität zum Bashir-Regime vorher entlassen worden waren. Hochrangige Repräsentan­ten des früheren Regimes kamen aus dem Gefängnis frei. Die Sudanesische Islamisti­sche Bewegung unter dem früheren Außen­minister Ali Karti macht aus ihrer Unterstützung für die SAF keinen Hehl.

Hemedti werden politische Ambitionen auf das höchste Staatsamt nachgesagt. Da­für müsste er seine politische Basis deutlich verbreitern, was schwieriger würde, wenn seine RSF in den Streitkräften aufgingen. Das ökonomische Imperium der RSF und der Familie Dagalo macht nach Schätzungen eines Experten die Hälfte der sudanesischen Wirtschaftsleistung aus. Hemedti pro­fitiert somit direkt von den militärischen Kapazitäten der RSF. In Darfur hat er sie zur gewaltsamen Einnahme von Gold­minen eingesetzt.

Sowohl den SAF als auch den RSF geht es also darum, ihre Privilegien zu wahren und Dominanz in einer zukünftigen politischen Ordnung in Sudan zu erlangen. Dafür stre­ben sie nach Legitimität in der sudanesischen Öffentlichkeit und bei internationalen Akteuren.

Strategisches Patt

Sowohl die SAF als auch die RSF werden aller Voraussicht nach geschwächt aus diesem Krieg hervorgehen, auch wenn eine der beiden Parteien Erfolge erzielen sollte. Derzeit ist es jedoch wahrscheinlich, dass beide diesen Konflikt weder militärisch noch politisch in nächster Zeit für sich ent­scheiden können. Je schneller sie einsehen, dass sie sich in einem strategischen Patt befinden, desto eher könnten sie bereit für ernsthafte Friedensgespräche sein.

Schätzungen über die genaue Truppengröße der SAF und der RSF gehen weit aus­einander, zumal beide Kampfverbände stark rekrutiert haben in letzter Zeit. SAF und RSF kontrollieren jedoch eine vergleichbare Größenordnung von Truppen, wobei die SAF noch auf Einheiten von GIS und der Central Reserve Police zurückgreifen. Die militärischen Spezialisierungen der SAF und der RSF erschweren es beiden Streit­kräften, die Oberhand zu gewinnen: Die SAF ist auf konventionelle Kriegsführung mit schweren Waffen und auf die Verteidigung von stationären Ein­richtungen aus­gelegt. Die RSF operiert als reine Boden­truppe hochmobil mit punk­tuellen An­griffen, die oft von Plünderungen begleitet werden.

Keiner der Kontrahenten ist damit auf urbane Kriegsführung im Großraum Khar­tum ausgerichtet. Die SAF tun sich schwer damit, die wesentlich beweglicheren RSF durch die Straßen zu verfolgen. Die Luft­überlegenheit der SAF hat die RSF dazu veranlasst, ihre Basen in der Hauptstadt zu räumen und sich in Wohn­gebieten und Privathäusern einzunisten. Sie hat Schwie­rigkeiten, ihre Versorgung sicherzustellen. In Khartum gibt es einen erbitterten Kampf um stra­tegische Orte wie den Präsidentenpalast, das Militärhauptquartier und die Brücken über den Nil.

Beide Parteien laufen Gefahr, durch den Krieg und die mögliche Beteiligung weiterer bewaffneter Gruppen zu zersplittern. Durch Rekrutierungen und Allianzen verfügen die RSF über Truppen aus vielen Teilen Sudans, nicht nur aus ihrem Ur­sprungsgebiet in Darfur. Dazu zählen auch Angehörige von Drittstaaten wie Tschad und anderen Sahel­ländern, die vor allem opportunistisch agie­ren. Islamistische Kräfte innerhalb der SAF könnten ab einem gewissen Punkt eigen­ständig handeln. Der Abnutzungskampf ist am Ende ruinös für die militärischen Fähig­keiten der beiden Kontrahenten.

Politisch werden SAF und RSF ohnehin geschwächt aus dem Gewaltkonflikt her­vor­gehen. Ihr Putsch war bereits vorher ge­scheitert, denn es war ihnen nicht wie anderen Militärregierungen vor ihnen ge­lungen, zivile politische Parteien zu koop­tieren. Burhan brachte zwar Angehörige der verbotenen National Congress Party (NCP) zurück ins öffentliche Leben, konnte es sich aber nicht leisten, die Partnerschaft publik zu machen. Dazu waren die Proteste der sudanesischen Zivilgesellschaft gegen sein Vorgehen zu groß. Außerdem hätte eine offen islamistische Regierung zu Reibungen mit den wichtigsten Partnern Sudans in der Region – wie Ägypten, den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten (VAE) und Saudi-Ara­bien – geführt. Hatten die letzteren beiden nach dem Sturz Bashirs dem damaligen Militärregime unter Burhan und Hemedti noch eine Finanzspritze von drei Milliarden US-Dollar versprochen, zeigen sich die Geber mitt­lerweile zurückhaltender. Eine milliardenschwere Investition aus den VAE in einen Hafen mit umliegendem Gewerbegebiet wurde wiederholt auf­geschoben und erst verkündet nach der prinzipiellen Eini­gung auf eine zivile Regierung im Dezember 2022.

Die Golfstaaten wissen, dass ohne eine Fortsetzung eines IWF-Programms mit makro-ökonomischen Reformen, ohne den Abbau von Sudans Auslandsschulden von über 50 Milliarden Dollar und ohne die Wiederaufnahme der Unterstützung durch die Weltbank und westliche Regierungen die sudanesische Wirtschaft weiter abstür­zen dürfte. Das wäre schlecht für ihre ge­planten Investitionen.

