Tag: Sudan

Trotz des Erfolges der Armee ist ein Ende der Kämpfe nicht in Sicht

Zitate in den Salzburger Nachrichten, 16. April 2025

Ukraine, Israel, Gaza und die US-Regierung: Für den Sudan ist häufig kein Platz in den Schlagzeilen. Dabei sind dort mehr Menschen auf der Flucht, als Österreich Einwohner hat.

Gudrun Doringer Salzburg, Khartum. Die Konkurrenz der Krisen sei verantwortlich dafür, dass die Katastrophe im Sudan zur Kurzmeldung verkomme, sagt Gerrit Kurtz. Er ist Sudan-Experte bei der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. Für ihn ist sie mehr als das. Er beschäftigt sich tagein, tagaus eben mit dem Krieg im Sudan, der nun ins dritte Jahr geht.

(…)

Warum wird überhaupt gekämpft in dem ostafrikanischen Land? Es ist der Machtkampf zweier Generäle, die einst verbündet waren. Gerrit Kurtz erklärt: „Abdel Fattah al-Burhan befehligt das Militär im Land. Mohamed Hamdan Daglo, bekannt als Hemeti, ist Chef der Rapid Support Forces, kurz RSF – eine Konkurrenzsicherheitskraft. Die RSF war unter dem früheren Herrscher Baschir aufgebaut worden, um sich vor Putschen zu schützen.“ Baschir war selbst unter einem solchen Putsch an die Macht gekommen. „Daher hat er Paramilitärs gefördert, um eine Konkurrenz herzustellen“, sagt Kurtz. „Die haben auch Aufstände [bekämpft] und Grenzen gesichert, aber sie waren von Anfang an als Konkurrenz angelegt. Als Baschir weg war, haben die beiden Kräfte erst einmal zusammengearbeitet, weil sie den Gegner in der zivilen Demokratiebewegung gesehen haben, mit der sie auch gut zwei Jahre lang mehr schlecht als recht zusammen regiert haben. Als sie dann geputscht haben im Oktober 2021, beide zusammen, da war der zivile Gegner in der Regierung nicht mehr da. Das Verhältnis zwischen diesen beiden Sicherheitskräften musste geklärt werden: Wer ist die Nummer eins?“ Zu einer Einigung kam es nicht. Daran entzündete sich im April 2023 der Kriegsausbruch.

(…)

Trotz des Erfolges der Armee ist ein Ende der Kämpfe nicht in Sicht. „Beide Seiten erhalten weiterhin reichlich Unterstützung von außen, um ihre Kämpfe fortzusetzen“, sagt Gerrit Kurtz. „Die RSF von den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten. Die Armee durch militärische Zusammenarbeit mit Ägypten, mit dem Iran, mit Russland und mit der Türkei.“ Für die Bevölkerung sind die Auswirkungen fatal. Hunger wird als Waffe eingesetzt. Sexuelle Gewalt ebenso. „Es ist ein Krieg, der die Körper von Frauen und Kindern als Kriegsstrategie benutzt“, sagt Hala al-Karib, Sudan-Direktorin der Frauenrechtsorganisation Siha.

(…)

Hätte das Grauen ein Ende – was würde der Sieg einer der beiden Kriegsparteien für das verwundete Land bedeuten?

Der Sudan sei die meiste Zeit seit seiner Unabhängigkeit vom Vereinigten Königreich von Militärregierungen regiert worden, sagt Kurtz. „Wenn also die Armee die Regierungsgewalt zurückerobern würde, dann wüssten wir, wie das aussieht: harte autoritäre Repression. In den Gebieten, die sie gerade zurückerobert haben, hören wir von Erschießungen der Leute, denen sie vorwerfen, sie hätten mit den RSF zusammengearbeitet.“ Kurtz erwähnt auch die Angehörigen des früheren islamistischen Regimes von Umar al-Baschir, die auch jetzt militärisch eine große Rolle für die Armee spielen. Sie könnten im Fall eines Armeesieges zurückkommen. „Davor haben viele Angst. Einige Menschen sehen die Armee dennoch als kleineres Übel. Die RSF wird mittlerweile zusammengehalten von einem Freibrief zu Plünderung und Rache. Wir sehen Massaker an der Zivilbevölkerung. Das ist Gewalt, die wir auf diese Weise von der Armee nicht sehen.“

