Horn of Africa: Time for preventive diplomacy

In both Ethiopia and South Sudan, conflicts are escalating again. To prevent further regionalisation of the conflict landscape, Europe should support high-level diplomacy, says Gerrit Kurtz.

SWP Point of View, 21 March 2025. Also available in German.

In the Horn of Africa, two peace processes are in acute danger: Local power struggles in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Tigray region are at risk of escalating into regional crises. In South Sudan – as in 2013 at the beginning of the last civil war – a power struggle is raging over the possible successor to 73-year-old President Salva Kiir. He is already positioning his son-in-law as a potential replacement. At the same time, clashes between the White Army – a Nuer militia – and the South Sudanese army in the Upper Nile region are causing a stir after a United Nations helicopter was shot down and a high-ranking army general was killed.

During the civil war from 2013 to 2018, the White Army fought on the side of the main rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-in Opposition (SPLA/M-IO) under today’s First Vice President Riek Machar. Tensions between Kiir and Machar are intensifying once again – a dangerous déjà vu for the country, which has barely had time to recover after decades of conflict.

Ethiopia: Split within the TPLF and growing tensions with Eritrea

In Ethiopia, a local power struggle in the Tigray region threatens to escalate into a regional crisis between the federal government in Addis Ababa and Eritrea. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – once Ethiopia’s ruling party and the Ethiopian government’s opponent in the war between 2020 and 2022 – is divided: A faction led by chairman Debretsion Gebremichael is opposed by a reformist faction under the president of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, Getachew Reda. 

The Debretsion faction has large parts of the Tigrayan military on its side and has been taking over local administrative structures for months, sometimes violently. In the meantime, it has also brought media and parts of the administration in the provincial capital, Mekelle, under its control. The TPLF’s Debretsion faction is said to have good relations with Eritrea, whereas Getachew is counting on Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have cooled markedly since the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war between the TPLF and the government in 2022. Both countries are accused of supporting opponents of the other’s regime.

Due to the increasing tensions, there is a risk that there will be a regionalisation of the conflict landscape. Uganda has already sent troops to support the South Sudanese government, as it did in 2013. Similar to previous clashes, Sudanese actors are also intervening. Over the weekend, militias of the Rapid Support Forces in South Sudan were already fighting against units of the SPLA/M-IO, which were apparently on their way to receive weapons from the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Failure of the peace agreements – fragmented international engagement

The current escalations are no coincidence. The respective agreements to end the civil wars in South Sudan and Ethiopia have only been implemented to a limited degree. Unilateral deviations by both governments from their obligations have de facto prevailed. Kiir rapidly replaced cabinet members and had high-ranking generals of the SPLA/M-IO arrested. In Ethiopia, important measures of the Pretoria Agreement, such as the demobilisation of militias and the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amharic troops from Tigray, have largely failed to materialise. 

International engagement with the region is increasingly fragmented – as are the states of the region themselves. In Ethiopia, for example, there is a lack of credible guarantors for the peace process. At the recent extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan, only two countries took part at the level of their president. Whereas the United States used to be the most important international partner for peace in the region, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are now influential, but they tend to support certain sides rather than mediate in internal conflicts.

In view of the deteriorating situation, it is now time for high-level preventive diplomacy. A coordinated international approach could contain the escalation. An informal division of tasks would be conceivable: Influential countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could defuse tensions at the intergovernmental level, while European actors could support IGAD and the African Union in local mediation processes.

Picture: In better times in 2019, President Salva Kiir met the head of the SPLA/M-IO, Riek Machar, in Juba, to prepare the government of national unity. Source: UN Photo/Isaac Billy

Power Struggle in Tigray

As Ethiopian PM Abiy Ahmed continues to renege on the Pretoria Agreement that ended hostilities two years ago, infighting within the TPLF further threatens the tenuous stability in war-shattered Tigray.

Published in African Arguments, 29 October 2024.