Diese Aussichten waren lange vor dem Ausbruch der Kämpfe in Khartum bekannt. Ein lange anhaltender Krieg wäre weder im Interesse der SAF noch der RSF. Daher spricht einiges dafür, dass die Konflikt­parteien diese Art der Auseinandersetzung so nicht gewollt haben, auch wenn beide mobilisiert und eskaliert haben. Eine Seite hat vermutlich für sich die Chance einer schnellen Entscheidung gesehen oder einem befürchteten unmittelbar bevorstehenden Angriff der anderen zuvorkommen wollen. Ähnliche Eskalationsdynamiken hat es be­reits in der Vergangenheit gegeben, zuletzt im Februar und Anfang März. In diesen Phasen war es sudanesischen und inter­nationalen Vermittlern jedoch gelungen, die Lage vor der Anwendung von Gewalt zu entschärfen. Einige Beobachterinnen wie die sudanesische Analystin Kholood Khair vermuteten in diesem Gehabe von Eskala­tion und Deeskalation eine Taktik des Sicherheitssektors, um unliebsame Kom­promisse in den Verhandlungen für eine zivile Regierung zu vermeiden. Khair warnte zu der Zeit auch vor einer bewaffneten Aus­einandersetzung zwischen beiden Kräften mit »desaströsen Folgen«.

Deals mit Gewaltakteuren sind gescheitert

Die Friedens- und Übergangsprozesse, die Sudan in den letzten Jahrzehnten durchlaufen hat, haben den Gewaltakteuren immer eine überproportionale Rolle zugemessen. Es liegt in der Logik von Abkommen, die unter solchen Vorzeichen starten und in der Regel unter internationaler Vermittlung zustande kommen, dass sie die Anwendung von Gewalt als Mittel der Interessendurchsetzung belohnen. Rebellengruppen haben diese Lektion seit langem gelernt: Wer Auf­merksamkeit und einen Platz am Verhandlungstisch will, sollte möglichst aggressiv auftreten.

Die SAF und die RSF sind Teil dieser am Horn von Afrika verbreiteten Dynamik und verhalten sich entsprechend. Sie sind es gewohnt, bewaffnete Gewalt und bewusste Regelverletzungen als Mittel einzusetzen – und damit Erfolg zu haben.

Diplomatinnen und Diplomaten begründen ihren Umgang mit den Gewaltakteuren in der Regel mit Pragmatismus und Real­politik. Jedes Abkommen sei besser als Krieg und Gewalt. Sudan ist ein gutes Bei­spiel für die Fehlerhaftigkeit dieser Argu­mentation. So stieg die konfliktbezogene Gewalt in Darfur nach dem Friedensabkom­men von Juba 2020 an. Der Deal revitalisierte Rebellengruppen, die in Sudan selbst keine Truppen oder relevante Zustimmung mehr hatten, und verhalf diesen zu einer Beteiligung an der Übergangsregierung.

Obwohl die sudanesische Zivilgesellschaft gerade ihre Organisationskraft auch angesichts massiver Gewalt der Sicherheitskräfte bewiesen hatte, konnten sich letztere während der 2019 eingesetzten zivil-militä­rischen Interimsregierung immer mehr Macht verschaffen. Das lag auch am Verhal­ten der Parteien der Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), die sich in der Frage der Ver­tei­lung von Sitzen für die Einsetzung eines Übergangsparlaments nicht einigen konn­ten. Stattdessen ließen sie es zu, dass Hemedti und Burhan Einfluss auf die täg­lichen Regierungsgeschäfte nahmen. Das Militär hatte nicht nur daran mitgewirkt die Regeln zu schreiben, sondern legte sie in der Praxis auch für sich aus.

Kein Wunder, dass eine Reihe von ehe­maligen internationalen Diplomaten wie der frühere US-Sondergesandte für das Horn von Afrika, Jeffrey Feltman, diesen mutmaßlich pragmatischen Ansatz mitt­ler­weile ablehnen. Denn er geht von der Prä­misse aus, die Generäle seien gutwillige Akteure, die sich an Abmachungen halten. Das sind sie nicht.

Wettbewerb um Vermittlung

Die Konfliktparteien werden sich wahrschein­lich dann ernsthaft zu Friedens­gesprächen bereiterklären, wenn sie erken­nen, dass sie mit militärischer Gewalt nicht mehr vorankommen können.

Die vielen regionalen und internatio­nalen Akteure, die Interessen in und mit Sudan verfolgen, müssten daher eine einheitliche Linie verfolgen. Vor allem Ägypten, die VAE und Saudi-Arabien sollten den Konflikt­parteien signalisieren, dass sie keine militä­rische Unterstützung zu erwarten haben.

Dies ist durchaus möglich. Kein Land in der Region hat ein Interesse an einem aus­geprägten Bürgerkrieg in Sudan. Auch wenn viele ausländische Regierungen Sympathien für die eine oder andere Seite hegen, hat bis­her keine einzige offiziell ihre Unter­stützung für eine Partei zum Ausdruck ge­bracht. Im Gegenteil haben sich die Nach­barstaaten und die wichtigsten anderen Regierungen einschließlich aller ständigen Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrats auf Initiative der Afrikanischen Union zu einer Verurteilung des Krieges bekannt und gegen ex­terne Einmischung ausgesprochen.

Gleichwohl zeichnet sich bereits eine Konkurrenz um die Führung von Friedensgesprächen ab. Diese nutzt am Ende nur den Gewaltakteuren selbst, die sich den­jenigen Rahmen aussuchen werden, der ihnen den größtmöglichen Freiraum so­wohl individuell als auch im Verhältnis zu zivilen Parteien erlaubt.