Eine einberufene Konferenz am Dienstag in London sagte dem Sudan 660 Millionen Euro Hilfsgelder zu. „Die Konferenz ist der Versuch, ein Thema aufs Tapet zu heben, das sonst nicht vorkommt, weil es auch europäische Politiker nicht hoch hängen“, sagt Gerrit Kurtz. „Es birgt Frustpotenzial, weil es an Einflussmöglichkeiten mangelt.“ Für die Menschen im Sudan bedeutet der Beginn des dritten Kriegsjahres Aufmerksamkeit – für einen Tag.

Mediation Efforts on Sudan: Beware the Pitfalls of Diplomatic Coordination

Establishing an informal but regular contact group of like-minded states and international organizations on Sudan would be an important outcome of the April 15 Sudan conference in London. It should learn lessons from the Friends of Sudan and other international coordination efforts, in the way it engages with Sudanese actors as well as external supporters of the conflict parties.

Commentary at ISPI, 15 April 2025

As the war in Sudan approaches its two-year anniversary, the conflict is set to enter a new phase. Regaining the heart of the capital Khartoum has been a major success – and a morale booster just ahead of the end of Ramadan – for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), for their part, still control vast swathes of Sudan’s territory west of the Nile. Military action won’t end the war anytime soon. This could be an entry point for a renewed push for a ceasefire. 

Given this prospect, more effective international coordination is essential. There is currently no unified, regular diplomatic contact group on Sudan, the biggest humanitarian crisis in the world with more than 30 million peopleneeding assistance (and much less getting it). The so-called Extended Mechanism created by the African Union (AU) in the first weeks of the war has only met infrequently and is probably also too unwieldy as a workable mechanism. Sudan special envoys have met in various configurations, including convened by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the sub-regional body for the Horn of Africa, and by Ramtane Lamamra, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Sudan Envoy. However, none of these have yet resulted in a regular mechanism. 

An overall aim of such a mechanism should be to provide regular updates of the members’ activities and create a platform to provide a modicum of coordination wherever possible. Ideally, it would also lead to more coherence, unity and sincerity in support of a negotiated end to the war, help mobilizing resources to avert (further) famine, and prevent the polarization of regional and international actors that are increasingly taking sides in the war. However, the current geopolitical context means that these objectives are probably no more than wishful thinking.

Why international efforts to end the war have failed so far

The war in Sudan is becoming increasingly protracted. SAF and RSF lead coalitions of armed actors over which they do not have complete control, but whose interests they have to consider in their political positions. Both Abdelfattah al-Burhan as head of the SAF and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti) as head of the RSF made clear in their respective Eid speeches at the end of March 2025 that there would be no negotiations. In contrast to previous declarations by the RSF over their readiness to talks, Hemedti now said there would be “only the language of the gun”. The roadmap for peace published by Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a national dialogue and a cabinet of technocrats, but also makes the laying down of arms and withdrawal from all areas currently controlled by the RSF a prerequisite: a negotiated surrender in all but name. 

So, there is no easy opening for mediation. In view of these rejections, international efforts so far relied essentially on three different approaches: security talks focused on a ceasefire and protection of civilians; personal accommodation through a face-to-face meeting between al-Burhan and Hemedti; and mobilizing a civilian bloc as alternative “third force”.