Long-simmering tensions within the Tigray People‘s Liberation Front (TPLF) broke out into the open in August 2024. The party leadership around President Debretsion Gebremichael now stands apart from key TPLF officials in the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA) around its President Getachew Reda. Each side considers the other an illegal entity. The division has stirred up fears of renewed violence in northern Ethiopia. The split occurs in a context in which the economic and social situation in the northern highlands remains dire, the legacy of the devastating war four years ago that was only stopped by the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa, in November 2022.

I was recently in Addis Ababa and Mekelle and spoke to political stakeholders and civil society representatives from both TPLF factions, TIRA representatives and opposition parties. They were eager to talk about the origins of the differences, the risks involved and a potential way out.

Dissonance in the aftermath of the war

Interlocutors went back to different points in time to explain the conflict. Internal differences are not new to the TPLF in its near-fifty-year long evolution from guerrilla movement to political party. A notable division took place in 2001, after the war with Eritrea and in the light of an internal evaluation of the party’s first ten years in power. In that case, Meles Zenawi, confirmed his dominance of the party until his premature death in 2012.

The party has long championed the Leninist concept of democratic centralism, which ensured a high degree of subservience of the lower ranks to the leadership. The principle eroded significantly under Meles‘ successors who lacked his charisma and vision.

Similarly, the most recent war in Tigray also stirred internal debates. Political stakeholders with direct knowledge of the Pretoria negotiations with the federal government pointed to simmering disagreements at the time. According to them, the provision that the existing regional government in Tigray be dismantled and an interim administration formed appeared relatively late during the negotiations. This created some opposition in Mekelle. It was visible in the initial difficulties of the TPLF in agreeing on the head of the new interim administration. Prime Minister Abiy rejected Debretsion, who laid claim to the position given his leadership of the TPLF. Debretsion then met Abiy and brought Abiy‘s informal ‘recommendation’, according to a TPLF cadre, that the former should prepare a short list of candidates. The Central Committee of the TPLF rejected this list as being too close to the party president though. It finally elected then TPLF deputy chairperson, Getachew Reda, who had led the TPLF delegation in Pretoria, via a secret ballot. Getachew had been an outsider in the TPLF Executive Bureau before the war, according to several accounts. A member of the TPLF negotiation team protested that they had not been properly consulted on the formation of the TIRA and that it was unclear how long the TIRA would remain in place and when elections would be held.

Every interlocutor agrees that the division within the party is not ideological. Rather, it is an inter-generational power struggle: “Power-mongering is the main problem in the TPLF as an organization,” observed a cadre member. The party leadership and people connected to them are perceived as seeking to evade accountability – for illicit gains, for corruption, and for political mistakes and alleged crimes committed before and during the war. The members of this “old guard” still control substantial business holdings amassed during the TPLF’s time in government, in particular as part of the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). Most of the conglomerate’s companies were released from state control in July 2023. In addition, some military commanders apparently took over gold mining in Tigray during the war and remain in control of illegal gold mining and smuggling, amounting to two metric tons of gold annually. 

The TPLF started a process of internal evaluation about three sets of issues: the conditions that led to the war; how the war has been conducted; and about the Pretoria Agreement and its implementation. The party leadership wanted to avoid the evaluation of the conduct of the war, claiming that this would touch on sensitive military matters and military leaders not formally part of the TPLF. One of the alleged abuses came to light last year: TPLF and federal government officials diverted substantial amounts of food aid for years, which is why USAID and WFP paused their assistance for several months in 2023.

Escalation of division

In the past two years, there have been several issues that further inflamed those tensions. Some interlocutors see the hand of the Federal Government in this, manipulating Tigrayan politics to foster divergence in the TPLF and thus making it easier to control. Even those highly critical of their internal opponents see Prime Minister Abiy as the main culprit. They point to the lack of implementation of the Pretoria Agreement. Indeed, the Federal Government has failed to ensure that Amhara militias and Eritrean troops leave Tigray, thus allowing the full return of the nearly one million displaced people, in particular to Western Tigray, most of whom remain in squalid camps. Still, they also blame Getachew as Regional President of being too accommodative of Abiy.