Den USA und Saudi-Arabien gelang es, die SAF und die RSF davon zu überzeugen, Delegationen nach Jeddah zu entsenden, wo die Gegner seit dem 6. Mai 2023 über eine humanitäre Feuerpause verhandeln. Zwar stehen die Media­toren in Kontakt mit den zivilen Forces of Freedom and Change; beteiligt sind diese jedoch nicht direkt an den Gesprächen, bei denen es nicht um das Ende des Krieges gehen soll. Washington und Riad stehen letztlich genau für den Ansatz von Eliten-Deals, der immer wieder gescheitert ist. Schließlich hat der Druck der US-Regierung auf das Militär, den ein­mal festgelegten Zeitplan zur Einrichtung einer zivilen Regierung einzuhalten, ob­wohl es keine belastbare Einigung zum Kernthema Sicherheitssektorreform gab, zur Eskalation beigetragen. Die Afrika-Beauftragte und Verhandlungsführerin der USA, Molly Phee, ist mitverantwortlich für bereits spektakulär gescheiterte Friedensprozesse in Südsudan und Afghanistan.

Aus der Sicht der Konfliktparteien im Grunde noch attraktiver ist die Einladung von Südsudans Präsident Salva Kiir Mayar­dit für Gespräche in Juba. Kiir agiert zwar im Auftrag der Regionalorganisation Inter­governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), hat jedoch eigene Interessen. Er sorgt sich um die Sicherheit der Ölexporte über Port Sudan, von denen sein Staatshaushalt fast ausschließlich abhängt. Sudan und Südsudan haben bereits meh­rere Frie­densabkommen verhandelt. Zivile Akteure waren dabei stets höchstens am Rand be­teiligt, ging es doch um rein transaktionale Macht­teilungsvereinbarungen zwischen Gewaltunternehmern.

Größere Chancen könnte eine Vermittlung von IGAD haben, wenn sich Kenias Präsident William Ruto noch stärker ein­bringen sollte, der zusammen mit den Regierungschefs von Südsudan und Dschi­buti von einem IGAD-Gipfel für Friedens­gespräche in Sudan mandatiert wurde. Er hat sich bereits gegen eine Fortsetzung der Militärregierung in Sudan eingesetzt. Kenia spielt auch in Äthiopien und in Ostkongo eine konstruktive Vermittlerrolle.

Die US-saudisch geführte Initiative bringt zumindest sehr gewichtige Länder zusam­men. Andere Vermittlungsangebote aus der Türkei, Äthiopien, Israel oder vom Präsi­denten der AU-Kommission Moussa Faki Mahamat hätten weniger Chancen, zumal diese Akteure selbst eine große Nähe zum sudanesischen Sicherheitssektor aufweisen.

Umso wichtiger ist es daher, dass die EU und die Bundesregierung sich bei den ge­nannten internationalen Partnern für einen anderen Verhandlungsansatz einsetzen. Deutschland könnte dabei an seine führen­de Rolle zu Beginn des sudanesischen Über­gangsprozesses anknüpfen, als die Bundes­regierung die diplomatische Kontaktgruppe der Friends of Sudan mit ins Leben rief, die erste Partnerschaftskonferenz mit und für Sudan ausrichtete und, zusammen mit Großbritannien, federführend das Mandat der UN-Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) im UN-Sicher­heits­rat aushandelte. Die Friends of Sudan brin­gen die wesentlichen westlichen und arabischen Partnerländer Sudans in einer losen, aber regelmäßigen Austauschrunde zusammen.

Zivile Akteure in die Führung bringen

Wie könnte ein alternativer Ansatz aus­sehen? Beginnen müsste er mit einer anderen Haltung gegenüber den Gewalt­akteuren. Vermittler sollten deren Ver­sprechungen keinen Glauben schenken, son­dern davon ausgehen, dass sie jede Gelegen­heit zu ihrem eigenen Vorteil nutzen werden und Regeln missachten. Die immer wieder gebrochenen Feuerpausen sind Ausdruck dieser Dynamik.

Aus dieser Haltung heraus müsste größerer Druck auf die Gewaltakteure ausgeübt werden, auch zur Einschränkung ihres finanziellen und diplomatischen Handlungs­spielraums. Die USA und die EU sollten Finanz- und Reise­sanktionen gegen aus­gesuchte Personen und Institutionen er­lassen. Dabei sollten sie aber darauf achten, das tägliche Leben für Bürgerinnen und Bürger in Sudan nicht weiter zu erschwe­ren. Auch Zivilisten haben beispielsweise Konten bei Banken, die mehrheitlich dem Sicherheitssektor gehören.

Die Konfliktparteien könnten durchaus ein Eigeninteresse entwickeln, sich einer zivilen Regierung zu unterwerfen. Da kein baldiger militärischer Sieg zu erwarten ist, werden sie einen Dritten brauchen, der ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis nach dem Krieg moderiert. Eine zivile Regierung und ein­heitlich agierende internationale Akteure könn­ten diese vermittelnde Funktion überneh­men. Sie könnten einen strukturierten Prozess begleiten, der sowohl die SAF von islamistischen Einflüssen befreit als auch alle Milizen einschließlich der RSF inte­griert und damit schrittweise auflöst.

Deutschland sollte sich starkmachen für eine führende Rolle politischer Parteien und anderer zivilgesellschaftlicher Akteure in möglichen Friedensgesprächen. Wichtige Parteien, Gewerkschaften, Widerstands­komitees, Frauenorganisationen und andere nicht-staatliche Initiativen und Vereinigun­gen haben bereits eine breite Anti-Kriegs-Koalition gegründet. Diese Civil Front bietet ein glaubwürdiges, konstruktives Gegen­gewicht zu den Generälen. Ermutigend sind Anstrengungen traditioneller Führer und lokaler Freiwilligenkomitees, räumlich be­grenzte Waffenstillstände auszuhandeln und zu überwachen. Freiwillige kümmern sich auch um die Erstversorgung von Opfern der bewaffneten Konfrontation, um sichere Fluchtwege und die Organisation von Hilfe.