Talks in Jeddah led by the US and Saudi Arabia in May 2023 resulted in a declaration on the protection of civiliansand a one-week ceasefire signed by SAF and RSF. Nevertheless, the parties did not adhere to their commitments, with no consequences for them. At the next round in October/November 2023, the parties did not confirm the ceasefire, and failed to follow through on their individual commitments for improved humanitarian access. Instead of a third round, the US tried to convene a slightly broader group of states and the two belligerents in Geneva in August 2024. However, the SAF delegation did not want to be treated on the same level as the RSF (and avoid exposing its internal differences) and declined the invitation. Lowering their ambition, the US-led coalition of facilitators founded in Geneva focused on improving humanitarian access instead. However, these efforts had limited success, as humanitarian access to fighting zones remained severely hampered in their search for a pragmatic approach, the US were prepared to accord the authorities in Port Sudan more legitimacy by treating al-Burhan as Head of the Transitional Sovereign Council and not just as head of the military. The supposed lead mediator, US Special Envoy Thomas Periello, was, for US security reasons, only able to travel to Port Sudan and meet al-Burhan in November 2024 though, when the result of the presidential elections signaled the foreseeable end of his term with the outgoing Biden administration, weakening the scope of this initiative.

AU and IGAD created several mechanisms for mediation, but were not fully accepted by the SAF: firstly, Sudan remains suspended from the AU because of the coup in October 2021; SAF withdrew from the IGAD initiative after a failed one-on-one meeting with Hemedti was followed by Hemedti attending an IGAD summit in Kampala in January 2024. SAF also rejected Kenya’s role as chair of IGAD’s quartet, a skepticism which only grew in light of the founding of a new RSF-led political alliance with Nairobi’s blessing in February 2025. The AU’s high-level panel on Sudan was very slow to organize talks with civilian actors, which has been its main objective, and failed to follow-up with them for months after two roundtables in the summer of 2024. The AU’s presidential ad hoc committee aims to organize a face-to-face meeting between Burhan and Hemedti, but has never met.

Competition between mediators did not help. Egypt distrusts IGAD as a mediation channel – both because it is not a member state, and because of the dominant role played in it by Ethiopia. It pushes for Sudan’s readmission to the AU (so far unsuccessfully) and organized its own initiative of Sudan’s neighboring countries (in July 2023), with no impact. Being non-African, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, major players in Sudan, are not part of the AU, and are also skeptical of pushing for a renewed civilian-led government in Sudan. When the UAE and Egypt facilitated a secret meeting in Bahrain, SAF and RSF both sent their respective deputy leaders and got relatively far. Yes, negotiations stalled again, and SAF withdrew from the talks, pointing to the RSF’s failed commitment to the Jeddah declaration. Cooperation between the AU and UN envoys remains difficult on the Sudan file. So-called “proximity talks” (i.e. indirect) talks set up by UN Special Envoy Ramtane Lamamra did not bring a breakthrough. Finally, a draft resolution in the UN Security Council co-signed by the UK and Sierra Leone, that would have asked the UN Secretary-General to develop a compliance mechanism for the protection of civilians and called for a cessation of hostilities, was vetoed by Russia in November 2024.

The fractured nature of the warring parties has been a major challenge. The mediation efforts failed to sufficiently account for the complex dynamics within the conflict parties as well as between them and their external backers, including in response to the situation on the battlefield. Competition between would-be mediators allowed Sudanese warring parties to decline invitations, withdraw from negotiations, and to avoid making compromises that could fracture their coalitions of militias, regular forces and mercenaries.

Learning from the Friends of Sudan experience

On April 15, 2025, British Foreign Secretary David Lammy is hosting a ministerial conference on Sudan in London, organised with Germany, France and the European Union. Lammy has vowed to make Sudan a foreign policy priority. The conference is billed as a follow-up to a similar conference in Paris a year earlier, which was co-hosted by the EU, France and Germany, all three of which will co-convene the London meeting with the UK as well. In contrast to Paris, there won’t be a humanitarian pledging element, nor will there be a parallel meeting of Sudanese civilian actors. Instead, the UK will convene around 20 foreign ministers and representatives of international organizations. Better coordination among this group is a central objective.