The interim cabinet decided to create an inclusive advisory council for the interim administration. Though without legal mandate in the Pretoria Agreement, the aim was to put the necessary post-war reforms on a more participatory basis with the involvement of the small but vocal opposition parties in Tigray. The TPLF leadership opposed this proposal, however, and the council has not been established despite continued calls from the opposition.

Furthermore, there were divisions about the re-registration of the TPLF as a political party and about the replacement of zonal and woreda (district) officials as planned by the TIRA. It all led to the organization of the 14th Party Congress by the TPLF in August 2024, even though there was no legal basis for it. Predictably, it was opposed by the National Election Board of Ethiopia (NEBE). The leadership felt that they could wait no longer as the re-registration of the TPLF kept being delayed despite Abiy’s promises to the contrary.

14 high-level members wrote a letter to the TPLF President denouncing the Congress and stating their intention not to attend, among them Getachew Reda. The Congress consequently excluded them from the Executive Bureau and the Central Committee, which were elected there.

Public dispute and the role of the security forces

Both factions are trying to assert themselves. Getachew has been holding large public meetings in different parts of the Region, trying to mobilise public support. The TPLF formally expelled Getachew and 15 other members of the party on 15 September, stating that they could no longer hold public office in the name of the party. As a reaction, Getachew accused them of plotting a “coup”. Both sides use leaks and allegations to accuse each other of betrayal and siding with the enemy – Eritrea, the Fano militia of Amhara, or the federal government.

The Tigray Security Forces (TSF) have become a key factor in this power game. Fears of renewed violence and even civil war could only materialise if the TSF became involved, which still numbers around 200,000 fighters under arms, even if it has handed over its heavy weapons as part of the Pretoria Agreement. So far, the TSF have remained neutral, despite their leaders being part of the TIRA. Interlocutors credited Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede, deputy president of Tigray’s interim administration and head of the cabinet secretariat for peace and security, with cooling down the temperatures. He spoke out against attempts to change the TIRA or appoint local officials and reinforced restrictions on public gatherings. Since then, Getachew Reda claimed that the TIRA cabinet has command over the TSF, which the TPLF’s Debretsion immediately disputed.

Mediation efforts

What does a way out look like? US officials have recently tried to mediate, first with Ambassador Massinga and just two weeks later, Mike Hammer, Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa, visiting Mekelle and speaking to the leaders involved. This was seen as helpful, though no concrete results emerged. The TSF are trying to mediate between the factions, together with representatives of civil society, business and religious leaders. According to a mediator, they are exploring a compromise that may involve creating a short-term technocratic or caretaker government and regional elections within six to eight months. So far, an agreement remains elusive. Both sides, at least, have pledged to pursue dialogue.

In any case, the status quo is untenable. The interim administration cannot function without the backing of the TPLF and their vast networks throughout the Region. The TPLF cannot just take over the administration either, however, as that would risk losing the legality and legitimacy of the TIRA in the eyes of the federal government. There is also the question of who will represent the TPLF as signatory to the Pretoria Agreement in future meetings with the federal government and the African Union.

At the same time, it is unclear how much support the TPLF still commands among the population at large in Tigray. Last year, the TIRA clamped down violently on an opposition rally in Mekelle. As a legacy of the war, many people are traumatised and focus on their own survival, especially the almost 900,000 internally displaced persons (out of a pre-war population of around six million). Tens of thousands of young people are leaving Tigray each year in search of better livelihoods, according to the TIRA. Others become criminals. There are many survivors of gender-based violence, including those that have born the children of their tormentors. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS has increased rapidly in the region. Nonetheless, one expert noted: “the TPLF is the best organisation we have” in Tigray. It remains by far the largest party in Tigray, and perhaps the only one with the organisational capacity at the moment that could address those urgent humanitarian and development issues. That requires a unity of purpose though and could benefit from a more inclusive approach. 

Full and speedy implementation of the Pretoria Agreement remains essential, including the return of displaced persons, the withdrawal of the non-federal troops from Tigray, elections for the regional and council and Tigray’s representatives in the federal parliament, and a comprehensive political dialogue. As long as political leaders in Tigray keep bickering among themselves, however, they will not unite to achieve these tasks.