Die Bundesregierung sollte sich innerhalb der von ihr mitinitiierten Koordinierungs­runden der Friends of Sudan gegen jede Parteinahme in Sudan einsetzen und darauf hinwirken, dass der sudanesischen Anti-Kriegs-Koalition schnell die Führungsrolle in Verhandlungen zugemessen wird. Internationaler Druck sollte die Kon­fronta­tion der Gewaltakteure nicht verschärfen, wie in den Wochen vor Ausbruch des Krie­ges. Vielmehr sollte die neu gebildete Civil Front entscheiden, welche Art von inter­nationaler Unterstützung sie will und welche ihren Anliegen eher schaden würde.

Fazit

Den Einfluss der Sicherheitskräfte in Wirt­schaft, Politik und Gesellschaft zurück­zudrängen wird eine lange Zeit brauchen. Der Mindestanspruch jeder zivilen Regierung sollte sein, den bisherigen Bedeutungs­zuwachs des Sicherheitssektors zu stoppen. Die Einigkeit der zivilen Anti-Kriegs-Koali­tion könnte in neuen Verhandlungen leicht zerbrechen, wenn politische Parteien wie­der versuchen sollten, sich gegenseitig aus­zustechen. Die Erfahrung der massiven Kämpfe der letzten Wochen müsste also auch zu einem Umdenken bei sudanesischen Poli­tikerinnen und Politikern führen.

Rückschläge einschließlich erneuter Putschversuche sind angesichts der auto­ritä­ren Instinkte der Gewaltakteure wahr­scheinlich. Ein neuer Ansatz in Sudan würde nicht sofort und vollständig zu Frieden, Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit, dem Slogan der Revolution von 2018/19, führen. Aber er bietet die beste Hoffnung, dass Sudan einen stabileren Weg dorthin einschlägt. Zivile Akteure in den Vordergrund zu stellen ist damit »realistischer« als ein Deal, der wieder nur mit den Generälen vorbereitet wird.

Outbreak of war in Sudan in April 2023: Interviews and other media appearances

Das Versagen der US-Diplomatie im Sudan, Echo der Zeit, SRF Radio, 12.05.2023

RSF will have to be integrated into a professional army: Gerrit Kurtz, Research Fellow, SWP, Deutsche Welle, 8 May 2023

Zitate in: Streit um die Beute: Warum im Sudan Militärs gegeneinander kämpfen, Berliner Kurier, 07.05.2023

Quotes in: „Zonder burgers aan tafel sneuvelt ieder bestand in Sudan”, Reformatorisch Dagblad, 06.05.2023

Experte zur humanitären Lage im Sudan, ORF III Aktuell, 05.05.2023

“Bei Afrika-Reise des Bundeskanzlers geht es vor allem um Frieden“, MDR Aktuell, 04.05.2023

The Sudan Crisis: Local and Global Perspectives on the New Instability in Africa, DGAP Morning Briefing, 04.05.2023

Politologe: Scholz sollte sich auf Afrika-Reise für Frieden einsetzen, NDR Info, 04.05.2023

Der Tag, HR2 Inforadio, 02.05.2023 (ab Minute 46:20).

Machtkampf im Sudan: Was steckt hinter dem blutigen Konflikt?, Die Presse Podcast, 01.05.2023

Politologe: Keine Kompromisse mit Autokraten machen, Information und Musik, Deutschlandfunk, 01.05.2023

«Der Konflikt zwischen dem Militär und der RSF-Miliz war bekannt. Es hatten nur alle gehofft, dass er nicht in Gewalt umschlagen würde,” Das war eine Fehleinschätzung,“, Zitate in: Der Sahel versinkt im blutigen Chaos – und Deutschland zieht sich zurück, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 29.04.2023

„Die RSF haben politisch an Einfluss gewonnen durch die EU und ihre Politik der Migrationsabwehr”, Zitate in: Sudan: Welche Fehler auch die EU gemacht hat, heute.de, ZDF, 29.04.2023

Politologe: Zivile Kräfte in Sudan brauchen internationale Unterstützung, NDR Info, 29.4.2023

„Es fehlte dann nur noch das Streichholz, um dieses Pulverfass zu entzünden.“, DGVN.de, 27.04.2023

Interview, MDR Aktuell, 27.04.2023

“Es bringt nichts, einen neuen Ausgleich allein zwischen den beiden autoritär gesinnten Gegnern zu suchen.« Nur unter einer zivilen Regierung könne das Verhältnis der beiden Militärs dauerhaft geklärt warden“, Zitate in: Sudan: Ein Land als Beute, DIE ZEIT, 27.04.2023

Machtkampf im Sudan: Wird der Konflikt zum Flächenbrand in Afrika?, Tagesspiegel, 27.04.2023

Zitate in: Sudan: Das bedeuten die Machtkämpfe für die jungen Menschen im Land, watson.de, 26.04.2023

Gerrit Kurtz, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, bewertet die derzeitige Feuerpause im Sudan, Tagesschau24, 25.04.2023

Radio Bremen, 25.04.2023

Kämpfe in Sudan – Welche Ziele verfolgt die russische Söldnergruppe Wagner?, FAZ Podcast, 24.04.2023

Gefährliche Rettungsmission im Sudan, Thema des Tages, BR24, 24.04.2023

„Der aktuelle Konflikt hat sich lange angekündigt. Die Streitkräfte und die Rapid Support Forces blicken auf eine jahrelange Rivalität zurück“, Zitate in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 24.04.2023

Zitate in: ProSiebenSat1 Nachrichten, 24.4.2023

Zitate in: MDR Nachrichten, 24.04.2023

Zitate in: Droht im Sudan ein neuer Bürgerkrieg?, t-online.de, 24.4.2023

NDR Info, 23.04.2023

Wer kann die Gewalt im Sudan stoppen?, Informationen am Morgen, Deutschlandfunk, 22.April 2023

Wenn sich „auch die südsudanesischen Parteien versuchen zu positionieren, was den Konflikt im Norden betrifft, könnte das jetzt halt auch zu Gewaltexplosionen in Südsudan führen”, Zitate in: Sudans Nachbarn in großer Sorge, Deutsche Welle, 21.04.2023

“The SAF and the RSF can’t just go back to the status quo ante, because this was not working”, quotes in Newshour, BBC World Service, 20 April 2023 (from 37:00 minutes).