In doing so, the UK should reflect on the experience of previous coordination mechanisms on Sudan. For decades, the UK was itself part of the Troika (with the US and Norway), which supported negotiations to end Sudan’s Second Civil war and South Sudan’s path to independence in 2011, among other issues. However, the Troika doesn’t appear to be an appropriate grouping on Sudan any longer, given the drastic aid cuts by the US and the Trump administration’s disregard for multilateralism and preference of optics over lasting results.

After the fall of Sudan’s thirty-year dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the UK was also part of the Friends of Sudan. This was an informal diplomatic group, co-founded by Germany and the US, whose primary purpose was to support Sudan’s transition process. Notably, it included also Egypt, the UAE, Saudi-Arabia, Qatar and the AU, among others. For a while, the Friends of Sudan met regularly at the level of Sudan envoys or senior officials, focusing mainly on coordinating the economic and financial support to the transitional government, including debt relief and setting up a cash transfer program for the parts of the population hit hard by the withdrawal of subsidies and high inflation. After the coup in October 2021, it lost its civilian Sudanese counterpart, and it petered out once the war started and the Sudanese authorities pushed out the UN mission – which had taken over a regular convening role of the Friends of Sudan – a few months later.

Key issues going forward

None of the mediation initiatives so far did have any major impact. Four points will be critical if any new diplomatic coordination mechanism is to even have the chance to influence events in Sudan. 

First, any high-profile conference on Sudan needs to have a link to Sudanese civilian actors. UK diplomats held meetings with Sudanese civil society in the Horn of Africa and the British Director General of African Affairs spoke with the authorities in Port Sudan to collect their perspectives. Still, Sudanese will always question the legitimacy of an international Sudan conference without any Sudanese present. The Paris conference organized a roundtable of around 50 people that represented different types of stakeholders, not just one civilian coalition. Attendees told me that they found it useful, because it had been rare for those diverse perspectives to be in the same room since the start of the war.

Second, any coordination mechanism resulting from the London conference should be nimble and relatively informal. There needs to be some agreement on who to include and how frequently to convene them, but perhaps not much more. It is unlikely to develop strong agency for joint actions. The main multilateral organizations – the UN, the AU, IGAD, perhaps the EU – should be in the lead, if they can be made to act jointly. Like-minded actors need to focus on tangible support to the Sudanese population, especially in light of the massive aid cuts by the US and other countries. While they won’t be able to fill all gaps, they should concentrate on stepping in to fully support the appeal of the Emergency Response Rooms, mutual aid networks. To function, this initiative would need 12 m USD per month, hardly any of which they have received so far. This won’t be enough – the UN appeals for Sudan and the neighboring countries are around 6 bn USD for 2025 – but the ERRs work particularly in areas hardly reached by international aid, where the risk of starvation is among the greatest.

Third, a new diplomatic group as well as the London conference should refrain from normalizing external interference. The Paris conference included a joint communiqué that urged “all foreign actors to cease providing armed support or materiel to the warring parties”. Egypt and the UAE signed this statement – yet, they have continued their support to SAF and RSF. If they were able to sign onto a similar statement, they could do so confident that a lack of commitment would remain without consequences. The foreign ministers present at the meeting should hold these foreign sponsors accountable for supporting warring parties. They should single out the UAE in particular because of their support to the RSF, as described by U.S. Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs, citing a US government briefing. Just this weekend, the RSF captured Zam-Zam camp, Sudan’s biggest displacement camp, after besieging it and neighbouring El-Fasher for many months. The RSF operates advanced drones and artillery to attack El-Fasher and Zam-Zam camp, which it most likely acquired from abroad. 

Finally, those international actors that have not picked a side in Sudan’s devastating civil war should not do so now. Normalizing relations with SAF-led authorities in Port Sudan won’t help people trapped in RSF-held areas nor will it help end the war. Assembling in London, foreign ministers will call global attention to the catastrophe that is the war in Sudan. Outrage without any of these actions would just underline their collective weakness. It is time to take responsibility. 