„Je länger die Kämpfe andauern, umso schwieriger wird es zu Verhandlungen über eine zivile Regierung zurückzukehren“, Zitate in: ZEIT Online Erklärvideo, 20.04.2023

„Derzeit verhalten sich die regionalen Partner der Konfliktparteien in Sudan eher abwartend und versuchen zu vermitteln“, Zitate in: ARTE Journal, 20.04.2023

»Ich kann keine konkrete Rolle Russlands erkennen«, Spiegel Online, 19.04.2023

Machtkampf im Sudan. Konflikt mit Außenwirkung, Zur Diskussion, Deutschlandfunk, 19.04.2023

Gerrit Kurtz: «Gewalt in Sudan ist Folge von Eskalationsspirale», Tagesgespräch, SRF, 19.04.2023

Konflikt in Sudan: Ein Land am Rande des Bürgerkriegs, Auf den Punkt, Podcast der Süddeutschen Zeitung, 18.04.2023

Sudan: “Konflikt war Vereinten Nationen sehr bewusst”, Mittagsecho, WDR5, 18.04.2023

Blutiger Machtkampf im Sudan, Deutsche Welle, 18.04.2023

Die beiden Konfliktparteien seien die “mit Abstand mächtigsten, größten und am besten bewaffneten Kräfte des Landes”, Zitate in: evangelischer Pressedienst, 18.04.2023

“For now, there is unlikely to be a reliable truce until one of the parties is in firm control of key state and military institutions in Khartoum,” quotes in: What’s behind the fighting in Sudan, and what is at stake?, Washington Post, 18.04.2023

Machtkampf im Sudan: „Das Ganze könnte in einem Bürgerkrieg münden“, Tagesspiegel, 17.04.2023

Kampf um die Dominanz im Staat, Phoenix, 17.04.2023

Kampf um Gold, Macht und Einfluss – und wie Russland dabei mitmischt, Südwest Presse, 17.04.2023

Experte zu den Kämpfen im Sudan: Große Gefahr eines Bürgerkriegs, rbb inforadio, 17.04.2023

Sudan Chaos escalates, The World, ABC Australia, 17.04.2023

Sudan: Hintergründe des Konflikts – Droht ein Bürgerkrieg?, Studio 9, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, 17.04.2023

„Entscheidend ist die Entwicklung der kommenden Tage. Dazu zählt, wer von den beiden Parteien Kontrolle über die Staatsinstitutionen im Zentrum Khartums erlangt und wer den Kampf um innenpolitische und internationale Legitimität gewinnt.“ Zitate in: DPA, 17.04.2023

HR2 Inforadio, 17.04.2023

Machtkampf in Sudan, Was jetzt Podcast, Die Zeit, 17.04.2023

“Weitere Kämpfe zwischen den Parteien erscheinen derzeit wahrscheinlich, trotz kurzfristiger Feuerpause heute Nachmittag. Ein Bürgerkrieg ist möglich.”, Zitate in: Droht Sudan ein Bürgerkrieg?, ZDF heute.de, 16.04.2023

Konflikt zwischen Militärmachthabern im Sudan, Echo der Zeit, SRF, 16.04.2023

Note: Links are provided where they are available.

Sustaining Peace in Ethiopia

The end of the war in the North should be the prelude to fundamental governance reforms

SWP Comment 2023/C 14, 07.03.2023

The agreement signed by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethio­pian government on 2 November 2022 offers a real chance to end one of the bloodiest wars in the world. The implementation of the agreement is going well so far. How­ever, the peace process has brought into focus the question of a stable distribution of power within Ethiopia and in the Horn of Africa. The government under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed faces three key challenges. First, it must integrate the TPLF and at the same time disengage from the partnership with Eritrea. Second, it must rebalance the domestic relationship between the main political actors in order to stop the escalating violence in the states of Amhara and Oromia. Finally, it must bring together a society divided and impoverished by war. International partners should support Ethiopia in addressing these challenges with conditional financial assistance and peacebuilding projects.

In January, Federal Foreign Minister Anna­lena Baerbock and her French counterpart, Catherine Colonna, visited Addis Ababa together. Their message: European partners are willing to intensify their cooperation with the Ethiopian government again if the peace process in Tigray is credible and, above all, if steps are taken to address the massive human rights violations.

Ethiopia’s civil war is the expression of a power struggle within the country’s ruling elite. In 2018, Prime Minister Abiy had sur­prisingly won an internal vote in the multi-party coalition Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front against the can­didate supported by the TPLF. When Abiy formed the new Prosperity Party from the old coalition in 2019, the TPLF, which had dominated the coalition government for 27 years, was left out. The TPLF retreated to Tigray while Abiy scaled back its influence within the government and security appara­tus and pursued a political and economic reform agenda.

However, the centralist course of Abiy’s government ran counter to demands for greater ethnic self-determination and political participation from communities across the country who saw their time had come after the TPLF had been set back. The 2018 transfer of power took place after years of protests in the states of Amhara and Oromia against Tigray’s dominance in Ethiopia. However, the differences between the government and the TPLF intensified the most, and in early November 2020, these differences escalated into an armed conflict.

The war was not limited to Tigray; there­fore, neither can the peace process be. In Ethiopia’s most populous states, Oromia and Amhara, ethno-nationalist forces have gained ground in recent years, fighting partly against the state and also against each other.

Abiy’s power base is crumbling as a re­sult of these fault lines, and no alternative centre of power has emerged. At stake is the stability – and ultimately even the unity – of the Ethiopian state. An optimistic per­spective, however, is that the peace process also offers an opportunity to involve more communities, strengthen civil society and renegotiate the distribution of power be­tween the centre and ethnically defined federal states that has preoccupied Ethiopia for decades.

Stopping the fighting helps Abiy to remain in power

The “agreement for a lasting peace through a permanent cessation of hostilities”, which the TPLF and the Ethiopian government signed in Pretoria, South Africa, and which was mediated by the African Union (AU), came as quite a surprise. A ceasefire lasting about five months in the first half of 2022 had brought no progress in negotiations. The fighting, which had flared up again at the end of August, was marked by a partic­u­lar degree of cruelty and a massive deploy­ment of troops. Reports speak of up to one million fighters deployed by all sides. In a joint offensive, Eritrean troops and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) captured strategically important towns in Tigray and were close to the regional capi­tal, Mekelle. The TPLF was sceptical about the AU as a credible mediator, which had delayed the start of peace talks.

In light of the military situation, the Ethiopian government’s rationale in partic­ular requires explanation. Its opponent, the Tigray Defence Forces (TDF), had already driven the Ethiopian armed forces out of Tigray in guerrilla actions in 2021 and then advanced into Amhara and Afar. However, the TDF did not manage to reach Addis Ababa or the supply routes between the economic centre of the country and the port in Djibouti. In autumn 2022, the TDF also ran out of supplies and ammunition.

For both sides, the war was associated with enormous costs. Estimates put the civil­ian death toll in Tigray alone at 518,000 at the end of 2022. Civilian casualties in Afar and Amhara and presumably hundreds of thousands of fallen fighters need to be added to this count. A total of 600,000–800,000 fatalities also corresponds with the order of magnitude cited by high-ranking representatives of the European Union (EU), the United States and the AU. Thus, about one-tenth of Tigray’s pre-war population may have lost their lives in the war, mainly due to the lack of medical care and mal­nutrition. The government blocked humani­tarian access for months and cut off Tigray’s population from electricity, telecommunications and banking services.

Abiy probably agreed to the cessation of hostilities because it helps to secure his own power. A complete military conquest of Tigray would probably have meant that the government would have had to con­centrate its armed forces in Tigray permanently in order to prevent possible guerrilla actions. The high military expenditure was a burden on Ethiopia’s national budget any­way. It would have become more difficult for Abiy to finance public investments, which have driven economic growth in the last decade and provided opportunities for patronage.

A permanent troop concentration in Tigray would also have prevented the government from deploying more military to the other conflict areas in the country. More­over, this scenario would have further increased Abiy’s dependence on Eritrea, which had deployed a significant part of its forces against the TDF.

After all, a military end to the war would have exposed the government to further international pressure. Although it had support for its course from the Trump ad­ministration and AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat at the beginning of the war, this changed later. The United States suspended trade privileges under the African Growth and Opportunity Act on 1 January 2022, which hit Ethiopia’s textile sector particularly hard. Calls for further sanctions intensified in the US Congress. In the region, Kenya campaigned for a peace­ful solution to the war. After AU Special Envoy Olusegun Obasanjo failed to make progress, the AU expanded the mediation panel to include Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s ex-president, and Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, a former vice-president of South Africa.

The agreement is working – so far

The core of the agreement consists of a deal: The TPLF has committed to the complete disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of the TDF into civilian life or into regular Tigray security forces and to the peaceful transfer of control to the police and armed forces of the central government. In return, the TPLF is to be removed from the Ethiopian terror list, humanitarian deliveries and basic services for the popu­lation in Tigray are to be restored and non-federal troops are to withdraw.

The most important goal of the agreement was achieved very quickly: an end to the fighting between the TDF and the ENDF. Both forces withdrew from the front lines. For most people in northern Ethiopia, the situation improved. Ninety per cent of Tigray’s population is dependent on food assistance – a large proportion of them now have access to aid again. Many towns were reconnected to the electricity grid in December. Banks reopened, telecommunications and internet connections were restored. Ethiopian Airlines resumed direct flights between Mekelle and Addis Ababa. But the quality of infrastructure is often still weak, and some areas remain barely accessible to humanitarian agencies, espe­cially those off of major roads and on the border with Eritrea. There are 2.3 million children out of school in Tigray alone, more than half of them for more than two years. Reconstruction will take a long time.

Close partnership with Eritrea

A sticking point in the peace process re­mains how to deal with those armed actors who were not present at the peace negotia­tions, primarily Eritrea and groups from Amhara.

For Abiy, Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki was an important ally in his power struggle against the TPLF. Isaias has har­boured deep hostility towards the TPLF ever since the border war over the town of Badme in northern Tigray (1998–2000). Al­though the Ethiopian government occupied the territory awarded to Eritrea by an international border commission after the war, Eritrea became increasingly isolated internationally. When it became known that the government in Asmara was sup­porting Al‑Shabaab in Somalia, the United Nations (UN) Security Council, at Ethiopia’s instigation, imposed sanctions and an arms embargo on Eritrea in 2009. The alleged threat posed by the TPLF – Ethiopia’s rul­ing party at the time – was used by Isaias to justify the introduction of indefinite mili­tary and labour service, which con­scripts Eritrean men and women alike.

The July 2018 agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which earned Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize a year later, brought little last­ing progress in the border region. Nevertheless, it strengthened security and intelligence cooperation between the two govern­ments and led to the lifting of UN sanctions. As relations between the TPLF and Abiy deteriorated, the peace agreement turned into a war pact. Months before the war be­gan, Abiy moved military forces to Tigray. Eritrea organised training for 60,000 troops from Amhara state (according to the federal constitution, Ethiopian states have their own security forces).

Isaias accordingly views the peace process between the TPLF and the Ethiopian government with great scepticism. Even though Eritrean troop movements from some Tigray towns were reported as with­drawing in January, Eritrean military units are arguably still present in some areas of Tigray, in addition to special forces from other Ethiopian federal states, especially from Amhara. Eritrean and Amharic troops are blamed for attacks on civilians, includ­ing sexual violence, kidnapping and loot­ing. Between the beginning of November and the end of December 2022 alone, sev­eral thousand people are said to have been killed.