Die Gewalt gegen die Zivilbevölkerung in Sudan ist leider kein Einzelfall

Interview mit NDR Info, 15.April 2025.

Ein baldiger Frieden sei nicht in Sicht. Sowohl Armee als auch RSF greifen Zivilisten gezielt an, sagt Gerrit Kurz von der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.

“The wars in Sudan and South Sudan are increasingly intertwined”

Comments on the war in South Sudan, EFE Agency, 4 April 2025

“The wars in Sudan and South Sudan are increasingly intertwined, and each side is likely to support armed actors in the other territory,” I tell Spanish media.

…

Kurtz says that although “there is no solid evidence” that the Sudanese Army supports the White Army or groups linked to the South Sudanese opposition, “there are strong historical ties” between the Sudanese military and Machar.

However, he points out that the Sudanese Army “has an interest in preventing the South Sudanese government from allowing the RSF to operate in South Sudanese territory and receive weapons” through the neighbouring country, especially after the agreement between the paramilitaries and SPLM-N, Kiir’s ally.

The Sudanese military dome is also concerned about the opening of an UAE hospital in Madhol, in northern South Sudan, as they “suspect it could be used as a concentration point for RSF supplies, as well as for the treatment of its soldiers,” as happened with the Emirati medical centre in Amdjarass (Chad).

…
Although the expert points to a growing interconnection of both crises, he recalls that “neither the Sudanese or South Sudanese parties have much resources, they are unlikely to act as major material sponsors.”

Added to this is Uganda’s participation and the influence of the Emirates in the area, so “it is absolutely possible that the conflict will become increasingly regional.”

“But we are not seeing two clear blocks, but rather a complex tangle of contradictions,” he says.

Horn von Afrika: Die Zivilgesellschaft wird weiter geschwächt

Beitrag in: Nadine Biehler (Koord.), US ohne AID?, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 04.04.2025 (360 Grad)

Am Horn von Afrika sind die USA bislang der größte Geber gewesen, sowohl in der klassischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als auch in der humanitären Hilfe. 45 Prozent der Mittel für die von den Vereinten Nationen (UN) koordinierte Hilfe für Sudan, die weltweit größte humanitäre Krise, kamen im vergangenen Jahr aus den USA. 

Hilfsorganisationen berichten, dass sie zwar Ausnahmen von den Kürzungen erhielten, die Mittel jedoch nicht bei ihnen ankommen, weil das Zahlungssystem von USAID nicht mehr funktioniert. Die Konsequenzen bekommt vor allem die Zivilbevölkerung zu spüren. Diese steht in einer von Konflikten, Klimaveränderungen, schwacher Infrastruktur und Repression geprägten Region ohnehin unter massivem Druck. Drei zentrale Folgen lassen sich identifizieren: 

Erstens wird die extreme humanitäre Not weiter steigen. In Sudan herrscht bereits jetzt in wahrscheinlich zehn Gebieten eine Hungersnot. Ohne zusätzliche Mittel dürfte sich die Hungersnot auf weitere Teile des Landes ausbreiten. Rund 30 Millionen Sudanes:innen sind auf humanitäre Hilfe angewiesen, aber nur ein Teil wird sie bekommen. Dies betrifft nicht nur Lebensmittel. In der äthiopischen Region Tigray zum Beispiel musste eine Organisation ihre psychosoziale Hilfe für Opfer sexueller Gewalt abrupt einstellen. Dies kann das Trauma der Überlebenden verstärken.