In contrast, the senior military commanders of the two conflict parties had agreed at a follow-up meeting 10 days after the Pretoria agreement in Nairobi that all non-ENDF troops should withdraw “concur­rently” with the disarmament of the TDF. To monitor compliance with the agreement, the AU set up a monitoring and verification mechanism led by Major General Stephan Radina from Kenya. This began its work at the end of December and confirmed on 10 January 2023 that the TDF had handed over most of its heavy weapons to the ENDF, including tanks and artillery. However, the AU team has not yet reported the withdrawal of non-ENDF troops from Tigray.

Domestic tensions

The ceasefire agreement offers indications for the peace process going forward, but it does not contain a comprehensive settlement of longer-term conflicts. Abiy’s chal­lenge is to make concessions to the TPLF in the peace process without putting too much strain on his other domestic alliances.

First, there is the future role of the TPLF in Ethiopian politics. The agreement fore­sees the formation of an inclusive interim administration for Tigray after the delisting of the TPLF as a terrorist organisation. It is considered likely that the TPLF will achieve a broad majority in the as of yet unscheduled elections for the regional parliament and for the representation of Tigray in the Ethiopian parliament. The question is whether the TPLF will allow itself to be integrated into Abiy’s government, whether it will withdraw to an opposition role or whether it will allow itself to be permanent­ly reduced to a purely regional party. At the same time, the TPLF must also strive for a more open and inclusive style of gov­ernment in Tigray itself, which opposition parties there are already calling for.

Abiy is encountering scepticism from Amhara about the peace process with the TPLF. Amhara were themselves victims of mass atrocities committed by the TDF, in­cluding sexual violence and looting of civil­ian infrastructure. Amharic leaders have therefore advocated for accountability of the TDF’s abuses and remain cautious about the possible involvement of the TPLF in the federal government.

Abiy will also have to perform a balancing act with regard to areas in West and South Tigray, which Amharic units occupied together with the ENDF at the beginning of the war (see map). In doing so, they dis­placed a large portion of the Tigrinya popu­lation in a campaign that a comprehensive report by Human Rights Watch and Amnes­ty International described as ethnic cleans­ing. The Amharic side points out that the TPLF had annexed the areas to the state of Tigray in the early 1990s and in turn dis­placed Amharic residents. The ceasefire agreement only stipulates that the affilia­tion of these areas is to be settled within the framework of the constitution. The Ethiopian government is likely to try to delay a final decision on the status of the disputed areas as long as possible in order to avoid having to choose between the peace partner TPLF and allies from Amhara.

Finally, the government has been trying since mid-2022 to curb the influence of irregular Amharic militias, the Fano, with whom it had cooperated during the war. They are accused of massive human rights violations. At one point numbering several tens of thousands, the Fano threaten the government’s monopoly on the use of violence. They are also active in Oromia.

Escalation in Oromia

Potentially the most explosive situation for Abiy and Ethiopia’s stability is no longer the conflict in Tigray, but conflicts in Oromia and tensions between Oromos and Amhara. The peace process with the TPLF could have both positive and negative effects on the government’s handling of these conflicts. The root cause is ultimately the same, namely the distribution of power between regions and the centre.

Although they are the largest ethnic group in the country, accounting for about one-third of the population, Oromos have never had a leading role in Ethiopia’s his­tory. Large parts of today’s Oromia state only became part of the Ethiopian empire in the second half of the 19th century.

Abiy himself comes from Oromia, where he worked in the regional government. However, many young people who were drivers of the pre-2018 reform protests see Abiy’s unitarism as a return to accommodation with Amharic-style centralism.

Operating at the end of Oromia’s nationalist spectrum is the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an armed group that split from the decades-old Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in 2018. The OLF signed a peace agree­ment with Abiy’s government in 2018 that the OLA subsequently rejected. In 2021, the OLA allied itself with the TPLF. After various phases of ups and downs, violence escalated again in November 2022, with clashes be­tween the OLA and Fano militias and regu­lar ENDF units, in addition to attacks on civilian infrastructure. Oromos are con­cerned that the Fano could occupy land that they consider Amharic, just as they did in Tigray. Land conflicts between Oromos and Amhara are thus politicised by armed groups from both sides. Hundreds of thou­sands of people have already fled from Oromia to Amhara.

The violence in Oromia is different from the conflict with the TPLF, but still serious. The OLA is probably too small, fragmented and ill-equipped to conquer larger cities or even Addis Ababa, even though it sometimes fights up to 25 kilometres from the capital (see map). The larger consequence of their actions is the climate of insecurity in an economically important region of the country. The German ambassador to Ethio­pia, for example, has already expressed his concerns about attacks on investors in Oromia. Ethiopia’s main supply links with the port of Djibouti also run through Oromia.

If the conflict between armed groups of Amhara and Oromia escalates, this could have serious consequences for the unity and governability of Ethiopia. At present, this scenario still seems unlikely, not least because the political actors in both states are much more heterogeneous than in Tigray.

However, the peace process in the north could also serve as a model for Oromia. Around 80 members of parliament from Abiy’s party in Oromia have already called on him to enter into peace negotiations with the OLA. The government has so far rejected negotiations, citing the fragmented leadership structure of the OLA, which – like the TPLF – is listed as a terrorist group. More recently, however, Abiy has shown himself to be more open to negotiations.

Holding the country together

The armed conflicts are being fuelled by a polarised society and an economy in crisis. Although Abiy’s government is not cur­rent­ly in danger of being overthrown by an in­surgency or voted out in elections, it needs to consolidate its position and unite society.