Zweitens drohen die US-Kürzungen, den zivilgesellschaftlichen Sektor am Horn von Afrika massiv zu schwächen. Dies betrifft nicht nur Organisationen in Feldern wie Gesundheit und Ernährung, sondern auch solche, die sich für Frieden, Menschenrechte und Demokratie einsetzen. So mussten in Äthiopien 85 Prozent aller zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ihre Arbeit einstellen. In den vergangenen Monaten standen diese ohnehin unter Druck: Einigen wurde die Lizenz entzogen, andere wurden zeitweise verboten oder ihre Führung ausgetauscht. In Südsudan könnten 60 Prozent des Mediensektors kollabieren, einschließlich der Radiosender in lokalen Sprachen. Dies verschärft die ohnehin unzuverlässige Nachrichtenlage in einer Situation, in der falsche Gerüchte schnell bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen anheizen.

Drittens könnte der Ausfall internationaler Unterstützung zwar langfristig die dringend nötige Lokalisierung humanitärer Hilfe beschleunigen – kurzfristig ist jedoch das Gegenteil der Fall. So mussten rund 80 Prozent der Gemeinschaftsküchen im Sudan, die von Selbsthilfenetzwerken mithilfe von US-Mitteln betrieben wurden, schließen. Die Diaspora unterstützt diese Netzwerke ebenfalls, kann den Wegfall aber kurzfristig nicht kompensieren. Europäische Geber, die ebenfalls ihre Mittel zurückfahren, sollten sich darauf konzentrieren, solche Selbsthilfenetzwerke und lokale Helfer stärker zu unterstützen. 

„Ein ignorierter Krieg“

Diktator Omar al-Baschir hat den Sudan 30 Jahre lang unterjocht. Als er 2019 gestürzt wurde, schienen Demokratie und Frieden in dem afrikanischen Land zum Greifen nah. Doch nun herrscht ein blutiger Bürgerkrieg. Er hat eine Vorgeschichte.

“Der Rest ist Geschichte”, Deutschlandfunk, 3.April 2025

Photo: President Kagame, President Omar al Bashir and Thabo Mbeki during Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa – Ethiopia, 20 April 2013

Die Rückeroberung des Präsidentenpalasts in Khartum

Im Podcast “Was jetzt” von DIE ZEIT ordne ich die Rückeroberung des Präsidentenpalasts in Khartum durch die Sudanesischen Streitkräfte (SAF) am 21.3.2025 ein.

Es ist ein großer Erfolg für das Militär. Das Regierungszentrum zurückzuerobern nach fast zwei Jahren Kontrolle durch die RSF hat einerseits symbolische Bedeutung, andererseits kann die bald anstehende Rückeroberung des gesamten Hauptstadtraums auch eine militärische Bedeutung für die weiteren Schritte der Armee haben.

Die Behörden in Port Sudan sollten diesen Sieg nutzen, jetzt auch mehr humanitäre Güter und Personal ins Land zu lassen.

Bild: SAF-Kämpfer vor dem Präsidentenpalast.

Horn of Africa: Time for preventive diplomacy

In both Ethiopia and South Sudan, conflicts are escalating again. To prevent further regionalisation of the conflict landscape, Europe should support high-level diplomacy, says Gerrit Kurtz.

SWP Point of View, 21 March 2025. Also available in German.

In the Horn of Africa, two peace processes are in acute danger: Local power struggles in South Sudan and Ethiopia’s Tigray region are at risk of escalating into regional crises. In South Sudan – as in 2013 at the beginning of the last civil war – a power struggle is raging over the possible successor to 73-year-old President Salva Kiir. He is already positioning his son-in-law as a potential replacement. At the same time, clashes between the White Army – a Nuer militia – and the South Sudanese army in the Upper Nile region are causing a stir after a United Nations helicopter was shot down and a high-ranking army general was killed.

During the civil war from 2013 to 2018, the White Army fought on the side of the main rebel group, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement-in Opposition (SPLA/M-IO) under today’s First Vice President Riek Machar. Tensions between Kiir and Machar are intensifying once again – a dangerous déjà vu for the country, which has barely had time to recover after decades of conflict.

Ethiopia: Split within the TPLF and growing tensions with Eritrea

In Ethiopia, a local power struggle in the Tigray region threatens to escalate into a regional crisis between the federal government in Addis Ababa and Eritrea. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – once Ethiopia’s ruling party and the Ethiopian government’s opponent in the war between 2020 and 2022 – is divided: A faction led by chairman Debretsion Gebremichael is opposed by a reformist faction under the president of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration, Getachew Reda. 

The Debretsion faction has large parts of the Tigrayan military on its side and has been taking over local administrative structures for months, sometimes violently. In the meantime, it has also brought media and parts of the administration in the provincial capital, Mekelle, under its control. The TPLF’s Debretsion faction is said to have good relations with Eritrea, whereas Getachew is counting on Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. Bilateral relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea have cooled markedly since the Pretoria Agreement, which ended the war between the TPLF and the government in 2022. Both countries are accused of supporting opponents of the other’s regime.

Due to the increasing tensions, there is a risk that there will be a regionalisation of the conflict landscape. Uganda has already sent troops to support the South Sudanese government, as it did in 2013. Similar to previous clashes, Sudanese actors are also intervening. Over the weekend, militias of the Rapid Support Forces in South Sudan were already fighting against units of the SPLA/M-IO, which were apparently on their way to receive weapons from the Sudanese Armed Forces.

Failure of the peace agreements – fragmented international engagement

The current escalations are no coincidence. The respective agreements to end the civil wars in South Sudan and Ethiopia have only been implemented to a limited degree. Unilateral deviations by both governments from their obligations have de facto prevailed. Kiir rapidly replaced cabinet members and had high-ranking generals of the SPLA/M-IO arrested. In Ethiopia, important measures of the Pretoria Agreement, such as the demobilisation of militias and the withdrawal of Eritrean and Amharic troops from Tigray, have largely failed to materialise. 

International engagement with the region is increasingly fragmented – as are the states of the region themselves. In Ethiopia, for example, there is a lack of credible guarantors for the peace process. At the recent extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on South Sudan, only two countries took part at the level of their president. Whereas the United States used to be the most important international partner for peace in the region, countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are now influential, but they tend to support certain sides rather than mediate in internal conflicts.

In view of the deteriorating situation, it is now time for high-level preventive diplomacy. A coordinated international approach could contain the escalation. An informal division of tasks would be conceivable: Influential countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia could defuse tensions at the intergovernmental level, while European actors could support IGAD and the African Union in local mediation processes.

Picture: In better times in 2019, President Salva Kiir met the head of the SPLA/M-IO, Riek Machar, in Juba, to prepare the government of national unity. Source: UN Photo/Isaac Billy

The Myth of the Gamechanger: Drones and Military Power in Africa

Advanced combat drones are increasingly used in conflicts in Africa. This analysis of the conflicts in Mali, Chad and Sudan shows, their potential to shift the balance of military power between state forces and insurgents depends on symmetrical access to technology, type of warfare and topography.

Megatrends Policy Brief 33, 05.03.2025, zusammen mit Wolfram Lacher und Denis Tull

Medium-altitude long-endurance combat drones are increasingly appearing in armed conflicts in Africa. In contexts where governments have historically possessed little or no air power, some expect drones to change the balance of military power between state and non-state forces. But is this actually
the case? This Policy Brief examines the role played by drones in recent conflicts in Mali, Chad and Sudan, finding three aspects to be particularly relevant. Firstly, access: does one conflict party enjoy privileged access to drones and interception technology? Secondly, is the fighting regular or irregular? Are both sides holding territory and fighting on definable fronts, or is it a guerrilla war? Thirdly, is the terrain open or covered? Are the distances involved within the range of available drones? In Africa’s theatres of conflict these factors rarely combine in ways that allow one side to derive a major strategic advantage from the use of combat drones.

Photo: Likely Chinese-made MALE UAV on Nyala airfield, Sudan, January 2025. Source: Maxar/ Humanitarian Research Lab at Yale School of Public Health