Politicians and other public actors have exacerbated ethnic polarisation during the war. Prime Minister Abiy himself referred to the TPLF in July 2021 as a “weed” and a “cancer” that needed to be eradicated. While the government stressed that it dis­tinguished between the people of Tigray and the TPLF, there were dehumanising statements on social media towards the people of Tigray in general, as Alice Wairi­mu Nderitu, the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, warned in October 2022. From the perspective of many people in Tigray, Abiy’s government stands for genocide against Tigray.

One answer to the polarisation in society can possibly be provided by the national dialogue that the government initiated with the establishment of a commission in December 2021. For this to be effective, opposition forces – not least the TPLF and parties from Oromia – would have to par­ticipate. So far, many perceive the process as being too one-sided and dominated by the government. In addition, the government would have to stop restricting access to media. If the national dialogue became more inclusive and independent – possibly also thanks to German support for a multi-track dialogue that has been ongoing for some time – it could provide an important platform to address fundamental social and political issues.

Looking at recent Ethiopian history, con­flict researcher Semir Yusuf argues that neither protest movements nor violent resistance have led to Ethiopia’s democratic transformation. Instead, what is needed for genuine democratisation is greater indepen­dence of institutions and stronger party structures.

Last but not least, Ethiopia’s economy and public finances have suffered enor­mously. The government estimates that the financial need for reconstruction in the war-torn areas in Tigray, Afar and Amhara is around US$ 20 billion. At the same time, the national budget is running a high deficit due to elevated military spending and an economic downturn. If access to financial resources continues to tighten, it is likely to become more difficult for the government to co-opt key elites. With currency reserves lower than one month’s external payment obligations, the rating agency Fitch has already warned of an increased credit default risk for Ethiopia.

In addition to the war, the economy is still suffering from the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic and the increase in fertiliser and energy prices in the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

The population is feeling the consequences. The annual inflation rate was 33.9 per cent in December 2022 – the third highest in Africa. Due to the armed con­flicts and a regional drought due to the failure of five rainy seasons in a row to materialise, 28.6 million people have become dependent on humanitarian aid.

The government is therefore urgently seeking a debt adjustment programme and financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF had post­poned such talks due to the renewed out­break of fighting in 2022.

European support needs prudence

Baerbock and Colonna also placed their visit to Ethiopia in the current geopolitical context. Standing in front of sacks of wheat donated by Ukraine and financed by the two governments, the German Foreign Minister justified the aid with the aim of “not letting the people of Ethiopia also be­come victims of Russia’s war of aggression”.

This narrative has not caught on in Ethio­pia, whose relations with Russia and China have become even closer since the start of the Tigray war. Both partners held a protective hand over Ethiopia’s government in the UN Security Council. China is the largest source of foreign investment in Ethiopia.

Instead, Baerbock’s statement attests to the risk of ignoring the specific context of the country, Africa’s second-largest by popu­lation, in favour of a pro-government narrative by focusing on the geopolitical competition for influence. In addition to the climate change-induced drought, mil­lions of people in Ethiopia are food-in­secure because of the war at home and the previous humanitarian blockade by Abiy’s govern­ment. In February, Abiy even launched wheat exports to bring in much-needed foreign currency.

An uncritical engagement by Europe to recover ground from its geopolitical rivals Russia and China could be counterproductive. It was not least the excessive inter­national enthusiasm at the beginning of Abiy’s reform course that encouraged the prime minister to follow his uncompromising course towards the TPLF.

The Tigray war did not lead the German government to put its preferred partnership with the government of Ethiopia on ice. At the end of 2020, it suspended the pledged reform financing but maintained Ethiopia’s status as a reform partner country of Ger­man development cooperation. Chancellor Angela Merkel promoted German investment at her Africa Summit in August 2021, which Abiy also attended. It was not until January 2023 – in the course of the new Africa Strategy of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) – that Development Minister Svenja Schulze announced that the reform part­ner­ships would be phased out as an instrument.

At the end of December 2022, the EU member states spelt out their conditions for a gradual resumption of budget support, which was also suspended by the EU. These are 1) progress in implementing the cease­fire agreement, 2) unimpeded humanitar­ian access and 3) addressing the massive human rights violations. In particular, there has been progress in the first two areas, such as disarming the TDF and deliv­ering aid to large parts of Tigray. In early February 2023, Abiy met TPLF representatives in person for the first time since the war began.

The EU has not publicly clarified what exactly the condition for accountability entails. It is true that the Ethiopian govern­ment rejects the International Commission of Human Rights Experts for Ethiopia, which the UN Human Rights Council established at the end of 2021. However, the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission continues to work with the Office of the UN High Com­missioner for Human Rights on the issue of accountability. In addition, the Ethiopian Ministry of Justice published a green paper on transitional justice.

Germany and its European partners should do what they can to support the peace process, which is rightly driven pri­marily by the Ethiopian parties to the con­flict. Concrete projects for stabilisation and peacebuilding are important for this. How­ever, Germany should also work to ensure that the media, civil society and academia in Ethiopia are given greater freedom. Tran­sitional justice and reconciliation should remain on the agenda without prescribing specific mechanisms. In any case, the Ger­man government should also continue its support for the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Election Commission.

In the course of their gradual normalisation of relations with Ethiopia, Germany and its European partners should pay closer attention to the root causes of the violence, not only in Tigray but also in Oromia and Amhara. For this, they do not need to change the conditions they have already set, but they need to focus more on trans­parency, population orientation, broad inclusivity and government accountability. This is especially true for reconstruction aid and for the modalities of a new IMF pro­gramme and debt reduction under the G20 Common Framework. A new government palace and housing complex in Addis Ababa, whose total cost is almost equal to the entire national budget, albeit financed from private and Arab sources, sends the wrong signal here.

If Ethiopia wants to achieve sustainable peace and stability, it needs a more inclu­sive political system. The peace process with the TPLF and its critical-constructive support from international partners can be the starting point for corresponding long-term progress.